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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2-2(3) (i) and challenges the Judgment and Decree executed by 
the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County on or about 
August 24, 1987, which was duly filed and entered on September 4, 
1987 and challenges the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered and filed on the same dates. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal presents the following issues for resolution: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that a letter 
written by Mr. Dean Mixon on February 18, 1985, which was 
dispatched no later than February 21
 f 1985, was not a valid, 
timely acceptance of Respondents" offer to purchase Appellants1 
shares in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., so as to require DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY to release funds placed in escrow to Appellants? 
2. Did Mr. Mixon1s letter of February 18f 1985, contain any 
new conditions, in addition to those which were already a part of 
the contract, which amounted to a counteroffer requiring 
Respondents• acceptance ? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case presented on appeal seeks to uphold a contract 
between the CRANES and Respondents LEISURE SPORTS, INC. , 
(hereinafter LEISURE SPORTS), HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., (hereinafter HEART MARKETING), and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, 
LTD., (hereinafter TIMBERBROOK) so as to require Respondent DIXIE 
TITLE COMPANY (hereinafter DIXIE TITLE) to release funds held in 
escrow to the CRANES. 
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On June 26, 1985, CLIFFORD AND BONNIE CRANE filed a 
Complaint in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, 
State of Utahf seeking specific performance of an agreement for 
the sale of their limited partnership interest in TIMBERBROOK to 
HEART MARKETING and LEISURE SPORTS and requesting that the courts 
aid in forcing DIXIE TITLE to relinquish documents and monies 
held in escrow to CRANES. At this time the CRANES also requested 
that alternative damages, interest, and attorney fees be awarded. 
(R. 001) 
On July 29, 1985f all Respondents answered the Complaint by 
way of general denial of the allegations and by asserting that no 
deal was in fact consummated inasmuch as the CRANES supposedly 
changed the terms of the agreement and Respondents withdrew their 
original offer. (R. 030f 033f 036, 040) DIXIE TITLE 
specifically claimed to be a neutral party, but asserted its 
inability to release the escrowed documents and monies until all 
conditions of the escrow had been fulfilled. (R., 036) LEISURE 
SPORTS also counterclaimed against the CRANES alleging it had 
been damaged as a result of the CRANES1 wrongful claim. (R. 040) 
Respondents also sought an award of costs and reasonable attorney 
fees. (R. 030, 033, 036, 040) 
On August 12, 1985, the CRANES replied to LEISURE SPORTS1 
counterclaim by general denial and by asserting that any damage 
caused by their claim was the result of LEISURE SPORTS' own 
actions. The CRANES further affirmatively asserted the matters 
set forth in their Complaint and the fact that LEISURE SPORTS had 
failed to mitigate its damages. (R. 075) 
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On October 2, 1986, Judge J. Harlan Burns signed a Pretrial 
Order in this case which was filed on October 7, 1986 which 
further delineated the issues to be considered at trial, (R. 
184) 
On January 23, 1987f Respondents filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment claiming that there were no remaining issues of material 
fact and that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law inasmuch as the CRANES had imposed new conditions in their 
attempted acceptance, which act voided the Respondents1 offer and 
constituted a counterclaim, (R. 206 and 210) 
On or about February 2f 1987f the CRANES filed an affidavit 
and memorandum opposing Respondents1 motion. (R. 238 and 248) 
An addendum to the memorandum was also filed on or about February 
3, 1987. (R. 266) 
The trial court entered its Memorandum Ruling on Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment on March 9f 1987, which ruling denied 
the motion on the basis that genuine issues of fact remained for 
resolution at the time of trial. (R. 276) 
Trial in this matter was commenced on August 4, 1987 and 
concluded on August 5f 1987, with the Court finding for 
Respondents and against the CRANES. (R. 301) 
On August 24, 1987f the Court entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, which were filed on September 4, 1987, by 
which the Court expressed its conclusions that no contract had 
been formed prior to the Respondents1 revocation of their offer 
and that the CRANES1 attempted acceptance was too late, and 
constituted a counteroffer which Respondents had rejected. The 
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Court concluded that Respondent's counterclaim should be 
dismissed upon Respondents1 noted acquiescence. (R. 305) 
The Court entered its Judgment and Decree in accordance with 
these findings on August 24, 1987 and the same was filed on 
September 4, 1987. 
Notice of Appeal was filed by the CRANES, acting through 
counsel, on October 1, 1987r by which the CRANES challenge the 
conclusions of the trial court that no contract was formed, that 
their acceptance was too late, and that such acceptance added new 
terms to the agreement and thereby became a counteroffer. (R. 
320) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, is a Utah limited partnership which is 
in the business of real estate development and sales in southern 
Utah. (Findings of Fact 1(2) HEART MARKETING, is a Utah 
corporation which serves as general or managing partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. (Findings of Fact 1[3) LEISURE SPORTS, is 
also a Utah corporation. (Findings of Fact 1(3) Mr. Barry Church 
is the President of HEART MARKETING as well as LEISURE SPORTS. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, page 231) Mr. Russell Gallian is a shareholder of 
LEISURE SPORTS. (Tr. Vol. 1, page 255) 
CLIFFORD CRANE, is a limited partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, 
owning twenty-five percent (25%) of the partnership interest. 
(Findings of Fact 112) California, where the CRANES reside, is a 
"community property" state. 
In November, 1984, the CRANES reached in principle an oral 
agreement with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, which was 
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to be reduced to writing by Russell Gallian, for the sale of 
CLIFFORD CRANE'S limited partnership interests. (Findings of 
Fact H4) Pursuant to the agreement, LEISURE SPORTS and HEART 
MARKETING placed $175,000 in escrow in reliance upon their belief 
that a deal had been struck and two separate agreements were 
prepared by Mr. Gallian and forwarded to the CRANES on November 
13f 1984. (Findings of Fact 1[s 6, 7) 
One agreement outlines the sale of a five percent (5%) 
interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE TO LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for 
Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums. (Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 8) This property was encumbered by an existing 
construction loan with Nebraska Savings and Loan Association and 
conveyance was to be made subject thereto, but title later was to 
be cleared. (Tr. Vol. 2, page 19) Attached to the agreement was 
an Assignment of Limited Partnership Interest. (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 8) 
The other agreement recited provisions which would transfer 
a twenty percent (20%) interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE from 
Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE to LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for the 
sum of One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($175f000). 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9) Attached to this agreement was a second 
Assignment of Partnership Interest conveying Plaintiffs' interest 
to LEISURE SPORTS. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9) 
On February 13f 1985f the CRANES executed both these 
agreements and deposited them with their California attorney, Mr. 
Dean Mixon. (Findings of Fact 1112) Mr. Mixon dictated a letter 
of transmittal on February 18, 1985, to accompany the documents. 
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(Findings of Fact 1(13) The letter and the documents were sent 
to DIXIE TITLE, the escrow agent for the transaction, on February 
21, 1985. (Findings of Fact 1[13) The postmark of this letter 
clearly indicates that it was placed in the mail on February 21, 
1985. (Findings of Fact 1113; Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 19A) 
The letter instructed DIXIE TITLE to proceed in closing the 
transactions with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK as soon as 
confirmation was received from Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association that Plaintiffs had been released of their 
obligations by acceptance of a Substitution of Guarantor 
agreement entered between that Association and Russell J. 
Gallian, Chairman of the Board of Directors of LEISURE SPORTS 
(Substitution of Guarantor was dated November 20, 1984). 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19A) 
The February 18th letter contained the following language: 
There are three conditions to closing from our 
side: 
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the 
original of the above-referenced affirmation 
and warranty by Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association; 
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a 
fully executed Warranty Deed to Unit 210, 
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums; 
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum 
of $175,000 into my client's account at Home 
Savings of America, 179 N. Tustin, Orange, 
California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3. 
If the above-referenced closing does not occur 
by Friday, March 8, 1985, you are instructed 
to return all documents to me and to terminate 
the escrow. If you have any question or 
comment, please do not hesitate to call. 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 19A) 
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The trial court found, however, that despite the fact that 
an oral agreement had been reached in principle in November, 
1984, the parties continued to act as though negotiations were in 
process. (Findings of Fact Ks 4f 9f 10). In this lightf the 
court determined that the CRANES considered the sales agreements 
merely an offer which they were free to accept or reject and not 
a memorialization of a binding agreement. (Findings of Fact 1[17) 
Mr. Gallianf as representative of Respondents, considered the 
status of the dealings in the same posture. (Findings of Fact 
1(18) 
The trial court further concluded that because Mr. Mixon's 
letter of February 18 was not received into escrow on the morning 
of February 22 when, by telephone, Mr. Gallian informed Mr. CRANE 
that the deal was off, no contract was formed. (Findings of Fact 
Ks 14, 16) This conclusion was reached despite the court's 
finding that the letter was postmarked on February 21, 1985. 
(Findings of Fact 1fl3) 
Furthermore, despite its finding that agreement had been 
reached in November 1984, concerning the "transfer of money, 
release of the Plaintiffs from the guarantee of a construction 
loan, preparation of a deed by the Defendants, and the 
preparation and completion of two assignments by the Plaintiffs," 
(Findings of Fact 1[5) , the trial court went on to find that the 
letter of February 18 "which accompanied Exhibits P-8 and P-9, 
and deposited in escrow, in fact, only conditionally accepted the 
outstanding offer and requiring (sic) that Defendants submit yet 
additional documents into escrow." (Findings of Fact 1[19) The 
-7-
court determined that the letter "created a counteroffer 
requiring the Defendants to supply a new document not previously 
part of the offer, that document being a verification of the 
authenticity of the release of the Plaintiffs from the 
construction loan on Timberbrook Village, Ltd. (Findings of Fact 
1119) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the letter 
written by Mr. Dean Mixon on February 18, 1985, which was 
dispatched no later than February 21, 1985f was not a validf 
timely acceptance of Respondents1 offer to purchase Appellants1 
shares in Timberbrook Villagef Ltd., so as to require Dixie Title 
Company to release funds placed in escrow to Appellants. The 
court should have concluded that a valid and binding contract was 
consummated no later than February 21, 1985 when Mr. Mixon1 s 
letter was placed in the United States Post Office. 
The "conditions" contained in Mr. Mixon1s letter were 
implied in the original contract and as such could not be 
considered a counteroffer which Respondents were free to accept 
or reject. In other wordsf a request to see the original 
Substitution of Guarantor was not a material variance from the 
anticipated construction loan release. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A 
LETTER WRITTEN BY MR. DEAN MIXON ON FEBRUARY 
18 , 1985, WHICH WAS DISPATCHED NO LATER THAN 
FEBRUARY 21, 1985
 f WAS NOT A VALID, TIMELY 
ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONDENTS' OFFER TO PURCHASE 
APPELLANTS' SHARES IN TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, 
LTD., SO AS TO REQUIRE DIXIE TITLE COMPANY TO 
RELEASE FUNDS PLACED IN ESCROW TO APPELLANTS. 
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The trial court committed reversible error by ignoring its 
own conclusion of fact that the letter of February 18, 1985, 
which was postmarked on February 21, 1985, constituted a valid 
and timely acceptance of Respondents' offer to contract for the 
sale of Mr. CRANE'S limited partnership interest. The law of 
contracts makes this error strikingly clear: 
For the purpose of consummating the 
contract. . .where the offer is made by mail 
or otherwise contemplates and authorizes an 
ac eptance by mail, the acceptance dates from 
the time the letter of acceptance is duly 
mailed, without regard to the time of its 
receipt or whether it is in fact received. In 
such cases, the courts, upon balancing 
conveniences and inconveniences, have deemed 
it more consistent with the purpose and 
intention of the parties to consider the 
contract complete and absolutely binding on 
the the transmission of the acceptance through 
the post as the medium of communication which 
the parties themselves contemplate, instead of 
postponing its completion until the acceptance 
has been received by the offeror. By treating 
the post office as the agency of both parties, 
the courts have managed to harmonize the legal 
notion that it is necessary that the minds of 
the parties meet with the equally 
well-established principle that the 
determination to accept is ineffectual if not 
communicated either actually or by legal 
implication. 
77 AmJur2d, Vendor and Purchaser §22. 
Accordingly, where acceptance by mail is 
authorized, the contract is completed- ^at the 
moment the acceptor deposits in the post 
office the letter of acceptance directed to 
the offeror's proper address and with the 
postage prepaid, provided he does so within 
the proper time and before receiving any 
intimation of the revocation of the offer. It 
follows that, in such a case, it is immaterial 
whether the letter of acceptance actually 
reaches the offeror. 
17 AmJur2d, Contracts §48. 
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This rule of lawf otherwise known as the "mailbox rule", has 
been uniformly accepted throughout the various jurisdiction of 
the United States as is indicated by Williston's statements that 
"it was early decided that the contract was complete upon the 
mailing of the acceptance," and that "the law is so well settled 
as to make discussion academic." Selections From Williston on 
Contracts, Acceptance of Offers §81. Professor Corbin adds to 
our understanding of the rationale underlying this principle: 
Where the parties are negotiating at a 
distance from each other, the most common 
method of making an offer is by sending it by 
mail; and more often than not the offeror has 
specified no particular mode of acceptance. 
In such a case, it is now the prevailing rule 
that the offeree has power to accept and close 
the contract by mailing a letter of 
acceptance, properly stamped and addressed, 
within a reasonable time. The contract is 
regarded as made at the time and place that 
the letter of acceptance is put into the 
possession of the post office department. 
• * * 
When an offer is by mail and the acceptance 
also is by mail, the contract must date either 
from the mailing of the acceptance or from its 
receipt. In either case, one of the parties 
will be bound by the contract without being 
actually aware of that fact. . '. The 
business community could no doubt adjust 
itself to either rule; but the rule throwing 
the risk on the offeror has the merit of 
closing the deal more quickly and enabling 
performance more promptly. . . . Also it is 
the offeror who as invited the acceptance. 
* * * 
An offeror can always so word his offer and so 
limit the power of acceptance as to make the 
receipt of the acceptance necessary to the 
creation of a contract. 
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Corbin on Contracts, Acceptance by Mail or Wire §78. 
The Supreme Court of the state of Utah does "not question 
these general principles of contract formation." Parks 
Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1982). 
There can be no doubt under the facts of the present case 
that the parties were dealing with each other at a considerable 
distance, the Respondents residing in Utah and* the CRANES in 
California. In fact, the documents which constituted LEISURE 
SPORTS and HEART MARKETING'S offer were transmitted by mail from 
St. George, Utah, to Santa Ana, California. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 
7) Furthermore, the letter accompanying these documents clearly 
invites acceptance by mail as the following paragraph 
demonstrates: 
Enclosed you will find documents which you 
should execute and send to the closing agent 
in connection with your sale of your Limited 
Partnership interest in Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. The closing agent is Dixie Title Co. 
Inc. , 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah, 
84770 (a self addressed envelope is enclosed 
for your convenienceK (Emphasis added) 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7) 
There is absolutely no indication here or -in any written or 
implied escrow agreement concluded between these parties that 
would indicate that receipt of the acceptance was to supplant the 
traditional and well accepted principles of contract law. Yet, 
the trial court found that: 
.the agreement states, as do the cover 
letters of Gallian, said agreements were to be 
executed and delivered by the Plaintiffs in 
escrow to complete their end of the 
transaction. The Court finds that this event 
had not occurred when Mr. Crane had been told, 
as had Mr. Westbrook, by Mr. Gallian that the 
deal was off. 
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(Findings of Fact 1(16) This conclusion is totally incorrect and 
unsubstantiated by the evidence produced at trial. 
Fully supported, however, by documentation produced at trial 
is the fact that the CRANES'' letter of acceptance, written and 
sent by their California attorney, Mr. Mixon, was postmarked on 
February 21, 1985, prior to the time when Mr. Gallian attempted 
to revoke the offer on February 22 of the same year. (Findings 
of Fact 1fl3) In other words, the CRANES fully complied with the 
express requirements to "execute and send" the documents which 
had been forwarded to them prior to Respondents1 attempted 
revocation. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18) 
The demonstrated facts of this case, the trial court's own 
Findings of Fact, and the law of contracts demand that this Court 
reach the conclusion that Mr. Mixon1s letter of February 18, 
1985, constituted a valid and timely acceptance to Respondents' 
continuing offer and, this being the case, DIXIE TITLE should be 
required to release the funds in escrow, along with interest, to 
the CRANES. 
POINT II 
THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN MR. MIXON'S LETTER 
OF FEBRUARY 18
 r 1985, WERE IMPLIED IN THE 
ORIGINAL CONTRACT AND AS SUCH COULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED A COUNTEROFFER WHICH RESPONDENTS 
WERE FREE TO ACCEPT OR REJECT. 
In reaching a conclusion that "Mixon1 s cover letter on 
behalf of Plaintiffs created a counteroffer requiring the 
Defendants to supply a new document not previously part of the 
offer. . .", the trial misconstrued the nature of the essential 
facts as well as the law of contracts pertaining to offer and 
acceptance. (Findings of Fact 1(19) 
The general rule is that for an offer and 
acceptance to constitute a contract, the 
acceptance must meet and correspond with the 
offer in every respect. The corollary of this 
rule is that any material variance between 
offer and and acceptance precludes formation 
of a contract. (Citations omitted) 
* * * 
However, if the condition added by the 
intended acceptance can be implied in the 
original offer, then it does not constitute a 
material variance so as to make the acceptance 
ineffective. 
Northwest Properties Agency, Inc. v. McGhee, 462 P.2d 249, 253 
(Wash.App. 1969); see also, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. 
Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1981); Pravorne v. McLeod, 383 
P.2d 855, 857 (Nev. 1963); 17 AmJur2d, Contracts, §64. 
Furthermore, it has been stated that "sometimes an acceptor 
from abundance of caution inserts a condition in his acceptance 
which merely express what would be implied in fact or in law from 
the offer. As such a condition involves no qualification of the 
acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer, a contract is not 
precluded." Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 NC 595, 146 SE2d 802, 16 
ALR3d 1416, 1421 (N.C. 1966) 
Moreover, although the offeree expressly 
qualifies his acceptance by making it a 
condition thereof that he is to have a right 
to which he would by law have been entitled if 
his acceptance had been absolute in terms, 
there being no reference to such right in the 
offer, it seems that the acceptance is in 
reality absolute, does not vary from the 
offer, and operates to form a contract." 
17 AmJur2d, Contracts, §64. 
The facts of the present case make it abundantly clear that 
Mr. Mixon's letter of February 18, 1985, though sounding 
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conditional, requested nothing more than that which was intended 
by the parties throughout their negotiations and that which would 
be implied by law. The letter contained the following language: 
There are three conditions to closing from our 
side: 
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the 
original of the above-referenced affirmation 
and warranty by Nebraska Savings & Loan 
Association; 
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a 
fully executed Warranty Deed to Unit 210, 
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums; 
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum 
of $175,000 into my clients account at Home 
Savings of American, 179 N. Tustin, Orange, 
California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3. 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18) 
It is important to note that the trial court considered only 
the first of these supposed "conditions" to be a new addition: 
The Court further finds that the letter of 
Dean Mixon of February 18th, 1985, which 
accompanied Exhibits P-8 and P-9, and 
deposited in escrow, in fact, only 
conditionally accepted the outstanding offer 
and requiring that Defendants submit yet 
additional documents into escrow. As a 
result, the Court finds that Mixon1s cover 
letter on behalf of Plaintiffs created a 
counteroffer requiring the Defendants to 
supply a new document not previously part of 
the offer, that document being a verification 
of the authenticity of the release of the 
Plaintiffs from construction loan on 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd. 
(Findings of Fact 1(19) 
Given the facts and evidence as produced during the course 
of proceedings in this case, it is impossible to justify the 
court's conclusion. During the course of negotiations, the 
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parties specifically agreed that Mr. CRANE was to be released 
from the obligations he had incurred as a guarantor of a 
construction loan with Nebraska Savings & Loan in connection with 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. (Tr. 69, 257) In fact, Mr. Gallian 
specifically testified that "we had agreed with Mr. Crane to 
obtain a novation where he would be released from the loans and 
someone else would replace him. That turned out to be me." (Tr. 
257) 
When Mr. Gallian forwarded the written agreement to the 
CRANES for signature, he did not enclosed anything which amounted 
to a release of from the construction loan. (Tr. 72) It was not 
until much later, February 11, 1985, that a "copy" of a 
"Substitution of Guarantor" was sent to Mr. Mixon. (Plaintiffs1 
Exhibits 12 and 14) Though the copy of the Substitution of 
Guarantor appeared to be signed by Mr. Gallian and Mr. Dewey 
Crouch on behalf of Nebraska Savings and Loan it was not 
notarized nor authenticated in any manner whatsoever. (Tr. 84; 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 14) 
At this point, out of an "abundance of caution" Mr. Mixon 
included a request in his letter that the original of the 
above-referenced substitution be produced for inspection. 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18). Given the substance and nature of the 
transactions under consideration it can hardly be said that such 
a request was a material alteration of the agreement. When 
hundreds of thousands of dollars are at stake, it is only 
reasonable that something more than an unnotarized, 
unauthenticated photocopy be produced. This is particularly true 
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where neither the CRANES nor Mr. Mixon were acquainted with Mr. 
Dewey Crouchf the signator for Nebraska Savings and Loan. (Tr. 
85) 
The reasonableness of Mr. Mixon1s request is reflected in 
the law of novations which requires that "all the parties 
concerned must agreef and in the absence of such agreement or 
consent a novation cannot be affected." 58 AmJur2d, Novation 
§16f see also; Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rider, 42 P.2d 842, 
843 (Okl. 1935). 
The facts and circumstances surrounding this case, indicate 
that the trial court was mistaken in reaching a conclusion that a 
request to see the original Substitution of Guarantor was a 
material variance from that which was anticipated by the parties 
throughout the course of negotiations. With this in mind this 
Court should overturn the ruling of the lower court and require 
DIXIE TITLE to release funds held in escrow along with all 
accrued interest to the CRANES. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Court considers this appeal, the CRANES respectfully 
urge it to conclude that the trial court has mistakenly 
interpreted the rules of contract law by finding that no contract 
was consummated, despite the fact that a letter of acceptance was 
deposited with the United States Post Office prior to 
Respondents1 attempted revocation. Furthermore, the Court should 
find that a request to see something more than an unnotarized, 
unauthenticated photocopy of a novation was not a material 
variance to the agreement which was sufficient to reach a 
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conclusion that the same constituted a counteroffer capable of 
being rejected by the Respondents, 
If the Court reaches these conclusions, the CRANES also 
respectfully request that the Court vacate the decision of the 
trial court and remand with instructions to enter a proper 
judgment which requires DIXIE TITLE to disburse the $175,000, 
along with all appropriate interest, held in escrow to them and 
that they be awarded costs on appeal and reasonable attorneys 
fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l~7ft- day of April, J.988. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four (4) full, true and 
correct copies of the above and foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to 
Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney for Respondents, of THOMPSON, 
HUGHES & REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, Utah 84770 this /~^C.day of April 1988. 
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78-2-1 5 JUDICIAL CODE 
Membership on state law library board, Qualifications of justices, Utah Const, Art 
§ 37-1-1 VIII, Sec 7 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, Retirement, Utah Const, Art VIII, Sec 15, 
§ 78 7 21 $49 7a-1 et seq , §§ 78-7 29, 78-7-30 
Salary, Utah Const, Art VIII, Sec 14 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts Key Numbers. — Courts «=» 101, 248, 
§§ 67, 68 Judges «=. 1, 7 to 12 
C.J.S. — 21 C J S Courts § 465, 48A C J S 
Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85 
78-2-1.5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-2 1 5 (L 1969, ch justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch 182, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court § 4 
78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78 2 1 6 (L 1979, ch 
134, § 1, 1981, ch 156, § 1), relating to sala-
ries of justices, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch 
267, <* 2, effective July 1, 1982 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until J anu -
ary 1, 1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases oiigmatmg«in 
(l) the Public Service Commission; 
(n) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and 
(v) the state engineer, 
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a s tatute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony, and 
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(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 
1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
s tate law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: x 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(D a final judgment or decree of any court of record-holding a s ta tu te of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
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(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(0 taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch . 161, § 303. 
Amended effective January 1, 1988. — 
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 303 amends this section 
effective January 1, 1988. See catchline 
"Amendment Notes," below. 
Repea l s and E n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1986, 
ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, added Subsec-
tion (6). 
Cross-References . — Appeals from juve-
nile courts, § 78-3a-51. 










—District judge filling vacancy. 
—Newly elected justice. 
Scope of review. 
In genera l . 
Supreme Court is exclusive judge of its own 
jurisdiction. Nations) Bank v. Lewis, 13 Utah 
507, 45 P. 890 (1896). 
The Supreme Court is not a court of general 
original jurisdiction; it is a reviewing court. 
Nielsen v. Utah Nat'l Bank, 40 Utah 95, 120 P. 
211 (1911). 
Supreme Court can inquire into its own ju-
risdiction no matter how that question is called 
to its attention and regardless of whether par-
Certiorari, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4; 
U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of 
governor, § 77-6-3. 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35, 
20-15-14. 
Extraordinary writs, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Industrial commission orders, review of, 
§ 35-1-36. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 
Public service commission orders, exclusive 
jurisdiction to review, §§ 54-7-16 to 54-7-18. 
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of 
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19. 
Unemployment compensation decisions, re-
view of, § 35-4-10. 
ties desire it to do so. Woldberg v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929). 
Question of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to 
hear and determine «n appeal is one that can 
be raised by the court on its own motion. City 
of Logan City v. Blotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 P. 
333 (1929). 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
—Probate o r d e r s . 
Final orders in probate were appealable un-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
003 
SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
der former § 20-2-2, Code 1943. In re Cliffs 
Estate, 101 Utah 343, 122 P.2d 196 (1942). 
Cer t io ra r i . 
Even prior to express statutory authoriza-
tion, Supreme Court had original jurisdiction 
to issue a writ of certiorari. Young v. Cannon, 
2 Utah 560 (1880). 
Where district court exceeded its jurisdiction 
on appeal from justice of peace, Supreme Court 
had power by certiorari to review such jurisdic-
tional question, judgment not being reviewable 
by further appeal. Oregon Short Line R.R. v. 
District Court, 30 Utah 371, 85 P. 360 (1906). 
Supreme Court, and not justice thereof, was 
authorized to issue writ of certiorari, and stat-
ute, which conferred such power on justice of 
Supreme Court, had to give way to Constitu-
tion. Robinson v. District Court, 38 Utah 379, 
113 P. 1026 (1910). 
Supreme court can exercise a reasonable dis-
cretion in granting or refusing a writ of certio-
rari. Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279, 
125 P. 671 (1912). 
Original ju r i sd ic t ion . 
—Equity. 
Supreme Court no longer possesses any orig-
inal jurisdiction in equity cases; in making its 
own findings in such cases, the court acts 
merely as an appellate or reviewing tribunal. 
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128,158 P. 705 
(1916). 
—Ext r ao rd ina ry wr i t s . 
Even prior to express statutory authoriza-
tion, Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue 
writ of mandamus in a proper case. Maxwell v. 
Burton, 2 Utah 595 (1880). 
It did not necessarily follow from fact that 
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to is-
sue writs, enumerated in former Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, that it was court's duty to 
issue such writs in every instance merely on 
applications for them. State v. Booth, 21 Utah 
88, 59 P. 553 (1899). 
Former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4, in con-
ferring authority upon the Supreme Court to 
issue writs of prohibition, contemplated a writ 
having the same character and functions as the 
writ defined by the territorial statute then in 
existence. Barnes v. City of Lehi City, 74 Utah 
321, 279 P. 878 (1929). 
After remittitur had gone down to district 
court, Supreme Court did not have exclusive 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition in the 
cause. Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 
286, 289 P. 132 (1930). 
Where situation called for relief more nearly 
analogous to purpose of writ of mandamus 
rather than to writ of prohibition, and neither 
standing alone would bring about desired re-
sult, Supreme Court had authority to issue 
both writs of mandamus and prohibition. Child 
v. Ogden State Bank, 81 Utah 464, 20 P.2d 
599, 88 A.L.R. 1284 (1933). 
Whether district court had jurisdiction was 
not determinative of whether Supreme Court 
would entertain application for writ of prohibi-
tion; whether there was a plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy at law was determinative. 
Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P.2d 
213 (1941). 
Objections to jurisdiction of administrative 
tribunals are to be first presented to such tri-
bunal before applying to Supreme Court for a 
writ of prohibition. Furbreeders AgrL Coop. v. 
Wiesley, 102 Utah 601, 132 P.2d 384 (1942). 
Supreme Court's discretion was exercised in 
favor of making writ of prohibition permanent 
to prevent enforcement of city (now circuit) 
court criminal contempt judgment, as against 
contention that petitioner had plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy by appeal, where alleged 
contempt was not committed in presence of 
court or judge, and court did not acquire juris-
diction over either person of petitioner or of 
offense claimed because of absence of initiatory 
affidavit required by former § 104-45-3, so 
that contempt proceedings were void. Robinson 
v. Citv Court, 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 
(1947). 
R e h e a r i n g s . 
—District j u d g e filling vacancy . 
A district judge called to sit in lieu of dis-
qualified justice is a member of the court for all 
purposes so far as his right to participate in the 
case and in its decision and should sit in on a 
rehearing even after the vacancy is filled. In re 
Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 P. 103 
(1927). 
—Newly e lec ted jus t ice . 
Member of Supreme Court, elected after case 
had been decided, was not entitled to partici-
pate in consideration for rehearing. Cordner v. 
Cordner, 91 Utah 474, 64 P.2d 828 (1937). 
Scope of review. 
In original proceeding in Supreme Court to 
review proceedings of district court, Supreme 
Court will ignore mere irregularities or legal 
errors in trial court, and^would limit review to 
question of whether district court exceeded its 
jurisdiction or was without jurisdiction in mak-
ing and entering the judgment complained of. 
Jeffries v. Third Judicial District Court, 90 
Utah 525, 63 P.2d 242 (1936). 
Where no motion wasmade for directed ver-
dict or new trial, Supreme Court was precluded 
from reviewing sufficiency of evidence in cause 
at law, since under former Utah Const., Art 
VIII, Sec. 9 and predecessor of this section re-
view could be made only on questions of law. 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 
292, 470 P 2 d 393 (1970). 
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JOHN A. BUKKHEAD 
v 
LESTER M. FARLOW ct al. 
North Carolina Supreme Court -— March 2, 1966 
266 NC 595, 146 SE2d 802, 16 ALR3d 1416 
SUMMARY OF DECISION 
The vendee under an alleged contract for the sale of land instituted an 
action against the vendors for specific performance in the Superior Court, 
Randolph County, North Carolina, James F. Latham, J. An "Option of 
Purchase," which did not require payment or tender of the purchase price until 
delivery of the deed and acceptance of title, was accepted by the plaintiff, who 
stated that the money would be available when title examination was completed, 
but the defendants attempted to revoke the offer and refused to execute a 
deed. The trial court allowed the defendants' motion for judgment of nonsuit. 
On appeal by the plaintiff, the trial court's judgment was reversed by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina, which, in an opinion by Sharp, J., held, 
inter alia, that (1) an acceptance of an offer to sell land making no specifications 
or limitations as to title was not made conditional by including a provision re-
quiring marketable title, since merchantability was implied in a contract to 
convey land, absent an agreement to the contrary, and (2) the vendee's accept-
ance in the case at bar was unconditional, not specifying any requirement other 
than a good or marketable title. 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to ALR Digests 
Contracts §§ 93, 94 — option — withdrawal Trial § 249 — nonsuit^— consideration of 
— acceptance plaintiff's evidence 
1. An option to purchase realty, not under 2. In considering a motion for nonsuit, the 
seal and without consideration, is a mere plaintiff's evidence must be taken as true, 
oiler to sell which the vendors may withdraw-
al any time before acceptance, but after un- Contracts §§99 , 10$ — .written option — 
conditional acceptance, there is a valuable parol acceptance — statute of frauds 
consideration to support the contract. 3. A wiitten option offering to sell, at the 
SUBJECT O F ANNOTATION 
Beginning on page 1424 
Variance between ofTer and acceptance in regard to title as 
afTccting consummation of contract for sale of real property 
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election of the optionee, can become bind- one that he will be willing to accept; the 
ing on the owner by verbal notice to the fact that the title is not satisfactory to a 
owner, but a parol acceptance does not repel part icular purchaser or his attorney does not 
the statute of frauds and thus cannot bind necessarily mean that the title is, in fact, not 
the optionee. marketable. 
Contracts § 102 — unconditional acceptance 
4. T o consummate a valid contract an 
acceptance must be unconditional and must 
not change, add to, or qualify the terms of 
the offer. 
Contracts § 102 — acceptance of option — 
condition implied in fact or law 
5. An optionee's insertion in his accept-
ance of a condition which merely expresses 
that which would be implied in fact or in 
law by the offer does not preclude the con-
summation of the contract, since such a con-
dition involves no qualification of the ac-
ceptor's assent to the terms of the offer. 
Vendor and Purchaser §§ 38, 40 — market-
able title — reasonable doubt 
6. In any contract to convey land, unless 
the parties agree differently, the law implies 
an undertaking on the part of the vendor to 
convey a good or marketable title to the 
purchaser; a marketable title is one free 
from reasonable doubt in law or fact as tc 
its validity, and it must be one which can 
be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mort-
gaged to a person of reasonable prudence. 
Contracts § 102 — sale of land — accept-
ance — provision requiring marketable 
title 
7. Since, in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, merchantability is implied 
in a contract to convey land, the acceptance 
of an offer to sell land making no specifica-
tions or limitations as to title is not made 
conditional by including a provision requir-
ing marketable title. 
[Annotated] 
Vendor and Purchaser § 40.5 — marketable 
title — satisfaction of vendee or at torney 
8. Although the law implies an obligation 
on the part of the vendor to furnish a good 
or marketable title, it does not imply any 
obligation to furnish a title that will be 
satisfactory to the vendee or his attorney or 
Contracts § 102 — sale of land — accept-
ance — title satisfactory to vendee's 
at torney 
9. An acceptance of an offer to sell land 
which provides that the title must be satis-
factory to the buyer's attorney is a condi-
tional acceptance, imposing as a condition 
of the sale the approval of the vendee's 
lawyer as distinguished from the standard 
established by the law of furnishing a good 
or marketable title. 
[Annotated] 
Contracts § 102; Specific Performance § 27 
— option to purchase land — accept-
ance — marketable title 
10. A vendee's oral acceptance of an "Op-
tion of Purchase," stating that the money 
would be available when title examination 
was completed, is unconditional, not specify-
ing any requirement other than a good or 
marketable title, where the option did not 
require payment or tender oi the purchase 
price until delivery of the deed and accept-
ance of title, and no tender was required 
of the vendee, seeking specific performance, 
where the vendors attempted to revoke the 
offer after acceptance and refused to execute 
a deed. 
[Annotated] 
Vendor and Purchaser § 40.5 — merchant-
able title — opinion of vendee's at-
torney 
11. The opinion of the vendee's attorney 
that title to the property is not merchantable 
is not binding upon the Vendor, unless it is 
so stipulated in the contract. 
Specific Performance § 64 — sale of land — 
marketability of title — question for 
court 
12. Where the vendor seeks specific per-
formance and the vendee defends on the 
ground that the vendor's title is not good, 
marketability becomes a question for the 
court. 
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BRIEFS OF COUNSEL 
John Randolph Ingram, of Asheboro, for 
appellant: 
Plainti(T\s evidence shows a valid ofTer in 
writing signed by defendants to sell their 
land. ^ GS 22-2. 
A written memorandum, though it may l>c 
informal, must be sufficiently definite to 
show the essential elements of a valid con-
tract. It must embody the terms of the 
contract, names of vendor and vendee, and 
a description of the land to be conveyed, at 
least sufficiently definite to be aided by parol. 
Smith v Joyce, 214 N C 602, 200 SE 431; 
Elliott v Owen, 224 N C GR4, 94 SE2d 59. 
The memorandum in issue is definite as 
to (1) the intent to sell; (2) the parties— 
vendee and vendors; (3) description of the 
lands (Norton v Smith, 179 N C 553, 103 
SE 14; Gilbert v Wright, 195 N C 165, 141 
SE 577); (4) the purchase price of $15,000, 
payable on delivery of deed and acceptance 
of title. 
After a party announces his refusal to 
comply with the terms of the option, the 
lender of the balance of the purchase price 
and a demand for the deed arc unnecessary. 
Johnson v Noles, 224 N C 512. 
An option without consideration is a con-
tinuing offer. 55 Am Jur , Vendor and Pur-
chaser § 32. 
A party may testify to his own intention 
and understanding when they are relevant. 
Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence § 130; 
Burns v Tomlinson, 147 N C 634, 61 SE 615. 
Consideration for an agreement to hold 
an offer open is unnecessary where the pur-
chaser notifies the vendor of an election to 
purchase prior to the at tempt of the vendor 
to withdraw the offer. 55 Am Jur , Vendor 
and Purchaser § 3 2 ; Winders v Kenan, 161 
N C 628, 632. 
Miller & Beck, Adam W. Beck, Coltranc 
& Gavin, and T. Worth Coltranc, all of 
Asheboro, for appellees: 
Plaintiff's intent with respect to payment 
of the $15,000 in accordance with the al-
leged option or offer to sell is not relevant 
to the question whether plaintiff accepted 
the option and tendered the $15,000 in ac-
cordance with its terms. Stansbury, North 
Carolina Evidence (2d cd) § 162. 
A leading question is one that suggests the 
answer desired; usually a question that may 
be answered by yes or no is regarded as 
leading. Stansbury, North Carolina Evi-
dence ' (2d ed) § 3 1 . 
Questions must not be so framed as to 
assume a fact not in evidence or a fact that 
is in dispute in the case. Stansbury, North 
Carolina Evidence (2d ed) § 3 1 . 
Want of consideration constitutes legal 
excuse for nonperformance of an executory 
promise. 1 Strong, North Carolina Index, 
Contracts § 4. 
Where the sole consideration for a con-
tract is the mutual promise of the parties, it 
is necessary that such promise be binding on 
both; where it is binding only on one it 
cannot constitute a sufficient consideration 
for the promise of the other. Smith v 
Barnes, 236 NC 176, 72 SE2d 216. 
The intention of the parties as expressed 
in the written agreement is contioiling, and 
when such agreement is explicit the court 
must so declare, irrespective of what either 
party thought the effect of the contract to 
be. 1 Strong, North Carolina Index, Con-
tracts § 12. 
An ambiguity in a written contract is to 
be inclined against the party who prepared 
the writing. Jones v -Realty Co 226 NC 
3 0 3 , 3 7 S E 2 d 9 0 6 . 
A permissive provision will not be con-
strued as imposing an obligation. William-
son v Miller, 2 3 1 N C 722,^58 SE2d 743. 
Until a proposal is accepted, there can be 
no contract, as there is nothing by which the 
proposer can l>e bound; unless both are 
bound so that an action can be maintained 
against either for breach, neither will }>e 
bound. Timber Co ; v Wilson, 151 NC 154, 
65 SE 932. 
An option is a right acquired by contract 
to accept or reject a present offer within a 
limited reasonable time in the future, Trog-
den v Williams, 114 NC 192. 
Plaintiff's evidence does not show an un-
conditional acceptance of the so-called op-
tion in accordance with its terms, or that 
plaintiff made a tender of the purchase price 
prior to the time that the offer was with-
drawn by defendants. 
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Briefs of Counsel -(Cont'd ent, a peiformance of which tondition is 
A c o m m i t is not made so long as, in the essential hefoie the paiiies become hound by 
contemplation of the paitics thereto, some- the agreement. 1 Stioni>, Noi th Carolina 
thing remains to be done to establish con- Index, Contracts § 16; Leiner Shops v 
tract relations. In negotiating a contract Rosenthal, 225 N C 316, 34 S1^2d 206. 
the parties may impose any condition pieced-
STATEMENT 
Action for specific performance of an alleged contract to convey real estate. 
It is alleged and admitted in the pleadings that defendants are seized in fee 
simple as tenants by the entireties of a tract of land consisting of approximately 
52 acres located in Black Creek Township, Randolph County, fronting approxi-
mately 500 feet on Spero Road. The property is described by metes and bounds 
in paragraph III of the complaint. 
Plaintiff's evidence tends to show: On or about August 15, 1961, defendants 
told plaintiff that they owned the 52-acre tract of land in question, and Mrs. 
Farlow said to plaintiff, "Why don't you buy it?'' Two days later he offered 
defendants $15,000.00 for this property "if they wanted to sign a contract 
and agreement at that time." Assenting, defendants signed the following 
document, which had been prepared by plaintiff: 
"Option of Purchase 
"We do here-by option to John A. Burkhead, a certain parcel or tract of 
land, lying & being in Black Creek Township, Randolph County and described 
as follows: App. 52 acres of land with 500 ft. more or le^s fronting the Spero 
Rd. The purchase 1-1,000:0*4 15,000.00, payable upon delivery of deed and 
acceptance of Title. 
"Option expires Oct. 15, 1961. 
HIS—Lester M. Farlow 
HER—Dorothy Far low; ' ' 
After the above memorandum was signed, plaintiff asked defendants for the 
deed to the property so that he could "put it in the hands of an attorney for 
a title check." When they gave him the deed, he told them it would be two 
or three weeks before the title examination could be completed, and that when 
it was "the money would be available for them." Plaintiff testified: "My 
acceptance of this title depended on the title examination of this property." 
Approximately two weeks after defendants signed the instrument set out above, 
Mrs. Farlow telephoned plaintiff that she and her husband had decided not to 
sell the property. Plaintiff told her that they had signedn- binding contract 
which he expected them to perform. Her reply was, "We are not going to sell." 
At the time of this conversation, the title examination had not been completed. 
It was completed thereafter, and the title is acceptable to plaintiff. 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court allowed defendants' motion 
for judgment of nonsuit. Plaintiff appeals. 
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OPINION OF T H E C O U R T 
Sharp, J. 
The informal ''Option of Purchase" signed by defendants, the parties sought 
to be charged in this action, embodies the terms of the offer-of sale and the 
names of the vendor and vendee. The adequacy of the description of the 
land to be conveyed is not in question here for defendants admit in their further 
answer that on August 15, 1961, they executed an option to plaintiff to pur-
chase the lands described in the complaint. Sec Lane v Coe, 262 NC 8, 136 
SE2d 269; Gilbert v Wright, 195 NC 165, 141 SE 577; Norton v Smith, 179 
NC 553, 103 SE 14. This case, therefore, involves no questions pertaining to 
the statute of frauds, G. S. § 22-2. 
H ] The option in suit is not under seal, and it was without consideration. It 
was a mere offer to sell which defendants might have withdrawn at any time 
before acceptance. "(W)ithout a valuable consideration to support it, the 
agreement would be a mere nudum pactum, and might have been withdrawn 
at any time. . . . But, after unconditional acceptance, there is a valuable 
consideration to support the contract. . . ." Bryant Timber Co. v Wilson, 
151 NC 154, 156, 65 SE 932, 933. See Thomason v Bescher, 176 NC 622, 
97 SE 654, 2 ALR 626. For a resume of the rules applicable to options in North 
Carolina, see Christopher, Options to Purchase Real Property in North Caro-
lina, 44 NCL Rev 63 (1965). 
[2, 3] Plaintiff's evidence, which must be taken as true in considering the 
motion for nonsuit, tends to show that at the time defendants delivered the 
option to plaintiff, he orally agreed to buy the property and told defendants the 
money would be available as soon as the title examination had been completed. 
"A written option offering to sell, at the election of the optionee, can become 
binding on the owner by verbal notice to the owner . . . ." Warner v W & 
O, Inc., 263 NC 37, 42, 138 SE2d 782, 786. Accord, Kovtler v Martin, 241 
NC 369, 85 SE2d 314. A parol acceptance, of course, would not repel the 
statute of frauds and thus could not have bound the optionee. 
Plaintiff's notice of acceptance was given to defendant-optionors approxi-
mately two months before the option expired, and defendants' purported repu-
diation occurred about two weeks after receipt of this notice. The question 
which this appeal presents is whether plaintiff unconditionally accepted the 
offer contained in the option. Defendants contend that plaintiff's acceptance 
was conditional in that it was made to depend upon the title examination 
which had not been completed at the time defendants withdrew their offer. 
I4» 5] It is uniformly held that to consummate a valid contract an acceptance A 
must be unconditional and must not change, add to, or qualify the terms of 
the offer. Carver v Britt, 241 NC 538, 85 SE2d 888. It is also the general 
rule that the optionee's insertion in his acceptance of a condition which merely 
expresses that which "would be implied in fact or in law by the offer does not 
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preclude the consummation of the contract, since such a condition involves rio 
qualification of the acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer." Annot., Land 
Sale—Offer and Acceptance—Variance, 149 ALR 205, 211 (1914). 
[6] In any contract to convey land, unless the parties agree differently, the 
law implies an undertaking on the part of the vendor to convey a good or mar-
ketable tide to the purchaser. Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse & Storage 
Co., 223 NC 344, 26 SE2d 897, 149 ALR 201; Leach v Johnson, 134 NC 87, 
19 SR 239; Townsend v Stick, 158 F2d 142; Annot., Marketable Title, 57 
ALR 1253, 1268 (1928); 55 Am Jur, Vendor & Purchaser § 149 (1946). A 
marketable title is one "free from reasonable doubt in law or fact as to its 
validity." Pack v Newman, 232 NC 397, 400, 61 SE2d 90, 92. It "must 
be one which can be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person 
of reasonable prudence." 55 Am Jur, op cit supra § 149; 92 CJS Vendor & 
Purchaser § 191 (1955). See Annot., 57 ALR, supra at 1282-85. 
[7] 
Since, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, merchantability 
is implied in a contract to convey land, "the acceptance of an offer to sell 
land making no specifications or limitations as to title is not made conditional 
by including a provision requiring "marketable title." 1 Corbin, Contracts § 86 
(2d Ed 1963). Cases supporting this proposition are collected in Annot., 149 
ALR, supra at 211-213 and in 1 Williston, Contracts §78 (3d Ed 1957), 
wherein it is stated: 
"Sometimes an acceptor from abundance of caution inserts a condition in 
his acceptance which merely expresses what would be implied in fact or in 
law from the offer. As such a condition involves no qualification of the 
acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer, a contract is not precluded. Thus 
an offer to sell land may be accepted subject to the condition that the title is 
good, for unless the offer expressly specifies that die offeree must take his 
chance as to the validity of the title, the meaning of the offer is that a good 
title will be conveyed." 
To like effect, see illustration No. 2 to Restatement, Contracts §"-60 comment a 
(1932). 
[fi. 93 Although the law implies an obligation on the part of the vendor to 
furnish a good or marketable title, it does not imply any obligation to furnish 
a title that will be satisfactory to the vendee or his attorney or one that he 
will be willing to accept. The fact that the tide is not satisfactory to a particular 
purchaser or his attorney does not necessarily mean that the title is, in fact, 
not marketable. 55 Am Jur, op cit supra § 150. Therefore, an acceptance of 
an offer to sell land which provides that the title must be-satisfactory to the 
buyer's attorney is a conditional acceptance; it imposes as a condition of the 
sale the approval of his own lawyer as distinguished from the standard estab-
lished by the law. Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., supra. 
Cf. Carver v Britt, supra; 1 Williston, Contracts § 77 (3d Ed 1957); Annot., 
149 ALR, supra at 208-210. 
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HO] The narrow question confronting us is whether the terms of plaintiff's 
acceptance—that when the title examination was completed the money would 
be available—specified any requirement other than a good or marketable title. 
It goes without saying that plaintiff had a right to secure a lawyer's opinion 
as to the quality of the title. No prudent person would buy land without 
first having the title examined by a qualified title attorney. In order to give 
a title opinion, an abstractor must make a careful, and sometimes time-
consuming, search of the public records. As Parker, J. (now C. J.) said in 
Carver v Britt, supra 241 NC at 541, 85 SE2d at 891, "The looking up of a tide, 
the drafting and execution of a deed, the time and place of payment of the 
purchase price are customary details in working out a real estate conveyance." 
[11,12] l n Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., supra, 
plaintiff not only made his acceptance of defendant's title dependent upon the 
approval of specified attorneys; he expressly stipulated that if these particular 
attorneys did not approve the title his earnest money would be returned and the 
transaction terminated. Plaintiff here imposed no such condition, nor did 
he require that the title be ''satisfactory" to any particular individual or his 
agent "before the money would be available." For a collection of the cases 
discussing this latter and troublesome requirement see Annot., Land Sale— 
"Satisfactory" Title, 47 ALR2d 455 (1956). All that plaintiff required in 
this case was "a title check." From these words we can imply only that 
plaintiff would accept the title if it were ascertained to be merchantable. Of 
course, it will always be the attorney selected by the vendee who first gives 
him a title opinion. Should the abstractor's opinion be adverse, unless it has 
been so stipulated in the contract, his opinion is not binding upon the vendor. 
In a situation where the vendor seeks specific performance and the vendee 
defends on the ground that vendor's title is not good, marketability becomes 
a question for the court. City of North Mankato v Carlstrom, 212 Minn 
32, 2 N\V2d 130. See 92 CJS op cit supra § 191. 
This case is closely analogous to Townsend v Stick, supra. There Stick 
(vendee) notified Townsend that he accepted his offer to sell land at the price 
quoted and offered to place the money in escrow "pending establishment of 
the title to the property." Townsend resisted specific performance on the ground 
that Stick had not accepted his offer unconditionally. The court held that 
Stick's acceptance did not modify the offer. It said, " (A) 11 that was suggested 
was an examination of title to determine its merchantability, and it is uni-
formly conceded that it is implied in a contract to convey land, unless differendy 
agreed, that the vendor will give a marketable title." Id. 158 F2d at 144. 
Specific performance was decreed. 
[10] \Vc hold that, upon this record, plaintiff's acceptance of the offer con-
tained in the "Option of Purchase" was unconditional. The option did not 
require payment or tender of the purchase price until defendants delivered a 
deed to plaintiff. The defendants having attempted to revoke the offer after 
acceptance and having refused to execute a deed, no tender was required of 
O i l 
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plaintiff. First Citizens Bank Trust Co. v Frazelle, 226 NC 724, 40 SL2d 
367. 
The judgment of nonsuit is 
Reversed. 
Moore, J., not sitting. 
Pless, J., and Rodman, E. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
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to be attached to the opinion and testimony 
of any exi>ert witness." 
It was not error for the court to give the 
above instruction. Producers' Oil Company 
v. Eaton, 44 Okl. 55, 143 P. 9. 
This tells the jury that the evidence of ex-
perts can be given weight only when the evi-
dence supports the facts assumed. It is not 
the duty of the jury to take for granted that 
the statements contained in the hypothetical 
questions are true. If the jury finds that the 
facts assumed by the question are not true, 
then they have a right to disregard the evi-
dence. 22 C. J. § 823, Page 728; Colley v. 
Sapp, 44 Okl. 1G, 142 P. 989, 1193. 
The judgment of experts, or the opinion of 
skilled witnesses, even when unanimous and 
uncontroverted, are not necessarily conclu-
sive, but may be disregarded by the jury. 
22 C. J. 823, p. 729. 
Both sides Introduced so-called expert tes-
timony. The jury had a right to believe ei-
ther, or reject all. 
The instruction does not tell the jury that 
they may take the testimony of the nonexpert 
witnesses, and determine the extent of plain-
tiff's injury from that evidence alone. 
The judgment of the district court is there-
fore affirmed. 
The Supreme Court acknowledges the aid 
of Attorneys Adrian Melton, Harry Hammer-
ly, and B. B. Barefoot in the preparation of 
this opinion. These attorneys constituted an 
advisory committee selected by the State Bar, 
appointed by the Judicial Council, and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. After the 
analysis of law and facts was prepared by 
Mr. Melton and approved by Mr. Hammerly 
and Mr. Barefoot, the cause was assigned to 
a justice of this court for examination and 
report to the court. Thereafter, upon consid-
eration, this opinion was adopted. 
LINCOLN NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. RIDER 
ot a!. 
No. 24378. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 
March 2G, 1935. 
J. Novation <2=>l 
Previous valid obligation, agreement of 
all parties to new contract, extinguishment 
C=>Fcr other cases see same toplo aud KEY NI 
of old obligation, and validity of new one 
held essential to constitute "novation/* 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Novation," see Words & Phrases.] 
2. Novation 0 7 
Where original mortgagor was not shown 
to have been consulted or to have consented 
to extension agreement between holder of 
mortgage and purchaser of encumbered prop-
erty, no novation existed. 
3. Mortgages <£=>305 
Renewal or substitution of evidence of 
debt secured by mortgage will not impair 
lien of mortgage. 
4. Mortgages <§=»306 
Extension agreement entered into be-
tween holder of mortgage and purchaser of 
encumbered property held not to impair lien 
of mortgage, since debt was not changed, but 
certain of parties involved merely changed 
their position with relation thereto. 
Syllabus by the Court. 
1. The requisites of a novation are a pre-
vious valid obligation, an agreement of all 
the parties to a new contract, the extinguish-
ment of the old obligation, and the validity 
of the new one. 
2. A mortgage secures a debt or obliga-
tion, and not the evidence of it, and no change 
in the form of the evidence, or in the mode or 
time of payment, can operate to discharge 
the mortgage. So long as the debt secured 
remains unpaid, neither the renewal nor sub-
stitution of the evidence of the debt will im-
pair the lien of the mortgage. 
Appeal from District Court, Marshall Coun-
ty ; Porter Newman, Judge. 
Action by the Lincoln National Life Insur-
ance Company against George E. Rider and 
others. Judgment for defendants, and plain-
tiff appeals. 
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded, 
with directions. 
W. D. Calkins, of Oklahoma City, Jos. L. 
Hull, of Tulsa, and Kelley & Grigsby, of Ma-
dill, for plaintiff in error. 
Geo. E. Rider, of Madill, for defendants in 
error. 
BAYLESS, Justice. 
The Lincoln National Life Insurance Com-
pany, a corporation, hereinafter called plain-
tiff, instituted an action in the district court 
of Marshall county, Okl., against several par-
ties, among them George E. Rider. Rider is 
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the only one of said parties interested in the 
appeal and will be referred to hereinafter as 
defendant. The purpose of the action was to 
foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate 
and to quiet title as against the defendant. 
The trial court decided the issues between 
plaintiff and defendant In favor of the de-
fendant, and the plaintiff brought this ap-
peal. 
The facts are these: J. H. Woodruff and 
wife (hereinafter called Woodruff) mortgaged 
the land in question to Exchange Trust Com-
pany, a corporation, to secure a certain debt; 
the Trust Company thereupon assigned the 
note and mortgage to the plaintiff; a creditor 
of Woodruff levied on. Woodruff's equity in 
the land and had it sold under execution; the 
purchaser of this land at the execution sale 
bought it subject to plaintiff's mortgage; the 
purchaser at the sheriff's sale conveyed to the 
defendant all of the mineral rights under for-
ty acres of this land subject to the mortgage 
indebtedness of record; the purchaser then 
conveyed the land by quitclaim deed to one 
Neff; and Neff then conveyed the land by war-
ranty deed to Peiker. When the mortgage 
matured plaintiff and Peiker entered into an 
agreement for the extension of the time of the 
payment of said note; and in said agreement 
the execution, delivery, and assignment of the 
note and mortgage, as aforesaid, was dul^re-
cited, and it was agreed that the note was 
unpaid, and that as a consideration for ex-
tending the time of payment thereof, Peiker 
should pay the unpaid balance due on the in-
debtedness in periodical payments. The con-
cluding paragraph of the agreement reads as 
follows: "And the parties to this agreement 
hereby consent to said extension and agTee 
that said mortgage shall continue a first lien 
upon said premises, and that said note and 
mortgage and all their covenants and condi-
tions shall remain in force except as herein 
modified." The only evidence introduced in 
the case was the various written instruments 
above mentioned. 
The defendant argues that the judgment of 
the trial court is sustainable upon two 
grounds. The first gTound that we will notice 
is that of novation. 
[1,2] We have defined "novation" and its 
essential elements as follows: "In every nova-
tion there are four essential requisites: (1) a 
previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement 
of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the 
extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) 
the validity of the new one. A novation is a 
new contractual relation. It is based upon a 
new contract by all the parties interested." 
Sec Martin v. Deeper Bros. Dbr. Co., 48 Okl. 
219, 149 P. 1140; Alkire v. Acuff, 134 Okl. 43, 
272 P. 405; Williams v. Otis, 155 Okl. 173, 8 
P.(2d) 728; and Tulsa Ice Co. v. Diley, 1570kl. 
80, 10 P.(2d) 1090. 
We have also said that three parties are es-
sential to a novation agreement. Martin v. 
Lceper Bros. Dbr. Co., supra; Fuller v. Stout, 
GO Okl. 15, 160 P. 898, L. R. A. 1918B, 108; 
Burford v. Hughes, 75 Okl. 150, 182 P. 089. 
There are two parties to this agreement—the 
plaintiff and Peiker. Woodruff, the original 
maker, is nowhere shown to have been con-
sulted or to have consented to the extension 
agreement There was no novation for the 
lack of this essential element. 
Defendant's other ground may be summa-
rized best as follows: Plaintiff, by entering 
into the extension agreement with Peiker, aft-
er defendant had acquired his interest of rec-
ord and without the defendant's consent, lost 
the priority of lien which it formerly had had 
by virtue of the mortgage given by Woodruff. 
Defendant bases this contention upon several 
grounds. 
[3] The first ground is that the extension 
agreement created a new and subsequent debt 
which had the effect of paying the debt of 
Woodruff. No evidence was introduced in 
this case other than the written instruments 
relating to the act of the various persons in-
terested in the property as aforesaid. The 
extension agreement stated in so many words 
that the original note and mortgage were not 
affected by the agreement except as they were 
modified as to the time of payment No one 
testified that the parties to the agreement had 
a different intention or understanding. 
The second point is: "When Peiker pur-
chased the land subject to mortgage, and said 
purchase ratified by plaintiff in error by ex-
tension agreement with Peiker, the land be-
came the principal debtor -and Woodruff the 
surety, and when time of payment of mort-
gage indebtedness was extended by agreement 
between plaintiff in error and Peiker to which 
Woodruff was not a party, Woodruff, then oc-
cupying position of surety,- was released and 
discharged, and lien was extinguished as to 
all persons holding title subject to mortgage, 
except Peiker!" Defendant argues that prior 
to the extension agreement Woodruff was the 
principal or primary obligor on the debt, but 
when Peiker assumed and agreed to pay the 
debt thereafter, Peiker thereupon and thereby 
became the principal obligor and Woodruff 
merely the surety. Then he argues further 
that the surety (Woodruff) was released from 
the debt by the act of the plaintiff in extend-
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lug the time of the payment without the sure-
ty's consent. He then argues further that 
because the surety (Woodruff) Is released, the 
debt is released. Defendant does not argue 
that Woodruff was released cither jas princi-
pal or surety, because a new or different debt 
was then in existence. Defendant seeks to ap-
ply to the debt—the real object under consid-
eration—the same life and existence with re-
lation to Woodruff when he was only surety 
that would have applied to the debt had 
Woodruff remained the principal. This is not 
logical or reasonable. 
We said in the case of Unger v. Shull, 154 
Okl. 277, 7 P.(2d) 881, 882, which is applicable 
here: "A mortgage secures a debt or obliga-
tion, and not the evidence of it, and no change 
in the form of the evidence, or in the mode or 
time of payment, can operate to discharge the 
mortgage. So long as the debt secured re-
mains unpaid, neither the renewal nor substi-
tution of the evidence of the debt will impair 
the lien of the mortgage." See, also, First 
National Bank of Altus v. Hendrick, 135 OkL 
260, 275 P. 314. 
We have heretofore construed the rights as 
establishing the fact that the same debt re-
mained in existence and that certain of tho 
parties involved merely changed their posi-
tions with relation thereto. This being so, 
both of defendant's grounds in this respect 
are answered when we say that no new debt 
was created, and, second, that there could be 
no novation for the lack of this essential ele-
ment. See discussion above with reference 
to novation and the essential elements there-
of. 
Defendant next says that the whole trans-
action, including the fact that Woodruff was 
not made a party to the action, evidences an 
intention to release or discharge the original 
debt. We have heretofore rejected that part 
of his argument relating to the interpretation 
of the extension agreement. In addition to 
this, it appears in the record that the plain-
tiff also pleaded and relied upon the original 
note and mortgage and no defense was made 
to them separately from the extension agree-
ment. There are a number of logical reasons, 
not all indicative of an intent to release 
Woodruff, why Woodruff was not made a par-
ty to the action. Among such reasons are: 
First, he was not a necessary party, having 
theretofore l>een divested of his title to the 
land; second, by not seeking a personal judg-
ment against him, no jury would be neces-
sary (Vose v. U. S. Cities Corp., 152 Okl. 295, 7 
l\(2d) 132); and, third, when, as is contended 
in the briefs, Woodruff was a nonresident and 
personal serUce could not be obtained upon 
him. 
We are of the opinion that the findings of 
the trial court are clearly against the weight 
of the evidence, and for that reason the judg-
ment of the trial court is reversed, and the 
cause is remanded, with directions to take 
further proceedings not inconsistent with the 
views herein expressed. 
McNEIIX, C. J., OSBORN, V. O. J., and 
WELCH and CORN, J J., concur. 
CAMDEN FIRE INS. ASS'N OF CAMDEN, 
N. J., v. KOURI. 
No. 24818. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 
March 26, 1935. 
1. Insurance ©=5163(5) 
Men's suits and furnishings, comprising 
relatively small portion of stock of merchan-
dise contained in retail store, held covered by 
fire policy describing insured property as 
stock of merchandise consisting chiefly of dry 
goods, shoes, ladies' ready-to-wear, etc., and 
such other merchandise as is usually kept for 
sale in dry goods stores. 
2. Insurance <£=>335(2) 
Insured's production of last annual in 
Ventoiy taken eight months prior to fire con-
stituted substantial compliance with fire pol-
icy requiring insured to take annual Inven-
tory and to produce last inventory after fire, 
notwithstanding fact that special inventory, 
taken three months prior to fire, was destroy-
ed. 
3. Insurance <S=»335(3) 
Iron safe, inventory, and book clause 
of standard fire policy is substantially com-
plied with if insured keeps and produces rec-
ords enabling insurer to ascertain with rea-
sonable certainty nature of property destroy-
ed and amount of loss. 
4. Insurance <§=>G48(0 
In action on lire policy, evidence that 
another Insurer paid its liability for loss oc-
casioned in same fire held inadmissible. 
<£=>For other cases sec same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexea 
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NORTHWEST PROPERTIES 
i Wash, A pp. ;tor> 
NORTHWEST PROPERTIES AGENCY, 
INC., a Washington corpora-
tion, Respondents, 
v. 
Joseph McGHEE and Jane NIcGhee, husband 
and wife, Appellants. 
No. 10-40104-11. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 2. 
Nov. 18, 19G0. 
Vendors appealed from a decree of 
specific performance entered in the Supe-
rior Court, Pierce County, Wm. F. 
LeVeque, J., of an earnest money receipt 
and agreement pertaining to certain real 
property. The Court of Appeals, Pearson, 
J., held that provision "that no restrictions 
to utilization of property exists by virtue 
of its proximity to the freeway," added to 
earnest money agreement by purchasers 
prior to signing, did not make material 
change in agreement's terms and did not 
revoke vendor's offer to sell, and that 
earnest money agreement, incorporating 
future real estate contract by reference to 
specific form, was sufficiently certain to 
allow court to grant specific performance. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error C=M95, 205 
Where there was no attempt by vendors 
to seek an amendment of pleadings to raise 
issue of whether nominal purchasers had 
duty to disclose real purchaser, to press for 
fraud or breach of trust, or to make offer 
of proof tenSing to show evidence of fraud 
or breach of trust by an agent, such failure 
foreclosed urging of such issue on appeal. 
2. Principal and Agent O I 4 ( l ) 
Commission agreement, as simply a 
term of original offer made by purchaser 
and retained in counteroffer transmitted by 
vendors to purchaser, was not an acknowl-
edgment of an agency relationship be-
tween purchaser and vendors. 
462 P.2d— I6V2 
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3. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I6<4) 
Purchasers' addition of language "pro-
vided that no restrictions to utilization of 
property exists by virtue of its proximity to 
the freeway" added nothing new to earnest 
money agreement which required title of 
vendor to be free of encumbrances or 
defects, and addition of such provision did 
not constitute counteroffer. 
4. Contracts <§=>24 
For an offer and acceptance to con-
stitute a contract, acceptance must meet and 
correspond with offer in every respect. 
5. Vendor and Purchaser C=^I6(4) 
When proviso added by purchaser 
materially modifies quality of title vendor 
has offered to furnish under terms of the 
earnest money agreement, proviso con-
stitutes rejection of vendor's offer by 
counteroffer. 
6. Vendor and Purchaser C= 16(4) 
If condition added by purchaser's in-
tended acceptance of vendor's offer can be 
implied in vendor's original offer, added 
condition does not constitute material 
variance and does not make acceptance in-
effective. 
7. Specific Performance 0=28(2) 
In absence of showing that selection of 
different forms would have materially 
altered vendors' performance, incorpora-
tion of future real estate contract in earnest 
money agreement by giving agent au-
thority to select one of five specifically 
identified forms was permissible and made 
agreement sufficiently certain to allow 
court to grant specific performance. 
Murray, Scott, McGavick & Graves, 
Frederick R. Hok.inson, Tacoma, for ap-
pellants. 
Conrad, Kane & Vandeberg, Elvin J. 
Vandeberg, Tacoma, for respondents. 
PEARSON, Judge. 
This is an appeal by the defendant seller 
from a decree of specific performance of 
an earnest money receipt and agreement 
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pertaining to 14 lots in Barker's Addition 
to the City of Tacoma. This real property 
borders Interstate 5 on the east and the 
Tacoma Mall properties on the west. 
The defendants, Joseph C. McGhee and 
his wife, admitted signing an earnest money 
receipt and agreement in December, 1966. 
They contended to the trial court, however, 
that the earnest money agreement should 
not be specifically enforced, for four rea-
sons : 
1. The agreement was not signed by the 
purchasers by its termination date of 
December 30, 1966. 
2. The purchasers, prior to signing, 
made a material change in the terms, there-
by revoking the offer to sell. 
3. The earnest money agreement, which 
called for a future real estate contract, was 
not certain enough for equity to enforce. 
4. Part of the acceptance of the con-
tract was oral, violating the statute of 
frauds. 
The operative facts show that an em-
ployee of Northwest Properties Agency, 
Inc., Sherman Hale, acting for an un-
disclosed principal, Peter Wallerich, on 
December 29, 1966 came to the home of the 
defendants, Joseph McGhee and wife, ages 
81 and 86 respectively, with a prepared 
earnest money receipt and agreement. 
(There was a dispute as to whether it was 
December 29 or December 30, which the 
trial court resolved in favor of December 
29.) 
The prepared earnest money agreement 
showed the plaintiff—"Northwest Prop-
erties Agency, Inc., Trustee"—as the pur-
chaser. In its original form, the earnest 
money agreement called for a sales price 
of $30,000, to be paid with $7,500 down and 
the balance on a real estate contract at $500 
or more per month, with interest at 6 per 
cent. The form also provided that sellers 
would pay a 10 per cent real estate com-
mission. The sellers declined to sign the 
earnest money agreement in that form and 
after some negotiations the earnest money 
agreement form was changed, so as to call 
for a purchase price of $55,000, with a 
$9,000 down payment. At this time the 
following words were added at defend-
ant's request, by Sherman Male: " [Coun t -
er offer good until midnight of 30 December 
1966 * * *." 
Hale took the earnest money agreement 
as signed by the McGhees to Peter 
Wallerich, the undisclosed principal, where 
the following language was added: " [ p r o -
vided that no restrictions to the utilization 
of the property exists by virtue of its 
proximity to the freeway." 
While there is a dispute in the testimony 
as to when the changes in the earnest money 
agreement were approved by the purchaser, 
the trial court found that the acceptance 
was made on December 30, 1966, and that 
notice of acceptance was given to the 
sellers on December 31, 1966. Since there 
was substantial evidence to support these 
findings, this court is bound thereby. 
With reference to the title, the earnest 
money receipt and agreement contained 
the following provisions: 
1. T I T L E : Title of seller is to be free 
of encumbrances or defects, except: 
None 
Existing reservations, existing ease-
ments, building" or use restrictions 
general to the district, and building or 
zoning regulations or provisions shall 
not be deemed encumbrances or defects. 
Encumbrances to be discharged by 
seller may be paid out of purchase 
money at date of closing. 
2. TITLE INSURANCE: Title is to 
be shown by title insurance report 
furnished by the seller within 30 days 
after loan approval if financing is pro-
vided for, otherwise 15 days. Seller 
authorizes agent to apply for such 
policy or report, showing condition 
of title within the specified time. The 
title policy to be issued shall contain no 
exceptions other than those provided 
for in said standard form plus encum-
brances and defects noted in Paragraph 
1 above. Delivery of such policy or 
title report to closing agent shall con-
n 1 ^ 
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stitutc delivery to purchaser. If title is ing to the type of future real estate con-
not so insurable as above provided and tract to be executed: 
cannot be made so insurable within one 7. CONTRACT PURCHASER : If this 
hundred twenty days from date of title agreement is for sale on real estate con-
report, earnest money shall be refunded
 t r a c t > s c n e r a n d p u r c h a s e r agree to 
and all rights of purchaser terminated: execute a Real Estate Contract for the 
Provided that purchaser may waive balance of the purchase price on Real 
defects and elect to purchase. If title Estate Contract Forms L-37, L-137, L-
is so insurable and purchaser fails or 33
 o r L _ 1 3 8 o f Washington Title Corn-
refuses to complete purchase, the ear-
 p a n V j o r F o r m \Q9 o f p u g e t Sound 
nest money shall be forfeited as liqui- Title Company, as selected by agent, 
dated damages unless seller elects to The terms of said form are herein in-
enforce this agreement or seek dam- corporated bv reference, 
ages for breach thereof.
 T h e e a r n e s t m Q ' n c y r e c e j p t a n d a g r e e m e n t 
The earnest money receipt and agreement also contained the following acceptance and 
contained the following provision, pertain- commission agreement: 
14. ACCEPTANCE AND COMMISSION AGREEMENT: Decem-
ber 29, 1966. We approve this sale and agree to deliver deed or 
contract for deed in accordance with the terms of this agreement, 
and pay agent, a commission of $ 10% for serv-
ices rendered. In the event the Earnest Money is forfeited, the 
same, after deduction of expenses incurred by the agent, shall be 
divided equally between the seller and agent, providing the amount 
to agent does not exceed the agreed commission. I/we ac-
knowledge receipt of a true copy of this agreement, signed by 
both parties. I agree to absorb a mortgage discount to finance 
this transaction, in an amount not to exceed % 
of the sale price. 
Joseph McGhee (signature) 
Address Seller 
Jane McGhee (signature) 
Seller (Wife) 
A true copy of the foregoing agreement, signed by the seller, is 
hereby received on this 30 day of December, 1966/ 
W. W. Templin (signature) 
Purchaser Purchaser (Wife) 
Plaintiff's exhibit 2, Washington Title 
Insurance Company real estate contract 
form L-37, was tendered to the defendants, 
together with the balance of the down pay-
ment of $9,000. Defendants refused to 
complete the transaction. 
Plaintiff's complaint prayed for specific 
performance. Defendant's answer denied 
that a contract of sale had been executed 
and alleged as an affirmative defense that 
the transaction involved violated the 
statute of frauds. 
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[1] We wish to dispose of one conten-
tion which is urged on appeal by the de-
fendants, which docs not appear to have 
been seriously advocated to the trial court. 
That argument was that the plaintiff, 
Northwest Properties Agency, Inc., failed 
in its duty of undivided loyalty, good faith, 
and full disclosure to the plaintiffs. De-
fendant urges that an agency relationship 
stemmed from this transaction between the 
plaintiff and the defendant sellers and that 
a duty of undivided loyalty, good faith, and 
full disclosure was created. We are asked 
to read into the commission agreement the 
creation of an agency relationship and are 
then asked to void the transaction because 
of the failure of the plaintiff to disclose 
the identity of the buyer. We do not accept 
this argument. The plaintiffs did not pro-
ceed on the theory that they were agents of 
the sellers. Defendants did not seek to 
avoid this transaction by pleading agency, 
fraud, or breach of trust. The closest this 
issue was brought to the trial court's at-
tention was when defendant's counsel 
sought to question plaintiff about what 
work he had performed in earning a real 
estate commission. This question was ob-
jected to and sustained by the trial court on 
the grounds that it involved an issue which 
had not been pleaded. There was no at-
tempt by defendant to seek an amendment 
of the pleadings, to press for fraud or 
breach of trust, nor was there an offer of 
proof made, tending to show evidence of 
fraud or breach of trust by an agent. Such 
failure would, in our view, foreclose urging 
this issue on appeal. Washington Co-
operative Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wash. 
2d 460, 256 P.2d294 (1953). 
[2] In any event, we do not deem the 
commission agreement as the acknowledg-
ment of an agency relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. From the 
manner in which the transaction was 
handled, the commission agreement was 
simply a term of the original offer made 
by the plaintiff purchasers and was re-
tained in the counteroffer transmitted by 
the defendant sellers to the plaintiffs. (It 
should be noted that the plaintiffs had 
sought a listing on the property several 
months before this transaction, but defend-
ants had declined to list the property for 
sale with the plaintiffs.) 
We shall now consider the remaining 
assignments of error. Did the addition of 
the following language constitute a counter-
offer by plaintiff purchasers? "[P]rovided 
that no restrictions to the utilization of the 
property exists by virtue of its proximity 
to the freeway." 
[3] The trial court concluded that this 
language added nothing new to the earnest 
money receipt and agreement "[S]ince the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement had 
the same proviso in substance in Paragraph 
1 and 2 thereof." We agree with this con-
struction of the contract. 
Paragraph 1 of the agreement required 
title of the seller to be free of encumbrances 
or defects. "Existing reservations, existing 
easements, building or use restrictions 
general to the district, and building or 
zoning regulations * * * " were not to 
be considered as encumbrances or defects. 
Paragraph 2 of the agreement required 
the seller to provide a title insurance policy 
containing no exceptions other than those 
provided in the standard form, phis those 
noted in paragraph 1. 
Defendant seller argues that the proviso 
written in by the purchaser should be con-
strued as adding a potential "defect" in the 
title which would not have been considered 
a defect in view of the provisions of para-
graph 1. Thus, the seller is required by the 
proviso to furnish a better title than his 
original counteroffer contemplated. 
To reach this construction, we would 
have to say that-a use restriction by virtue 
of "proximity to the freeway" would con-
stitute "building or use restrictions general 
to the district * • * " 
In commencing on this proviso, the trial 
court stated: 
[T]his is no more than a reiteration of 
the language contained in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the earnest money receipt and 
agreement. There might possibly be a 
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different question raised if this lawsuit 
was turned around and the plaintiff was 
seeking to take advantage of that lan-
guage, but in the light of the present 
factual situation it appears to the Court 
that nothing at all has been added to the 
contract by that language, * * * 
Statement of facts at 49. 
[4] The general rule is that for an 
offer and acceptance to constitute a con-
tract, the acceptance must meet and cor-
respond with the offer in every respect. 
The corollary of this rule is that any 
material variance between offer and ac-
ceptance precludes formation of a contract. 
Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wash.2d 41, 216 P. 
2d 196 (1950); Pearce v. Dulien Steel 
Products, Inc., 14 Wash.2d 132, 127 P.2d 
271 (1942). 
[5] The real issue raised here is 
whether the proviso added by the pur-
chaser materially modified the quality of 
title the seller offered to furnish. If it did, 
then adding the proviso would constitute a 
rejection of seller's offer by counteroffer. 
See 16 A.L.R.3d 1424 (1967) for a collec-
tion of cases on this issue. 
[6] However, if the condition added by 
the intended acceptance can be implied in 
the original offer, then it does not constitute 
a material variance so as to make the ac-
ceptance ineffective. Pickett v. Miller, 76 
N.M. 105, 412 P2d 400 (1966). 
We believe that the subject matter of the 
proviso, namely, "restrictions to the utiliza-
tion of the property * * * by virtue 
of its proximity to the freeway" should be 
implied in defendant's offer to give title 
"free of encumbrances or defects," and 
should not be construed as "building or use 
restrictions general to the district." The 
latter phrase should be construed to include 
those building or use restrictions placed 
upon the property at the time the area was 
platted or developed. This is the type of 
restriction that would be "general to the 
area." 
In the case at bar, a portion of defend-
ant's property had previously been sold 
AGENCY, INC. v. McOHEE Wash. 2 5 3 
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by defendants to the state for freeway pur-
poses. Any restrictions that were imposed 
by that sale would not be "general to the 
district" but would be specific restrictions 
on the property retained. We therefore 
believe that the trial court was correct 
in holding that such restriction would, by 
implication, come within the terms of de-
fendant's offer to give title free of en-
cumbrances or defects. 
It is well settled that an offeree's ac-
ceptance is not conditional and therefore 
insufficient merely because it recites 
terms or conditions that would in any 
event have been implied from the original 
offer, inasmuch as such an acceptance 
introduces nothing new into the contract. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 17 Am.Jur.2d Con-
tracts § 64 (1964) at 403; 16 A.L.R.3d 
1429 (1967). 
[7] We now turn to the contention that 
the earnest money agreement was not 
certain enough for equity to enforce since 
it called for a future real estate contract 
in which the agent was given the authority 
to select from five different forms. The 
forms were incorporated into the earnest 
money agreement by reference as "Real 
Estate Contract Forms L-37, L-137, L-38 
or L-13S of Washington Title Company, 
or Form 109 of Puget Sound Title Com-
pany * * * " 
It is not contended that such forms did 
not exist or that there were material 
variances between them. Xor is there any 
contention that the form chosen (Washing-
ton Title Insurance £ompany Form L-37) 
contained any objectionable or contradicto-
ry provisions. (We note also that defend-
ant had 17 years of experience in dealing 
in real estate transactions and for 4 years 
prior to the trial had been engaged in 
developing and selling real estate.) 
The argument appears to be that because 
multiple forms were incorporated into 
the earnest money agreement by reference, 
a reasonable doubt exists as to the specific 
agreement equity is asked to enforce. 
Such an argument would be more 
persuasive had the trial court been shown 
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that the selection of different forms would 
have materially altered defendant's per-
formance. In the absence of such a show-
ing, the only question before us is whether 
or not it is permissible to incorporate a 
future real estate contract into an earnest 
money agreement by reference to a specific 
form, or by giving an agent authority to 
select one of several specifically identified 
forms. 
No Washington cases have been cited 
which have held such a procedure is 
prohibited. In Haire v. Patterson, 63 
Wash.2d 282, 3S6 P.2d 953 (1963) an earnest 
money agreement which called for a future 
real estate contract with no reference to a 
specific form was held to be enforceable 
as a cash sale. In alluding to the procedure 
used here, the Supreme Court stated at 287, 
288, 3S6 P.2d at 956: 
It has been said that real estate con-
tracts have become so standarized that, 
when parties enter into an earnest money 
agreement calling for a future contract, 
they must be held to have had in mind 
the provisions of a "standard" contract 
of sale. We know of no "standard" 
contract. However, if parties have a 
particular contract form in mind, it seems 
that they could evidence that fact by at-
taching a copy thereof to the earnest 
money receipt and making it a part there-
of by reference, and we are aware of 
such a practice. We note the existence 
of printed earnest money agreement 
forms providing that the contract to 
follow shall be on a particular form, 
identified by number, publisher, and date 
of printing. And it would not seem an 
impossibility to prepare an earnest money 
agreement, printed or otherwise, con-
taining within its four corners the 
material terms of the future contract of 
sale. 
Plaintiff's exhibit 2, which was tendered 
to defendants in compliance with the earn-
est money agreement, is identified as 
"Washington Title Insurance Company 
Real Estate Contract Form L-37." Its pub-
lisher and form number are identified. It 
was selected by the agent. It hears no 
publishing date. It was not attached as an 
exhibit to the earnest money agreement. 
It contains no unusual terms or conditions, 
nor do its terms contradict any provision 
of the earnest money agreement. 
We hold that such identification in the 
earnest money agreement is sufficiently 
certain that a court may grant specific 
performance as the trial court did here. 
We believe that this court should judicially 
recognize a well-established custom of long 
standing in the real estate industry. 
While the better practice would be to in-
corporate by reference only one form and 
attach such form to the earnest money 
agreement, we do not find that the failure 
to do so is fatal to the transaction, absent 
some showing of prejudice to the party 
seeking to nullify the transaction. None 
having been demonstrated here, the judg-
ment of the trial court is affirmed. 
ARMSTRONG, C. J., and PETRIE, J., 
concur. 
1 Wash.App. 420 
S T A T E of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Jo Ann B A K E R , Appellant. 
No. 80-40748-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1, Panel Two. 
Dec. 8, 1909. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 21), TJ70. 
Defendant was convicted in the Supe-
rior Court, King County, Ward Roney, J., 
of second-degree assault and she appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Stafford, J., held 
that findings that defendant had voluntari-
ly waived her right to jury trial must be 
accepted as verities in absence of assign-
ment of error. 
Affirmed. 
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PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation au-
thorized to do business in the State of 
Wyoming, Appellant (Defendant), 
v, 
Nowlin SMITH, Jr., Appellee (Plaintiff). 
No. 5506. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
Dec. 16, 1981. 
Employer appealed from a decision of 
the District Court, Weston County, Paul T. 
Liamos, Jr., J., which awarded damages to a 
former employee for breach of contract. 
The Supreme Court, Brown, J., held that: 
(1) empfoyee's "grumbfing acceptance" of 
employer's offer to withdraw his discharge 
was effective, and (2) contract, dispute be-
tween employer and employee did not arise 
under collective bargaining agreement and 
therefore it was not subject to arbitration; 
furthermore, employer waived any right it 
might have had to arbitration, by implying 
that it considered its offer to be separate 
from the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement then denying that any contract 
even existed and by failing to use the statu-
tory procedure for requiring arbitration. 
Affirmed. 
Thomas, J., filed specially concurring 
and dissenting opinion in which Rose, C. J., 
joined. 
1. Contracts <s=»22(l) 
An offeror has the right to demand an 
exclusive mode of acceptance from offeree. 
2. Contracts «=*22(1) 
Mode of acceptance of an offer can be 
unreasonable or difficult if the offeror 
clearly expresses his intention to exclude all 
other modes of acceptance and such inten-
tion must be expressed in the communica-
tion of the offer itself. 
3. Master and Servant e=>47 
Employer's offer to withdraw dis-
charge, which was in letter form, did not 
propose an exclusive mode of acceptance 
calling for the absence of any writing on 
the paper other than signatures since the 
letter did not explicitly demand that exact 
and exclusive mode of performance. 
4. Contracts c=>24 
One who modifies an offer has usually 
rejected the offer and made a counteroffer 
and no contract exists* unless the original 
offeror accepts the counteroffer. 
5. Contracts c=>23 
An offer must be accepted uncondition-
ally; however, an acceptance is still effec-
tive if the addition only asks for something 
that would be implied from the offer and is 
therefore immaterial. 
6. Contracts c=*22(l) 
Master and Servant c=*47 
Employee's "grumbling acceptance" of 
employer's offer to withdraw his discharge 
was effective. 
7. Labor Relations <^ =>436 
The courts are to decide the question of 
whether a grievance or dispute arises under 
terms of collective bargaining agreement 
and should be arbitrated, unless agreement 
clearly demonstrates that the question is 
reserved to the arbitrator. 
8. Arbitration ^=»1.1 
Arbitration is a matter of contract and 
party cannot be required to submit any 
dispute to arbitration which is not agreed to 
submit. 
9. Labor Relations c=>434.5, 436 
Contract dispute between employer and 
employee did not arise under collective bar-
gaining agreement and therefore it was not 
subject to arbitration; furthermore, em-
ployer waived any right it might have had 
to arbitration by implying that it considered 
its offer to be separate from the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement and 
then denying that any contract even existed 
and by failing to use the statutory proce-
dure for requiring arbitration. W.S.1977, 
§ 1-36-101 et seq. 
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10. Arbitration c=>23.3 
There are certain instances where a 
party asserting arbitration is estopped by 
his own conduct to rely on unexhausted 
arbitration procedures. 
11. Arbitration c=>23.3 
The right to have a dispute submitted 
to arbitration is a contractual right which 
may be waived either expressly or implicit-
ly. 
12. Damages c=*117 
Measure of damages for breach of con-
tract is that which would place plaintiff in 
same position as he would have been had 
the contract been performed, less proper 
deductions. 
13. Master and Servant c=>41(2), 42(1) 
In a suit for breach of employment 
contract, damages are the amount of com-
pensation agreed upon for the remainder of 
the period involved less the amount which 
employee earned or with reasonable dili-
gence could have earned from other em-
ployment. 
14. Master and Servant o=>41(6) 
Damages award of $40,000 for breach 
of employment contract of indefinite term 
was supported by sufficient evidence. 
15. Damages o=189 
Existence of damages must be proved 
and the amount of damages must be decid-
ed with all the certainty the case permits. 
Richard L. Williams of Williams, Porter, 
Day & Neville, P. C, Casper, for appellant. 
Bernard Q. Phelan of Graves, Hacker & 
Phelan, P. C , Cheyenne, for appellee. 
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOM-
AS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ. 
BROWN, Justice. 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company 
(Panhandle) appeals a district court judg-
ment granting damages to its former em-
ployee Nowlin Smith, Jr., for breach of 
contract. Panhandle asserts that no con-
tract ever existed. It maintains that the 
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dispute which is here on appeal should have 
been submitted to arbitration under the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
It also maintains that if this court decides a 
contract did exist, we should nevertheless 
reverse the damage award because it was 
not supported by sufficient evidence. 
Wfe affirm. 
Panhandle fired Mr. Smith in October, 
1979. Mr. Smith followed the grievance 
procedure provided by a collective bargain-
ing agreement to the third and final level 
of intracompany proceedings, which was a 
meeting with company officials at the divi-
sion office. After that meeting, Panhandle 
initially decided to uphold the decision to 
fire Mr. Smith, but changed its mind after 
Mr. Smith's union representative requested 
that it reconsider. By letter dated Decem-
ber 13, 1979, the company offered to with-
draw the discharge if Mr. Smith would 
agree to comply with certain terms and 
conditions. Mr. Smith signed the letter un-
der the typewritten words, "Understood, 
Agreed To and Accepted," added some 
handwritten notations, and again signed his 
name. . The union representative also 
signed the letter and returned it to the 
company. 
Because Mr. Smith wrote on the letter, 
Panhandle argues thai no contract existed, 
claiming that Mr. Smith failed to use the 
mode of acceptance which it prescribed. As 
Panhandle conceded at oral argument, it 
would have contested any words being add-
ed to the letter, e*en ones as innocuous as, 
"Have a nice day." Panhandle also argues 
that Mr. Smith made a counteroffer by 
adding terms and conditions which showed 
he was trying to modify the offer. 
We think appellant's "mode of accept-
ance" argument was not directly raised in 
the district court. Panhandle's pleadings 
spoke to a counteroffer being made because 
Mr. Smith added terms and conditions to 
the proposed offer. The exhibits intro-
duced at trial spoke to "modifications," and 
"added terms and conditions," implying 
that the content of the words mattered. 
No mention was made anywhere below of 
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"mode of acceptance" or "method of accept-
ance." Appellant cautioned this court not 
to confuse the two theories of "mode of 
acceptance" and "counteroffer," although 
appellant tried to interweave them in its 
brief. Because we want to avoid any con-
fusion, we have decided to address both the 
"mode of acceptance" argument and the 
"counteroffer" argument. 
I 
[1,2] An offeror has the right to de-
mand an exclusive mode of acceptance from 
an offeree. The mode of acceptance can be 
unreasonable or difficult if the offeror 
clearly expresses his intention to exclude all 
other modes of acceptance. This intention 
must be expressed in the communicated of-
fe r itself. Crockett v. Lowthcr, Wyo., 549 
P.2d 303, 309 (1976), citing 1 Corbin, Con-
tracts, § 88, at 373 (1963). The letter of 
December 13, 1979, contained the offer to 
withdraw Mr. Smith's discharge. The let-
ter directed that both Mr. Smith and the 
union had to agree in writing to the terms 
of the offer, and that the signatures were a 
condition precedent to the withdrawal of 
the discharge.1 It went on to reiterate that 
the withdrawal of the discharge was contin-
gent upon receipt of written acceptance by 
Mr. Smith and the union. 
[3] Panhandle insists that it modified 
this offer by demanding of Mr. Smith dur-
ing a telephone conversation that he just 
sign the letter and not add anything. 
Mr. Smith, however, does not remember the 
conversation that way, and we must view 
the evidence on appeal most favorably to 
him. Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 596 P.2d 
1108 (1979). Here, Mr. Smith testified he 
did not understand that any addition to the 
letter would be considered a rejection of the 
offer. Panhandle, therefore, did not orally 
modify the written offer of December 13, 
1979; it failed to "clearly express, in the 
1. " * * * The Company has, therefore, deter-
mined that Mr. Smith will be given one more 
opportunity to rehabilitate himself and his 
discharge shall hereby be withdrawn under 
the terms and conditions listed below, which 
terms and conditions must be agreed to in 
writing by both Mr. Smith and the Union as a 
terms of the communicated offer itself," its 
intention to exclude all other modes of ac-
ceptance. Crockett v. Lowther, supra. 
Panhandle was explicit only in stating that 
the terms and conditions had to be agreed 
to in writing. 
The offeror is master of the offer, but we 
think fairness demands that when there is a 
dispute concerning mode of acceptance, the 
offer itself must clearly and definitely ex-
press an exclusive mode of acceptance. 
There must be no question that the offeror 
would accept the prescribed mode and only 
the prescribed mode. Corbin comments, 
"The more unreasonable the method ap-
pears, the less likely it will be that a court 
will interpret his offer as requiring it [a 
specific mode of performance] and the more 
clear and definite must be the expression of 
his intention in words." 1 Corbin on Con-
tracts, § 88, at 373 (1963). The only motiva-
tion we could surmise for the requirement 
that no handwriting be added to the paper, 
regardless of content, would be that the 
offeror had an inordinate fondness for tidy 
sheets of paper. The requirement strikes 
us as unreasonable, and strikes out as a 
prescribed mode of acceptance unless the 
offeror's intention is explicitly set out. We 
agree that the mode of acceptance rule 
" * * * has been enforced with a rigor wor-
thy of a better cause." Calamari & Periilo, 
Contracts, § 2-22 (2d ed., 1977). We are 
not eager to enforce it if there is any ques-
tion about the mode of acceptance or about 
the clarity with which the demand was 
made. Had Panhandle seriously been pro-
posing an exclusive mode of acceptance call-
ing for the absence of any writing on the 
paper other than signatures, the letter 
should have explicitly demanded that exact 
and exclusive mode of performance. 
II 
[4-6] The requirement that no terms or 
conditions be added to change the contract-
condition precedent to the withdrawal of the 
discharge." 
The letter then said, "The terms and conditions 
are: * * * " and set out eight additional terms 
and conditions, some of which will be dis-
cussed later. 
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is a different matter. The law of contract 
formation dictates that one who modifies 
an offer has usually rejected the offer and 
made a counteroffer, and that no contract 
exists unless the original offeror accepts the 
counteroffer. Trautwein v. Lcavcy, Wyo., 
472 P.2d 776 (1970). Panhandle contends 
that Mr. Smith made a counteroffer by 
adding a request on the letter to see his 
personnel file and to contest any mistakes 
he found there. An offer must be accepted 
unconditionally; but there is, as always, an 
exception to the rule. An acceptance is still 
effective if the addition only asks for some-
thing that would be implied from the offer 
and is therefore immaterial. 1 Corbin on 
Contracts, § 86, p. 368 (1963). Kodiak Is-
land Borough v. Large, Alaska, 622 P.2d 440 
(1981); Pickett v. Miller, KM., 412 P.2d 400 
(1966). A Panhandle supervisor, Mr. Smith, 
and a company machinist, who was also a 
union representative, all testified that all 
Panhandle employees had the right to see 
their personnel files. Panhandle's offer to 
withdraw its discharge and eventually rein-
state Mr. Smith carried with it the implica-
tion that he would be able to see his person-
nel record when he was once again an ac-
tive employee. 
Besides reserving the right to see his 
personnel file, Mr. Smith wrote that his 
personnel file contained mistakes, and that 
he was having financial problems, apparent-
ly as a result of the company's actions. 
Williston has described the kind of accept-
ance Mr. Smith made as one showing "an 
2. 1 Williston on Contracts, § 78 (3rd ed., 1962); 
1 Corbin on Contracts. § 84 (1963). 
3. In the novel Catch-22, Group Headquarters 
let its men request a medical release if they 
thought they were on the verge of a nervous 
collapse. When Yossarian, a bombardier, asked 
the doctor for a release, the doctor refused. He 
told Yossarian the catch was that his recom-
mendation for a release had to be approved by 
Group, and Group never approved any of them. 
The doctor later said to Yossarian that Group 
couldn't let the crazy people go home, as no 
one else but a crazy person would fly the 
bombing missions willingly. J. Heller, Catch-
22, Simon and Schuster (1955, 1961). 
4. "7. Without limiting Mr. Smith's ability to 
contact Company Supervisors to ask ques-
tions about these terms and conditions or 
abundance of caution," and Corbin has 
called it a "grumbling acceptance," which in 
this case it certainly appeared to be.2 The 
acceptance was unenthusiastic to be sure, 
but it was an acceptance nevertheless. Mr. 
Smith signed his name under the words 
"Understood, Agreed To and Accepted.*' 
He wrote that he agreed to the terms and 
conditions. He began performance by seek-
ing medical help and by sending in a check 
to keep his insurance current. Mr. Smith 
wanted to be sure that he would be able to 
see his personnel file when he returned to 
work. His effort to insure that right 
should not block him from benefits that 
Panhandle had already offered to him. His 
"grumbling acceptance" should stand. 
Mr. Smith found himself in his own 
"Catch-22" 3 when he tried to accept Pan-
handle's offer contained in the letter of 
December 13, 1979. The letter said that 
Mr. Smith could contact Panhandle's super-
visors about the terms and conditions of the 
offer.4 When Mr. Smith telephoned the 
company to ask about his personnel files, 
Panhandle viewed his request as an indica-
tion that Mr. Smith did not want to elimi-
nate the problems that had led to his dis-
charge. In the same letter, Panhandle 
wrote that Mr. Smith would have at least 
six months to improve-his emotional state, 
and indeed demanded that Mr. Smith re-
ceive counseling for that purpose.5 When 
Mr. Smith made a request which Panhandle 
thought showed an improper attitude, he 
other business related matters * * * the 
Company expects that there will be no un-
usual contacts by Mr. Smith with Company 
employees or Supervisors which might rea-
sonably leave an impression of threatening, 
intimidation or harrassment [sic]." 
5. "2. Within two weeks of acceptance hereof, 
Mr. Smith must have contacted his choice of 
a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other licensed 
individual * * * capable of giving him com-
plete treatment for his emotional disorder 
and he must have established a schedule and 
frequency of treatment which, in the opinion 
of the Doctor, might reasonably be expected 
to enable him to overcome his problem with-
in the leave of absence period * * *." 
The leave of absence period was six months. 
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was apparently fired because he had failed 
to spontaneously rehabilitate. We do not 
dispute that Panhandle's offer to Mr. Smith 
was generous. We do say that Panhandle 
could not withdraw its offer just because 
Mr. Smith did not and could not fulfill 
Panhandle's unrealistic and contradictory 
expectations. 
Ill 
[7,8] Panhandle contends that Mr. 
Smith should not be allowed to assert his 
claim for breach of contract because the 
collective bargaining agreement under 
which he was employed required him to 
take his grievance to arbitration. The 
agreement did provide a three-step griev-
ance procedure culminating in the fourth 
stop of binding arbitration. The arbitration 
clause of the collective bargaining agree-
ment said "All grievances and disputes aris-
ing under the terms of this Agreement * * * 
shall be settled in accordance with this Arti-
cle." The courts are to decide the question 
of whether a grievance or dispute arises 
under the terms of the bargaining agree-
ment and should be arbitrated, unless the 
agreement clearly demonstrates that the 
question is reserved to the arbitrator. 
United Steel workers of A me rial v. Warrior 
and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 
574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). 
Although this court has said that arbitra-
tion is favored, it is a matter of contract, 
and a party cannot be required to submit 
any dispute to arbitration wrhich he has not 
agreed to submit. American National Bank 
of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority, 
Wyo., 562 P.2d 1017 (1977). 
[9] We think that neither party here 
agreed to submit this dispute to arbitration. 
Mr. Smith took his original grievance about 
his termination of employment through the 
three-step grievance procedure, which re-
sulted in a decision to uphold the company. 
The company then chose to offer Mr. Smith 
a contract independent of the grievance 
proceedings. The record shows that the 
company itself considered the offer of De-
6. "8. Violation of any of the above terms and 
conditions may, in the sole discretion of the 
comber 13, 1979, to be an independent one. 
The offer set up terms and conditions with 
which Mr. Smith had to comply, while Pan-
handle tried to reserve the right to rein-
state Mr. Smith's original discharge at its 
sole discretion if Mr. Smith violated any of 
the separate terms and conditions.6 The 
dispute which arose over the offer of De-
cember 13, 1979, was not a dispute arising 
under the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Before the company made its 
offer to Mr. Smith on December 13, 1979, he 
would have been required to submit the 
matter to binding arbitration. The arbitra-
tor would have considered the same matters 
that had been considered at the grievance 
proceedings. After Panhandle made the of-
fer to Mr. Smith, he would have been sub-
mitting a different issue to the arbitrator, 
the issue of whether a new contract existed 
and was breached. 
Furthermore, Panhandle had the burden 
of proving that the dispute should have 
been arbitrated, since that burden is on the 
party asserting it. If Panhandle wanted 
the dispute to be arbitrated, it should have 
used the procedure set out in the Uniform 
Arbitration Act, § 1-36-101, et seq.f W.S. 
1977, which says that the district court has 
the jurisdiction to enforce an agreement 
providing for arbitration. American Na-
tional Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing 
Authority, supra at 1020. When a party 
makes application to arbitrate and shows an 
agreement to arbitrate, the court must or-
der the parties to'proceed with arbitration. 
If any action involving an issue subject to 
arbitration is pending, the district court will 
then stay the action. 
[10, 11] Even had this dispute been sub-
ject to arbitration, there are certain in-
stances where a party asserting arbitration 
is estopped by his own conduct to rely on 
unexhausted arbitration procedures. Vacs 
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct 903, 17 
L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The right to have a 
dispute submitted to arbitration is a con-
tractual right which may be waived either 
Company, result in the reinstatement of Mr. 
Smith's discharge. * * * " 
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expressly or implicitly. Spain v. Houston 
Oilers, Tcx.Civ.App., 593 S.W.2d 74G (1979); 
Barton-Dixie Corporation v. Timothy 
McCarthy Construction Co., 436 F.2d 405 
(5th Cir.f 1971). We think Panhandle 
waived any right it may have had to arbi-
tration. Panhandle implied that it con-
sidered its offer to be separate from the 
terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and then denied that any contract 
even existed. It also failed to use the stat-
utory procedure for requiring arbitration, 
and having failed to do so, it should not be 
able to raise the issue now. Therefore, 
even had the dispute been one which arose 
under the terms of the bargaining agree-
ment, Panhandle waived its right to assert 
arbitration. 
IV 
Appellant contends that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support the trial court's 
finding of damages of $40,000. We do not 
agree. 
[12,13] The measure of damages for 
breach of contract is that which would place 
plaintiff in the same position as he would 
have been had the contract been performed, 
less proper deductions. Reynolds v. Tice, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 1318 (1979); and Zitterkopf 
v. Roussalis, Wyo., 546 P.2d 436 (1976). In 
a suit for breach of an employment con-
tract, then, the damages are the amount of 
compensation agreed upon for the remain-
der of the period involved less the amount 
which the employee earned or with reasona-
ble diligence could have earned from other 
employment. 
[14] The contract which Panhandle of-
fered to Mr. Smith was for an indefinite 
term, and impliedly called for reinstatement 
of Mr. Smith's discharge only if Mr. Smith 
violated any of the terms of the contract. 
Mr. Smith testified that he had worked for 
Panhandle for eight and one-half years and 
had intended to stay with Panhandle until 
retirement at age fifty-five, which would 
have been twenty-six more years. There 
was also testimony showing twelve years to 
be the average seniority at the company-
The trial judge here determined that it 
would be reasonable to infer that a person 
who had already worked eight years for a 
company, enjoyed favorable working condi-
tions and l>enefits, and intended to stay 
until retirement, would be employed for a 
longer period than the average period of 
seniority. He decided that a figure of eight 
years of continued employment would be 
reasonable. Appellant argues that the 
twelve-year seniority figure is not applica-
ble because it is not the same as the aver-
age time an employee stayed with, the com-
pany. Be that as it may, the figure is still a 
useful one because it provides the average 
length of time that people who are current-
ly employed at Panhandle have been on the 
job. Mr. Smith was a member of that 
group until his termination. The judge 
could also give weight to Mr. Smith's testi-
until retirement. Appellant offered no ob-
jection or contradictory testimony, and we 
think that the eight-year figure was reason-
able in light of the evidence. 
The trial judge also decided that Mr. 
Smith's damages were $5,000 a year for the 
eight years. The value of the tangible lost 
fringe benefits of a stock purchase plan, 
health insurance, investment credit match-
ing stock ownership plan, group life insur-
ance, and a qualified retirement pension 
plan were mathematically ascertainable ac-
cording to the testimony of one of Panhan-
dle's own supervisors at one-half of the 
hourly wage, which in Mr. Smith's case was 
one-half of $8.35 an hour for a total of 
approximately $12.52 an hour. That does 
not take into account any monetary value 
the judge attributed to the less mathemati-
cally ascertainable benefits of which Mr. 
Smith was deprived as a result of the con-
tract breach. The trial judge said: 
44
 * * * I don't think there is any doubt 
that Mr. Smith has a much poorer job 
today than he would have with Panhan-
dle Eastern. He doesn't have the bene-
fits, doesn't have as good working condi-
tions, his work is hit and miss, and there 
are not hours or days guaranteed. I 
don't think it a bit speculative to place a 
value on those benefits over and above 
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anything th it Mr Smith is making today 
of $5,000 a } e a r " 
The fact that some of the lost benefits of 
Mr Smith's job at Panhandle may be char-
acterized as intangible does not mean that 
Mr Smith should not be able to recover for 
their loss It is true that one meaning of 
intangible is that which cannot be defined 
with precision (Webster's Third Interna-
tional Dictionary Unabridged, p 1173, G & 
C Merriam Co 1966) Semantics aside, 
however, Mr Smith testified that he does 
not get to work a forty-hour week, that he 
is no longer under a union contract, that his 
work is harder physically, and that it is less 
comfortable because he is working outdoors 
Neither appellee nor an expert witness 
could place an exact dollar value on the loss 
of those benefits Whether we call the loss 
of those benefits tangible but not mathe-
matically ascertainable with precision or 
whether we call them intangible, they are 
injuries caused by Panhandle's breach of 
contract for which Mr Smith should be 
recompensed 
The existence of those damages here is as 
tangible as the existence of pain and suffer-
ing damages in a personal injury case or the 
existence of damages to character and repu-
tation in a defamation case The United 
States Supreme Court said in a tort case 
that there is a clear distinction between the 
measure of proof necessary to prove that 
the plaintiff has sustained some damage 
and the measure of proof necessary to allow 
the factfinder to fix the amount of dam-
ages Story Parchment Co \ Paterson 
Parchment Paper Co , 282 U S 555, 51 S Ct 
248, 75 LEd 544 (1931) Although there 
was some doubt at that time whether the 
same rule applied to contract cases, the 
Supreme Court later said in a case in a 
bankruptcy proceeding involving a lessor's 
claim for damages for rejection of its lease, 
citing to Story Parchment Co v Paterson 
Parchment Paper Co, supra, that certainty 
in the fact of damages is essential, but that 
certainty as to the amount goes no further 
than to require a basis for a reasoned con-
7 For a recent case speaking to this iule see 
American Sanitars Sales v Purchase & Prop 
elusion Palmer \ Connecticut Ry <& 
Lighting- Co, 311 U S 544, 61 S Ct 379, 85 
LEd 336 (1941)7 
[15] The existence of damages must be 
proved, the amount of damages must be 
decided with all the certainty the ease per-
mits That is what happened here The 
amount of damages in this case cannot be 
determined with precise mathematical ex-
actness, but it does not have to be 
" * * * Although a factfinder may not 
make an award on the basis of specula-
tion or conjecture, he need not make an 
award with precise mathematical exact-
ness It is sufficient if he determines the 
amount with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty on the basis of the evidence placed 
before him, if the evidence is such as is 
reasonably applicable to the nature of the 
injury " (Emphasis added ) Sagebrush 
Development Inc v Moehrkc, W}o , 604 
P2d 198, 202 (1979) 
The evidence presented at trial was rea-
sonably applicable to the nature of Mr 
Smith's injur} It went to the fact that he 
does not have as good a job now as he did at 
Panhandle According to Corbin 
"There are many cases in which, by rea-
son of the ordinary experience and belief 
of mankind, the trial court is convinced 
that substantial pecuniar} harm has been 
inflicted, even though its amount in dol-
lars is incapable of proof If the defend-
ant had reason to foresee this kind of 
harm and the difficult} of proving its 
amount, tfie injured party will not be 
denied a remed} in damages because of 
the lack of certaint} • • •" 5 Corbin 
on Contracts, § 1020, pp 125-126 (1964) 
This is one of those cases It is also one of 
those cases where "substantial justice is 
better than en.act injustice" Wemglass v 
Gibson, 204 Pa 203, 155 A 439, 440 (1931) 
Appellant argues that Mr Smith was free 
to choose any other job he wanted and that 
he could have found a better job than h€ 
did Mr Smith did have to exercise reason 
able care and diligence to avoid loss or 
Dn 178 N J Super A D 429 429 A 2d 40C 
(1981) 
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lessen the resulting damage, but the ques-
tion as to whether he used reasonable care 
and diligence is one for the trier of fact, 
within its considerable discretion. Wyo-
ming BancorfX)ration v. Bonham, Wyo., 563 
P.2d 1382 (1977), reh. denied, Wyo., 566 P.2d 
219 (1977); Asbell Bros., Inc., v. Nash-Davis 
Machinery Company, Wyo., 382 P.2d 57 
(1963); and Thayer v. Smith, Wyo., 380 P.2d 
852 (1963). We are not prepared to disa-
gree with the trier of fact on the question 
of Mr. Smith's mitigation. Panhandle, as 
the party breaching the contract, carried 
the burden of proving that Mr. Smith did 
not mitigate his damages. Sturgeon v. Phi-
fer, Wyo., 390 P.2d 727 (1964); and Truck 
Terminal, Inc., v. Nielsen, Wyo., 339 P.2d 
413 (1959). Panhandle failed to prove or 
even to introduce evidence that Mr. Smith 
could have avoided some of his damages by 
finding a better job than he did. 
Alternatively, Panhandle asserts that Mr. 
Smith did actually find a better job because 
his pay was $12.50 an hour at the time of 
trial. The assertion ignores the fact that 
the trial judge did compare the value of Mr. 
Smith's job at Panhandle with the value of 
Mr. Smith's new job at the time of trial, but 
that he considered more than just the hour-
ly wages in his determination of damages. 
The testimony showed that Mr. Smith's new 
job did not guarantee forty hours of work a 
week, that it was harder physical work, that 
it was outdoors, and that there was no 
collective bargaining agreement or individ-
ual contract, so that Mr. Smith's job securi-
ty was greatly diminished. The trial judge 
reasonably concluded that Mr. Smith had 
found a job inferior to the one he had with 
Panhandle. Indeed, we see no purpose for 
a remand on Ihe issue of damages, because 
we see no other basis on which to recom-
pute damages that would be any more 
mathematically certain or reasonable than 
the method which the trial judge used. The 
parties certainly cannot wait eight years so 
that they can precisely determine just how 
much less time Mr. Smith gets to work. 
We would also still have the problem of just 
how to assign a value to the less mathemat-
ically ascertainable benefits which we re-
ferred to earlier. 
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The rules of law on recover} of damages 
for breach of contract have to be very flexi-
ble. As stated in 5 Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 1002, at 33 (1964), 'Their application in 
the infinite number of situations that arise 
is beyond question variable and uncertain. 
Even more than in the case of other rules of 
law, they must be regarded merely as 
guides to the court, leaving much to the 
individual feeling of the court created by 
the special circumstances of the particular 
case." We accept the way the trial judge 
applied the law to the facts of this case, and 
we see no reason to upset his factual deter-
mination of the amount of damages. 
The district court had jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute and correctly decided that a 
contract did exist and had been breached. 
Its damage award was supported by suffi-
cient evidence. We therefore affirm. 
THOMAS, Justice, specially concurring 
and dissenting, with whom ROSE, Chief 
Justice, joins. 
I agree with all that is said in the majori-
ty opinion with respect to the existence of a 
contract and the right of Smith to recover 
for breach of that contract. I cannot agree 
with the disposition made of the issue of 
Smith's damages dealt with under Part IV 
of the majority opinion^and I dissent there-
from. 
It is interesting to note that the majority 
opinion correctly states the rule with re-
spect to damages as follows: 
44
 * * • In a suit for a breach of an em-
ployment contract, then, the damages are 
the amount of compensation agreed upon 
for the remainder of the period involved 
less the amount -which the employee 
earned or with reasonable diligence could 
have earned from other employment." 
The rule is stated thusly in 11 Wiiliston on 
Contracts, § 1358, p. 302 (3d Ed., Baker, 
Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1968). 
41
 * * * Therefore, in an action by the 
employee against the employer for a 
wrongful discharge, a deduction of the 
net amount of what the employee earned, 
or what he might reasonably have earned 
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in other employment of like nature, from 
what he would have received had there 
been no breach, furnishes the ordinary 
measure of damages [footnote 5 omit-
ted] " 
In footnote 5 cases are cited from 23 other 
jurisdictions without any contrary authority 
being noted 
Turning then to the facts as recited in the 
majority opinion, it appears that a value 
should be assigned to Smith's wages at Pan-
handle Eastern Pipeline Company of $12 53 
an hour This is based upon his hourly 
wage of $8 35 plus one-half of that amount 
for fringe benefits As recited in the ma-
jority opinion, Smith was earning $12 50 an 
hour at the time of trial Assuming a 40-
hour week for 52 weeks a year, Smith 
would have been paid for 2,080 hours per 
year multiplied by an assumed continued 
period of employment with Panhandle East-
ern Pipeline Company of 8 years This is a 
total of 16,640 hours for which he would 
have been paid at Panhandle Eastern Pipe-
line Company $208,499 20 At $12 50 an 
hour for the same period, he would have 
earned $208,000 00 
I recognize that he did experience a peri-
od when he was not employed, and that his 
new job ma} not have resulted in a 40-hour 
work week in all instances I would re-
mand the case to the trial court for those 
value determinations, and having made the 
appropriate adjustments the trial court 
would then deduct his earnings at his new 
job for the 8 } ear period from the $208,-
499 20 he would have earned at Panhandle 
Eastern Pipeline Company It appears that 
that amount would be substantially less 
than the $40,000 00 which was awarded 
The majority opinion goes astray when it 
suggests that Smith selected a job that was 
qualitatively less desirable than his employ-
ment with Panhandle Eastern Pipeline 
Company This qualitative difference 
might have excused Smith from accepting 
that employment He would not then be 
chargeable with amounts he might have 
earned in a position substantially qualita-
tively less desirable than the one he had 
wfith Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company 
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Since he did accept the new employment 
the question of qualitative difference disap-
pears under the rule of damages, and he 
must account for his actual earnings I 
would hold that when the employee actually 
accepts new employment he is in effect 
conceding that there is no qualitative dif-
ference in the nature of the two employ-
ments, and the only matter to be accounted 
for is the actual difference in dollar value 
between the new employment and the old 
employment In my view, the majority in 
this instance injects a classic speculative 
factor into the damage formula, and that 
should be avoided 
I find that in Webster's Third Interna-
tional Dictionary, Unabridged, page 1173 
(G & C Mirnam Co , Publishers, 1961), one 
of the definitions of the word "intangible'* 
is, "incapable of being defined or deter-
mined with certainty or precision vague, 
elusive " Using this word to describe bene-
fits lost b\ Smith, the majority concludes 
that the trial court wab able to determine 
"the amount of damages with a reasonable 
degree of certainty " It seems to me that 
the rule is antithetical to the description of 
the benefits for which Smith is being com-
pensated This is confessed by the majority 
opinion in the sentence "We would also still 
have the problem of just how to assign a 
value to the less mathmatically ascertain-
able benefits which we referred to ear l ier" 
I am satisfied that the reason there is a 
problem is that Smith has been awarded 
damages which are speculative In effect 
the court is supporting a holding that 
Smith's job>with Panhandle Eastern Pipe-
line Company was worth $5,000 a year more 
than his actual compensation or, without 
supporting evidence, it is concluding that 
Smith's new employment somehow is worth 
$5,000 a year less than he apparently is 
being paid 
I would reverse and remand to the dis-
trict court for a different computation of 
damages, while agreeing with the majority 
that the right to recover damages is 
present 
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$2,148 per month. The plaintiff's income 
had increased also, to $1,875 per month. 
The parties furnished itemized statements 
of expenses. After weighing the evidence, 
the court found that "there has been a 
material change of circumstances" in that 
the parties have both improved their in-
comes and that "the needs of the child have 
increased." The court ruled that the de-
fendant, who had stipulated to and agreed 
to pay $150 per month for child support 
nine years before, could and should pay 
additional support when the child's needs 
obviously and measurably had increased. 
[5] The defendant contends that the 
court used its own "predetermined sched-
ule" to arrive at the $225 support figure. 
There is nothing in the record, except possi-
ble gratuitous remarks of counsel, to indi-
cate that the court relied on any such sched-
ule. Counsel's contention is apparently 
based on a chart allegedly used by the 
judges of the second judicial district in aid 
of child support enforcement in welfare 
cases. Counsel has improperly included 
these schedules in his brief as pages 6A, B, 
C, and D. They were never admitted in 
evidence and are not a part of the record, 
and are not given any consideration by this 
Court in appraising the issue of abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
PARKS ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
NEW CENTURY REALTY, INC., John 
A. Riding and Cleo B. Mason, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 17652. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 23, 1982. 
Purchaser brought suit for specific per-
formance of sale of real property. The 
District Court, Utah County, George E. Bal-
lif, J., dismissed purchaser's suit, and pur-
chaser appealed. The Supreme Court, Dur-
ham, J., held that: (1) tender of earnest 
money to title company which was to han-
dle closing did not constitute tender to ven-
dor; (2) evidence did not preponderate 
against trial court's finding that purchaser 
failed to tender earnest money; (3) trial 
court had reasonable basis to conclude that 
purchaser's acceptance by mail was not rea-
sonable; and (4) signed earnest money 
agreement, without tender of earnest mon-
ey, did not form binding contract 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J.f concurred in the result. 
1. Appeal and Error c=*847(l), 1009(4) 
In equity cases, Supreme Court will 
review both facts and law, but will reverse 
trial court's findings only if evidence clearly 
preponderates against them. 
2. Equity c=>66 
One seeking equity must take care to 
discharge his own obligations regardless of 
mere inconvenience. 
3. Contracts c=>155 
Contract will be construed against its 
drafter. 
4. Vendor arid Purchaser c=>170 
Earnest money agreement that speci-
fied title company would handle real estate 
closing did not make title company escrow 
agent of parties such that tender of earnest 
money to title company constituted tender 
to vendor as required by offer and counter-
offer. 
5. Specific Performance o= 121(11) 
In purchaser's suit for specific perform-
ance, evidence did not preponderate against 
trial court's finding that purchaser failed to 
tender earnest money to vendor within 48 
hours as required by terms of vendor's 
counteroffer. 
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6. Vendor and Purchaser <£=>16(1) 
In case of offer to sell real property 
where offer is made to other party person-
ally, offeror is entitled to personal notice of 
acceptance. 
7. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»16(l) 
Where vendor's agent personally 
brought offer to vendor and counteroffer to 
purchaser, and parties had not negotiated 
by telephone or letter, and where counterof-
fer required acceptance within 48 hours, 
there was reasonable basis for trial court to 
conclude that acceptance by mail was not 
reasonable and that timely personal or actu-
al notice of acceptance was required. 
8. Vendor and Purchaser c=>16(l) 
Where vendor's counteroffer on pur-
chaser's own form required deposit of ear-
nest money with vendor, signed earnest 
money agreement, standing alone, was in-
sufficient to form binding contract without 
tender of earnest money. 
Richard D. Bradford, Provo, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Jackson Howard and John Merkling of 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Provo, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case is an appeal from the trial 
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for 
specific performance of a sale of real prop-
erty. The plaintiff, Parks Enterprises, Inc., 
desired to purchase approximately 84 acres 
of land from New Century Realty, the de-
fendant. On September 27, 1979, the plain-
tiff filled out and signed a printed form 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase, which was carried to the defendant 
by the plaintiff's agent, J. Fred Smith of 
Tri-State Realty. Among other terms, the 
plaintiffs offer provided that $5,000 in ear-
nest money would be deposited with Tri-
State Realty upon the parties' reaching an 
agreement and that the offer would remain 
1. The trial court found that the defendant in-
tended the addition as a counteroffer, which 
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open for two hours. The offer also listed 
four conditions to which the sale would be 
subject upon acceptance of the offer. John 
A. Riding, President of New Century Real-
ty, found the primary terms of the offer 
acceptable, but objected to the listed condi-
tions. In the space below the conditions, 
Riding typed'in the following:1 
Seller will accept the above total price 
and downpayment and other terms with 
no "Subject To's" other than Seller's good 
and marketable title. All release to be 
$1500.00 per acre. Seller must approve 
counter within 48 hours. 
The counteroffer was signed "New Century 
Realty, Inc. by John A. Riding, 2 p.m., 27 
Sept. 1979." The following morning, Fri-
day, September 28, the plaintiff considered 
the counteroffer and decided to accept i t 
Hal Parks, president of Parks Enterprises, 
signed the earnest money document below 
the defendant's typed counteroffer and sent 
a signed copy back to the defendant with 
the plaintiff's agent, Smith. 
From this point, the evidence presented 
at trial was in conflict. The plaintiff's 
agent, J. Fred Smith, testified that he went 
to the defendant's offices but found them 
closed and locked all day and, for this rea-
son, placed a signed copy of the earnest 
money agreement tinder the door. He also 
mailed a copy to the defendant, return re-
ceipt requested. The defendant did not re-
ceive notification of the letter until after 
the expiration of the 48-hour period. The 
defendant, however, introduced evidence at 
trial to show that its offices were open that 
day, that business was conducted as usual, 
and that the plaintiff made no response to 
its counteroffer within the specified time 
period. 
After hearing the evidence, the trial 
court entered findings of fact which includ-
ed findings that the defendant's typed addi-
tion to the earnest money agreement was a 
counteroffer with acceptance limited to the 
following 48 hours, that the plaintiff had 
failed to accept within the specified period, 
finding is not contested in this appeal. 
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and that the recited earnest money pay-
ment of $5,000 was never tendered to the 
defendant. The trial court concluded that 
because of the plaintiffs failure to accept 
and failure to tender the earnest money, 
there was no contract which could be specif-
ically performed. The plaintiff's cause of 
action was dismissed. 
[1] The plaintiff argues three points on 
appeal. In its first point, the plaintiff 
states that this Court should review ques-
tions of fact as well as law, asserting that 
in an equity case it is the Court's duty to 
examine the evidence and to overrule the 
trial court's findings unless they are sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence. 
The plaintiff has misstated the standard of 
review. While it is true that in equity cases 
appeal may be had on the facts as well as 
the law, this Court defers to the "advan-
taged position of the trial judge who sees 
and hears the witnesses," McBride v. 
McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (1978), by 
reversing the trial court's findings only 
when the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 
Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980); Tanner v. £a-
adsgaard, Utah, 612 P.2d 345 (1980). In 
these cases, both suits for specific perform-
ance of contracts for the sale of real proper-
ty, this Court cited the above rule and 
looked for a "reasonable basis in the evi-
dence" to justify the trial court's findings. 
Bradford at 1243; Tanner at 347. More 
recently, we thoroughly reviewed and af-
firmed this standard of review for equity 
cases in Jensen v. Brown, Utah, 639 P.2d 
150 (1981). We therefore review the trial 
court's findings of fact as well as its conclu-
sions of law, but will reverse those findings 
only if the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them. 
[2-5] In its second point, the plaintiff 
contends that it properly tendered the ear-
nest money to the defendant. It is well 
recognized that one seeking equity must 
take care to discharge his own obligations 
regardless of mere inconvenience. Fischer 
v. Johnson, Utah, 525 P.2d 45 (1974); Brad-
ford, supra. It is also settled law that a 
contract will be construed against its draft-
er. See, e.g., Microbiological Research 
Corp. v. Muna, Utah, 625 P.2d 690 (1981); 
Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 
1003 (1972). The plaintiff filled out an 
earnest money agreement which in part 
read as follows: "To: Tri State Reality [sic] 
. . . In consideration of your agreement to 
use your efforts to present this offer to the 
Seller, I/we Parks Interprises, Inc. [sic] 
hereby deposit with you as earnest money 
the sum of $5,000, Five Thousand and 
no/100 dollars, in the form of check to 
secure and apply on the purchase of the 
property . . . ." The plaintiff's provisions 
were incorporated in the defendant's coun-
teroffer except for those specifically reject-
ed. Therefore, the $5,000 should have been 
deposited immediately upon the plaintiff's 
acceptance of the defendant's counteroffer. 
The plaintiffs agent, J. Fred Smith, testi-
fied at trial that Tri-State Realty had never 
received such a check or any earnest money 
payment from the plaintiff. Smith testi-
fied that the check was made out to Back-
man Abstract & Title Company to hold as 
escrow agent, although Smith was uncer-
tain whether he had delivered the check to 
Backman on Friday, September 28, or Mon-
day, October 1. The check itself was not 
presented as evidence, nor did the plaintiff 
offer any other evidence to show when the 
check was delivered. The plaintiff argues 
that since the earnest money agreement 
specified that the closing would be handled 
by Backman Abstract & Title Company, 
Backman became the escrow agent for both 
parties and tender to Backman constituted 
tender to the defendant. This contention is 
contrary to the equity and contract princi-
ples cited above. The plaintiff asks for 
specific performance, an equitable remedy, 
but is unable to show compliance with the 
terms which the plaintiff had chosen, i.e., 
tender of the earnest money to Tri-State 
Realty, or compliance with the defendant's 
counteroffer, i.e., tender within 48 hours. 
The evidence does not preponderate against 
the trial court's finding but, in fact, pro-
vides a reasonable basis for finding that the 
plaintiff failed to tender the earnest money 
payment. Therefore we will not disturb 
that finding. 
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[6,7] The plaintiff asserts in its third 
point that its acceptance of the defendant's 
counteroffer was proper, timely and created 
a binding contract. The plaintiff cites 
many authorities to the effect that where 
an offer is silent as to the manner of ac-
ceptance, any reasonable method may be 
used and that acceptance is effective upon 
dispatch. We do not question these general 
principles of contract formation but find 
that they are not dispositive here. In the 
case of an offer to sell real property where 
the offer is made to the other party person-
ally, the offeror is entitled to personal no-
tice of acceptance. In a real property case, 
Frandsen v. Gerstncr, 26 Utah 2d 180, 184, 
487 P.2d 697, 700 (1971), we referred to the 
rule that "generally a contract arises from 
the time that the agent of the offeree com-
municates the acceptance of his principal to 
the offeror." (Emphasis added.) A review 
of the record makes it clear that the parties 
were negotiating personally through the 
plaintiff's agent, Smith, and that both par-
ties were in a hurry. The plaintiff limited 
the effectiveness of its original offer to a 
mere two hours. Smith personally carried 
the offer and counteroffer between the par-
ties. The parties did not negotiate by tele-
phone or letter. The defendant's counterof-
fer specified no particular manner of ac-
ceptance, but stated that "Seller must ap-
prove counter within 48 hours." When an 
offer does not specify the manner of accept-
ance, the offeree may accept in any reason-
able manner. Here, the plaintiff properly 
sent its acceptance with its agent, Smith. 
When Smith failed to communicate the ac-
ceptance to the defendant personally, the 
acceptance was not yet out of the posses-
sion of the plaintiff. There was conflicting 
evidence regarding whether the defendant's 
office was open and the defendant denied 
having received the acceptance which Smith 
claimed to have put under the door. Under 
these circumstances, there was a reasonable 
basis for the trial court to conclude that 
2. It should be noted that although the trial 
court found that the defendant had intended to 
type "Buyer must approve . . . " rather than 
"Seller must approve counter within 48 hours," 
that sentence should have put the plaintiff on 
notice that the 48-hour limitation was of impor-
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acceptance by mail was not reasonable in 
this situation and that timely personal or 
actual notice of acceptance was required.2 
Therefore, we will not disturb the findings 
of the trial court on that question. 
[8] As we have sustained the trial 
court's findings of fact that there was no 
timely acceptance of the defendant's coun-
teroffer and no proper tender of the speci-
fied earnest money, we must also conclude 
with the trial court that there was no con-
tract between the parties which could be 
specifically performed. Even if we had 
found the mailed, late acceptance to be 
reasonable and proper, the absence of a 
proper tender of the earnest money would 
have barred the plaintiffs action. In Fisch-
er v. Johnson, supra, the plaintiffs sought 
specific performance, alleging that they had 
sufficiently tendered performance by noti-
fying the defendants that they were ready 
and willing to enter into and perform the 
purchase contract as planned. The plain-
tiffs had some difficulty contacting the de-
fendants and did not tender the $3,000 pay-
ment prerequisite to entering into the con-
tract. 
There is undoubtedly a basis in the evi-
dence to justify a conclusion that" the 
actions of the defendants created some 
degree of difficulty or inconvenience for 
the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, we cannot 
see therein any basis upon which it could 
reasonably be concluded that tfie plain-
tiffs discharged the duty which the law 
imposes upon them of attempting with 
reasonable diligence and good faith to do 
what the agreement required -of- them. 
They did not fulfill that obligation by 
simply serving the notice of willingness 
to go forward, and yet failing to tender 
the required $3,000 payment. 
525 P.2d at 47. The situation in the instant 
case is comparable. The signed earnest 
money agreement, standing alone, was in-
tance to the defendant and that mailing an 
acceptance on a Friday afternoon, half-way 
through the 48-hour period, would not commu-
nicate with the defendant fast enough to allow 
the defendant to approve it within the 48 hours. 
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sufficient to form a binding contract with-
out the required tender of earnest money. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
No costs are awarded. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and OAKS, 
JJ. , concur. 
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CALDER BROS. COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ross L. ANDERSON, Signs, Inc., Dunn 
Construction Co., Jarvis Electric Co., 
Michael Crowley, Michael Crowley dba 
Star Palace, Star Palace, Inc., et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
JARVIS & SONS ELECTRIC CO., INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Ross L. ANDERSON and Brent Weeks, 
et al., Defendants. 
DUNN CONSTRUCTION CO., and Roy-
den, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Ross L. ANDERSON and Allison Ander-
son, Brent C. Weeks and Western 
Star Palace, Inc., Defendants. 
Nos. 17449, 17458 and 17459. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 24, 1982. 
A mortgage foreclosure action was con-
solidated with two other actions brought by 
independent contractors to foreclose their 
mechanics' liens on the same properly. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, George 
E. Ballif, J., entered judgment in favor of 
the mortgagee. Appeals were taken. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
there was ample support for the determina-
tion that the liens in favor of the indepen-
dent contractors did not attach prior to the 
mortgage and did not have priority over the 
mortgage; (2) the mortgage foreclosure ac-
tion was not so inextricably intertwined 
with an Idaho bankruptcy case as to be 
stayed by the bankruptcy case; and (3) the 
order appointing a receiver did not go be-
yond the permissible bounds of the scope of 
a receivership. 
Affirmed. 
1. Mechanics' Liens e=*3 
Purpose of Mechanics' Lien Act is re-
medial in nature and seeks to provide pro-
tection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to value of property of 
1
 another by their materials or labor. U.C.A. 
' 1953, 38-1-5. 
i
2. Mechanics' Liens <s=>168 
Phrase "commencement to do work" as 
used in mechanics' lien statute is construed 
in favor of lien claimants. U.C.A.1953, 38-
1-5. 
3. Mechanics' Liens c=>173 
Materialmen's or mechanics' liens re-
sulting from materials furnished or labor 
performed relate back to and attach as of 
date of commencement of first work on 
improvement or structure involved. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-5. 
4. Mechanics' Liens <^ =>173 
For one contractor's lien to relate back 
to commencement of work or supplying of 
materials by another contractor, both con-
tractors' projects' must have been per-
formed in connection with what is essential-
ly single project performed under common 
plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness 
and without material abandonment; ordi-
nary maintenance or cleanup work does not 
serve as basis for "tacking" so as to fix 
earlier lien date for labor and materials 
 supplied. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
f 5. Mortgages c=> 151(3) 
Liens of contractors could not be 
 "tacked" onto earlier date so as to have 
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Pat I. P R A V O R N E , Appellant, 
v. 
V/ayne M c L E O D and Louise McLeod, 
Respondents. 
No. 4603. 
Supremo Court of Nevada. 
July 10, 1003. 
Purchaser's action for specific per-
formance of vendors' contract to sell realty. 
The 8th Judicial District Court, Clark-
County, John Mowbray, J., entered judg-
ment for the vendors and the purchaser ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Badt, C. J., 
held that the purchaser's signing and re-
turning of the agreement which had been 
drafted by the vendors and forwarded to 
the purchaser constituted an unconditional 
acceptance of the vendors' offer, and that 
a request seeking insertion of a provision 
for gradual release of portions of the realty 
from the note and deed of trust as stated 
portions of the indebtedness were paid was 
only a request for an additional benefit and 
not an essential term or condition of ac-
ceptance. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser OI6(4) 
Purchaser's signing and returning of 
agreement for sale of realty constituted an 
unconditional acceptance of vendors' offer, 
and request attached to agreement seeking 
insertion of a provision for gradual release 
of portions of the realt\ from the note and 
deed of trust as stated portions of the 
indebtedness were paid was not an essential 
term or condition of acceptance. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser C==>23 
Notwithstanding lack of their signa-
tures on the agreement itself, vendors were 
bound by terms of the agreement which 
they had drafted and sent to purchaser 
where a signed covering letter accompany-
ing the agreement contained both the offer 
and the vendors' unconditional promise to 
sign, demonstrating the vendors' assent 
thereto. 
George E. Fianklin, Jr , Las Vegas, for 
appellant. 
Springmeyer, Thompson & Dixon, Reno, 
for respondents. 
BADT, Chief Justice. 
The question here involved for deter-
mination is whether the instrument herein 
referred to- as a contract of purchase and 
sale was a completed contract, or whether 
it was merely an offer made by the McLeods 
to Pravorne tc enter into a contract, which 
offer was rejected by Pravorne and a 
counteroffer made by him, which in turn 
was not accepted by the McLeods. 
Under similar circumstances the law was 
very simply stated in Hargrave v. Heard 
Inv. Co., 56 Ariz. 77, 105 P.2d 520, 521, as 
follows: 
"It is the law that when A offers B to 
enter into a contract on certain terms, and 
B declines to accept those terms but offers 
a counter-proposition, the original offer 
loses its effect, and is thereafter only open 
to acceptance by B when renewed by A. 
On the other hand, if A makes an offer 
which is unconditionally accepted by B, the 
fact that B, after such acceptance, pro-
poses a modification of the original con-
tract, which is declined by A, does not affect 
the validity of the original contract. If 
then, in the present case, the original con-
tract of purchase and sale, upon its delivery 
to and acceptance by plaintiff, was a com-
pleted and binding contract between defend-
ant and the insurance company, the fact 
that the latter desired to have certain 
terms added to those of the contract in the 
escrow directions to plaintiff does not af-
fect the validity of the contract." 
Neither party contests such general re-
cital of the applicable well-established law. 
Pravorne, in his complaint for specific per-
formance, asserts that there was such com-
pleted contract. McLeod insists that his 
offer to enter into the contract of purchase 
and sale was not unconditionally accepted 
by Pravorne but that Pravorne rejected 
the same and made a counteroffer, which 
McLeod refused to accept. The case ther 
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turns upon the construction of the written 
instruments and correspondence involved 
and the actions of the parties thereunder. 
The facts arc as follows: 
The parties had been negotiating with 
respect to a proposed purchase of real prop-
erty by Pravornc from McLeod. Pravornc 
had the Nevada Title Insurance Company 
prepare escrow instructions. They were 
mailed to McLeod but were unsatisfactory 
to him, so he had his attorney draft a com-
plete new contract entitled "Agreement for 
Sale of Realty," which in turn contained 
escrow instructions. McLeod then mailed 
this agreement to Pravorne's real estate 
broker, with a better addressed to the broker 
and signed by McLeod, reading as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Bell: 
"Upon reviewing your Escrow Instruc-
tions which were prepared by Nevada Title 
Insurance-Company, I took them to my at-
torney, Mead Dixon, for his approval. 
"Obviously, we decided to prepare our 
own Agreement of Sale and I am sending 
it for the examination and approval of your 
buyer. There is no change in any of the 
conditions of our telephone agreement, 
but merely that the conditions are set forth 
more clearly. 
"I am sending two copies of this Agree-
ment to Nevada Title Insurance Company, 
If the Agreement is acceptable to your 
buyer, please have him sign and return two 
copies as soon as possible. We will then 
sign one and return it to Nevada Title Com-
pany immediately. 
"If these papers arc in order and ac-
ceptable to your buyer, we are going to be 




"cc: Nevada Title Insurance Company 
"118 South Fourth Street 
"Las Vegas, Nevada 
"ATTENTION: Evelyn Wilson" 
Two unsigned copies of the agreement 
were enclosed. The agreement was be-
tween McLeod and his wife, as sellers, and 
Pravornc as purchaser, and provided that 
the sellers agreed to sell and the purchaser 
to buy the described real estate for the pur-
chase price of §70,50(1.00, payable $1,000.00 
"on the signing of this contract, by cash 
or check to the order of Nevada Title In-
surance Company, * * * $19,445.00 by 
cash or check to the order of Nevada Title 
Insurance Company * * * on or before 
closing," and ' $50,055.00 "by promissory 
note of the Purchaser payable to the order 
of the Sellers in four (4) equal annual 
instalments of principal, plus interest at 6% 
per annum, such instalments to be payable 
on or before May 1 of each year commenc-
ing with May.l , 1963, secured by first deed 
of trust on the above described property.,, 
The contract provided further for the ap-
portionment of taxes and special assess-
ments; that the closing should take place 
at the office of Nevada Title Insurance 
Company at Las Vegas, and that closing 
should be effected (a) by depositing such 
instruments or funds with the title in-
surance company as might be necessary to 
effect the closing, (b) that the deed be the 
usual grant, bargain, and sale deed, (c) that 
the note and deed of trust be in usual form, 
(d) that the sellers would furnish a policy 
of title insurance subject to certain specified 
exceptions, (c) the division and charging 
of fees and expenses according to the usual 
practice of the title insurance company. 
The contract then provided certain condi-
tions as to brokerage commissions, the re-
sulting situation if the sellers should be 
unable to convey good merchantable title, 
that appropriate instructions should be 
signed by cither party upon demand of 
the other and that in the event of conflict 
between the provisions of the agreement 
and the provisions of any escrow instruc-
tions, the provisions of the agreement 
should prevail. 
Pravornc signed the contract of purchase 
and sale in duplicate and delivered the 
copies to the title insurance company. The 
title insurance company mailed the signed 
agreement to McLeod, but stapled to the 
agreement were three sheets of paper. For 
037 
3 5 8 K c v - 3 8 3 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
a rejection of it, a mere inquiry as to 
whether one proposing a contract will alter 
or modify its terms, made before acceptance 
or rejection does not amount to a rejection. 
* * * » > > 
For additional authorities see 1 Williston, 
Contracts § 79, and cases cited therein. 
[1] We are of the opinion that when ap-
pellant signed and returned the agreement 
he made an unconditional acceptance which 
was not made to depend upon McLcod's 
assent to the proposed amendment, which 
was simply a request for an additional bene-
fit which was not an essential term or condi-
tion of his acceptance. 
[2] The fact that Mr. and Mrs. McLcod 
did not sign the original contract before 
forwarding the same is not material. Re-
spondent conceded in oral argument that the 
>igned covering letter above quoted in full 
was the offer. The question that arises 
from such situation is whether or not the 
seller consented to be bound by the written 
contract even though he did not sign it. 
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 
10 Cir., 70 F.2d 969, 974; Reno Electrical 
Works v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
43 Ncv. 191, 194, 183 P. 386, 387; Geary 
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 366 111. 
625, 10 N.E.2d 350; Bartlett v. Rogers, 103 
Cal.App.2d 250, 229 P.2d 434, 437; 1 Cor-
bin, Contracts § 31, at 85. 
Here McLcod had the contract drawn by 
his own attorney and he himself mailed it 
to Pravorne, stating that he would sign it. 
The conclusion is clear that he expressed 
his unconditional assent thereto. 
Concluding as wc do that the request for 
amendment was merely for an additional 
benefit if the request should be approved 
and was not a rejection of the offer, the 
judgment must be reversed and a judgment 
of specific performance entered, and it is 
so ordered. 
The appeal is also from the court's denial 
of Pravorne's "Motion to set Aside Order 
for Summary Judgment or to Grant a Xew 
Trial." XRCP 59. Respondents argue 
that a motion for new trial does not lie 
under the circumstances. In view of the 
foregoing however, it is not necessary to 
discuss this subject. 
Judgment reversed with costs, and re-
manded with instructions for entrv of iuds:-
ment not inconsistent with the foregoing-
opinion. 
McXAMEE, J., and GABRIELLI, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
THOMPSON, J., being disqualified, the 
Governor commissioned Honorable JOHN 
E.< GABRIELLI of the Second Judicial 
District to sit in his place. 
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where the offeree has agreed in advance that such silence he so construed13 
or where there was some duty resting upon him to that effect.14 The solicita-
tion of the offer by the offeree may, in the light of the relations of the parties 
or other surrounding circumstances, justify the offeror in regarding the offeree's 
silence after receiving the offer as an acceptance.15 It is said, however, 
that circumstances which will impose a contractual obligation by mere silence 
are exceptional in their character and of rare occurrence; and no legal liability 
can arise out of the mere silence of the party sought to be affected, unless he 
is subject to a duty to reply which is neglected, to the harm of the other party.16 
An agreement inferred from silence must rest on the principle of estoppel, 
and a change of position, in reliance on such silence, resulting in substantial 
injury, is an essential element of the estoppel.17 
While there is authority that silence amounts to assent where the offer states 
that acceptance will be assumed m case there is no reply,18 there is also au-
thority that even under such circumstances silence is not necessarily a legal 
acceptance which forms a contract.19 
There is a legal acceptance where silence is accompanied by acts of the of-
feree, such as exercise of dominion over things offered to him, which warrant 
an inference of assent.20 
§ 48. Acceptance by mail. 
While an offer may ordinarily be accepted by mail, such an acceptance 
must be unqualified, plain, and free from ambiguity, to constitute a contract.1 
Whether certain correspondence between the parties showed that the plaintiff 
had unconditionally accepted the defendant's offer has been held to be a ques-
tion for the court.2 
13. Bowlcy v Fuller, 121 Mc 22, 115 A 466, 
24 ALR 964. 
14. Colc-Mclntvre-Norneet Co. v Hollowav, 
141 Term 679, 214 SW 817, 7 ALR 1603, 
holding that the delay of a jobber in notify-
ing a customer of the rejection of an order 
Liken bv the jobber's traveling salesman 
amounts to an acceptance of it. 
15. Truscon Steel Co. v Cooke (CA10 Okla) 
90 F2d 905. 
17 Tex Lc Rev 209. 
16. Chastian v Baxter, 139 Kan 331. 31 P 
2d 21; Lcchlcr v Montana L. Ins. Co. 48 ND 
644, 186 NW 271, 23 ALR 1193; Roval Ins. 
Co. v Beatty, 119 Pa 6, 12 A 607; Colc-Mc-
Intvrc-NorP.cet Co. v Hollow-ay, 141 Tcnn 
679, 214 SW 817, 7 ALR 1683. 
There can be an acceptance by silence only 
where the circumstances arc such that a duty 
to speak arises. A duty to speak can arise 
only when an offeror has a right to demand 
some action by the offeree. Suittcr v Thomp-
son, 225 Or 614, 350 P2d 267. 
In Bowley v Fuller, 121 Mc 22, 115 A 
466, 24 ALR 964, it was held that the mere 
failure of the owner of hay stored in an-
other's barn, to answer the latter's letter 
naming a price for storage, docs not create a 
contract to pay the price named. 
17. Lctrcs v Washington Co-op. Chick Asso. 
8 Wash 2d 61. I l l P2d 59k Shakman v 
United Slates Credit Svstem Co. 92 Wis 366, 
66 NW 520. 
18. Wood & B Co. v D. E. Hcv.it Lumber 
Co. 89 W Va 254, 109 SE 242, 19 ALR 
467. 
19. Bowlev v Fuller, 121 Mc 22, 115 A 
466, 24 ALR 96k Trover v Fox, 162 Wash 
537, 290 P 733, 77 ALR 1132. 
The recipient of an o.Tcr is under no 
duty to speak, his silence may not be trans-
lated into an accep*arce where it is not mis-
leading, merely because the ofTer purports 
to attach that effect to it. Albrecht Chemical 
Co. v Anderson Trading Corp. 293 NY 437, 
84 NE2d 625. 
20. Russell v Texas Co. (CA9 Monts. 238 
F id 636. cert den 354 US 938, 1 L ed 2d 
1537, 77 S Ct 1400: Gorham v Peerless Life 
Ins. Co. 368 Mich 335, 118 NW2d 306; Wads-
Worth v New York Life Ins. Co. 349 Mich 
240, 04 NW2d 513. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 72. 
1. Watts v Thcmas Carter & Sons, Inc. 207 
App Div 656, 202 NYS 852. 
Practice Aids.—Proof of mailing of letter. 
7 AM JUR PROOF OF FACTS 417, MAILINC, 
Proof 1. 
2. M. P. Berglas Mfg. Co. v Paddleford, 201 
App Div 611, 194 NYS 756. 
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-n confronted by 
1 when the letter 
There is no doubt 
binding contract 
ay in some cases 
has been pointed 
ation of the con-
i cation to himself 
ived by him and 
of the person to 
With respect to acceptance by mail, the courts have 1 
the rather difficult question whether the contract is complc 
of acceptance is mailed or when it is received by the offeror, 
tha t the implication that a complete, final, and absolute) 
is formed as soon as the acccr vancc of an offer is posted 
lead to inconvenience and haidship . At the same time, i 
out that an offeror, if he chooses, may always make the fo. 
t rac t which he proposes dependent upon the actual commv 
of the acceptance and that if no answer to his offer is rc< 
the mat ter is of importance to him, he can make inquiri< 
whom his offer was addressed. It has been suggested, moreover, tha t if the 
offeror is not to be bound by the acceptance until it is received by him, the 
par ty accepting the offer ought not to be bound when his acceptance is re-
ceived, because he docs not know of the meeting of the minds, for the offer 
may have been wi thdrawn before his acceptance was rccciwd. Upon balanc-
ing convenience and inconvenience, the courts have deem< 1 it more consist-
ent wTith the acts and declarations of the parties to consider the contract com-
plete and absolutely binding on the transmission of the ac ccptance through 
the post, as the medium of communicat ion which the parti :s themselves con-
template, instead of postponing its completion until the acceptance has been 
received by the offeror. By treat ing the post office as the agency of both 
parties, the courts have managed to harmonize the legal notion tha t it is neces-
sary tha t the minds of the parties meet with the equally well-established pr in-
ciple that a determination to accept is ineffectual if it is not communicated 
either actually or by legal implication.3 Accordingly, where acceptance by mail 
is authorized, the contract is completed at the moment the acceptor deposits 
in the post office the letter of acceptance directed to the offeror's proper ad-
dress and with the postage prepaid, provided he docs so within the proper 
time and before receiving any intimation of the revocation of the offer.4 I t 
follows that , in such a case, it is immaterial whether the letter of acceptance 
actually reaches the offeror.5 There arc, however, instances where the mailing 
of an acceptance is unauthorized and docs not form a contract.6 
3 . Burton v United States, 202 US 344, 50 
L ed 1057, 26 S Ct 688: Patrick v Bowman, 
149 US 411, 37 L cd 790, 13 S Ct 811, 866; 
Tayloc v Merchants' F. Ins. Co. 9 How (US) 
390, 13 L ed 187: Cohen v First Nat. Bank, 
22 Ariz 394, 198 P 122, 15 ALR 701; 
Kcmpncr v Cohn, 47 Ark 519, 1 SW 869; 
Updike v People, 92 Colo 125. 18 P2d 472; 
New v Gcnnania F. Ins. Co. 171 Ind 33, 85 
NE 703; Lucas v Western U. Tclcg. Co. 131 
Iowa 669, 109 NW 191; Gipps Brewing Co. 
v Dc France, 91 Iowa 108, 58 NW 1087; 
Wheat v Cross, 31 Md 99; Eggcr v Neshitt, 
122 Mo 667, 27 SW 385; Wester v Casein Co. 
206 NY 506, 100 NE 488; Macticr v Frith, 
6 Wend (NY) 103. 
Adams v Lindscll. 1 Barn & Aid 681, 106 
Eng Reprint 250: Brogdcn v Metropolitan R. 
Co. (Eng) LR 2 App Cas 66G; Household F. 
& Carriage Acci. Ins. Co. v Grant (Eng) LR 
4Exch Div216 (CA). 
Williston, Contracts 3d ed §§ 81, 83, 85. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 67. 
This rule is known as the "deposited ac-
ceptance rule" and also as the "rule in 
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Adams v Lindscll [1 Barn" & Aid. 681, 106 
Ens. Reprint 2 5 0 ] / ' Morrison v Thoclkc (Fla 
App) 155 So 2d 889. 
4. Shuhert Theatrical Co. v Rath (CA2) 
271 F 827, 20 ALR 846 (holding that the 
mailing of a letter exercising an open option 
to employ another's services for a specified 
time, properly stamped and addressed, closes 
the contract); Morrison v Thoeike (Fla App) 
155 So 2d 889; Consolidated Sales Co. v 
Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va 307, 68 
SE2d 652. 
5. Cohen v First Nat. "Bank, 22 Ariz 394, 
198 P 122, 15 ALR 701; Egger v Nesbitt, 122 
Mo 667, 27 SW 385: Anderson v Stewart, 
149 Neb 660, 32 NW2d 140, 3 ALR2d 250; 
Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v Davis, 96 
Tex 501, 74 SW 17; Consolidated Sales Co. 
v Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va 307, 68 
SE2d 652; Weaver v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 
SE 743. 
Household F & Carriage Acci. Ins. Co. v 
Grant (Eng) LR 4 Lxch Div 216 (CA). 
In holding that an option was accepted 
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Where acceptance by mail is authorized, as the contract is completed when 
the acceptance is duly mailed, the ofTcr cannot thereafter be revoked even 
though the revocation is mailed before, if it does not reach the acceptor 
until after, the mailing of the acceptance. The ofTer cannot be withdrawn 
unless the withdrawal reaches the party to whom it is addressed before his 
letter of reply announcing the acceptance has been mailed.7 While there is 
some authority apparently to the contrary, most of these cases seem distin-
guishable. Some arc explainable under express provisions of a statute relating 
to effective time of revocations. Others are based on the theory, contrary 
to the prevailing rule, that acceptance does not become effective until receipt 
thereof by the offeror. In jurisdictions where this view prevails, it would seem 
that the general rule above stated will not be applied, and the revocation 
may be effective at least if communicated to the offeree before receipt by the 
offeror of the letter of acceptance, although the revocation was not received 
by the offeree until after the mailing of his acceptance.8 
It would seem that regardless of the manner in which an offer is commu-
nicated, acceptance by letter is sufficient if the letter is actually delivered to 
the offeror within the time the offer remains open. But of course a letter 
which is written and remains in the writer's hands or under his control is not 
an acceptance.9 Similarly, where the offeree promptly delivers a letter of ac-
ceptance to his agent with directions to mail it, but the agent neglects to mail 
it within the time specified in the offer, no contract is formed.10 
§ 49. — Authorization. 
Acceptance by mail may, of course, be expressly authorized, and it would 
appear to be impliedly authorized when the circumstances are such that it 
must have been within the contemplation of the parties that the mails would 
be used in making the answer. It is said that where the circumstances are 
such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, 
according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the mails might be used as a 
means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is com-
plete as soon as it is posted.11 It has also been said that the rule should be 
by the mailing of a letter, the court in Shu-
bcrt Theatrical Co. v Rath (CA2) 271 F 
827, 20 ALR 816, observed that "the law is 
settled that, if a letter accepting an offer is 
made in the manner either expressly or im-
pliedly indicated by the party making the 
ofTcr, it makes no difference whatever that 
the letter is never received because of some 
mistake of the post-office authorities, or 
through accident in transmission, or because 
in some way it becomrs lost," citing numerous 
authorities in support of the proposition. 
6. § 50, infra. 
7. Patrick v Bowman, 149 US 411, 37 L cd 
790, 13 S Ct 811, 866; TayJoc v Merchants' 
F. Ins. Co. 9 How (US) 390. 13 L ed 187; 
Kempncr v Cohn, 4 7 Ark 519, 1 SW 869.; 
Wheat v Cross, 31 Md 99; Anderson v Stewart, 
149 Neb 660, 32 NW2d 140, 3 ALR2d 
250. 
Stevenson v McLean (Ens) LR 5 QB Div 
316. 
Annotation: 125 ALR 900. 
8. Stahl v Locb, Cooncy & Locb, Inc. 209 
III App 245 (abstract) (on theory that ac-
ceptance docs not become effective uivil re-
ceipt by offeror); M'Cullo<h v Eagle Ins. Co. 
18 Mass (1 Pick) 278 (same); Waiters v Lin-
coln, 29 SD 98, 135 NW 712 (statute). 
Annotation: 125 ALR 991. 
9. Morrison v Thoclkc (Ha App) 155 So 2d 
839; Ritchie v Rawlings, 106 Kan 118, 186 
P 1033; Logan v WaddV ' M o App) 238 
SW 516; Mactier v Frith, 6 Wend <XY) 103: 
Watson v Orccon Mohnc Plow Co. 112 Or 
414, 227 P 278. 
10. Maclay v Harvey, 90 111 525. 
1 1 . Shubcrt Theatrical Co. v Rath (CA2) 
271 F 827, 20 ALR 846; Lucas v Western U. 
Teles. Co. 131 Iowa 669. 109 XW 191; Blake 
v Hamburg-Bremen J \ Ins. Co. 67 Tex 160, 
2 SW 368 / 
Household F & Carriage Acci Ins. Co. v 
Grant (Eng) LR 4 Exch Div 216 (CA). 
Williston, Contracts 3d ed §S 81, 83, 85. 
Authority to send an acceptance by mail so 




should notify the offeror if he docs not intend 
to accept. 
An offeree who does any act inconsistent 
with the offeror's ownership of offered prop-
erty is bound in accordance with the offered 
terms unless they arc manifestly unreasonble. 
But if the act is wrongful as against the offeror 
it is an acceptance only if ratified by him. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 69. 
p 387, n 17— 
An agreement based on estoppel, when in-
ferred from silence, must include a change of 
position and reliance on the silence and an 
obligation or duty to speak out. Bivans Corp. v 
Community Nat. Bank, 15 Mich App 178, 166 
NW2d 270. 
p 3 8 7 , n 19— , 
Sec also Sorg v Fred Weisz 8c. Associates, 14 
Cal App 3d 78, 91 Cal Rptr 918, holding that 
silence or inaction by an offeree did not consti-
tute acceptance of a landowner's written offer 
to grant, for a certain daily compensation, a 
license to store waste and rubbish which the 
offeree without authority had previously aban-
doned on the land, even though the offer 
slaved. \ha\ continued use oV \he tand COT "S\OT-
ing" the waste would constitute acceptance and 
even though the offeree failed to remove the 
rubbish within what was found to be a reason-
able time, where there were no prior dealings, 
communication, or any other relationship be-
tween the landowner and the offeree from 
which the former could reasonably have con-
cluded that the offeree intended to accept the 
obligation contained in the offer. 
p 387, n 20—First Nat. Bank v Marietta Mfg. 
Co. 151 W Va 636, 153 SK2d 172. 
§ 48. Acceptance by mail 
Practice aids: Acceptance by Correspondence. 
1 VVilliston on Contracts 3d ed § 81 . 
When an Acceptance Is Mailed. 1 Williston 
on Contracts 3d ed § 85. 
Restatements: 
As to time when rejection or counter-offer 
terminates power of acceptance, according to 
Restatement. Contracts 2d, see § 39, supra. 
An acceptance sent by mail or otherwise 
from a distance is not operative when dis-
patched, unless it is properly addressed and 
such other precautions taken as are ordinarily 
observed to insure safe transmission of similar 
messages. Restatements, CONTRACTS 2d § 66. 
p 388, n 4—E. M. Boerke, Inc. v Williams. 28 
Wis 2d 627, 137 NW2d 489. 
Where a letter confirming exercise of option 
to purchase was mailed within the period of 
option, it constituted a valid acceptance of the 
offer under the terms of the option, even 
though the letter was received after the period 
had expired. Re Crossman's Estate, 231 Cal 
App 2d 370. 4 1 Cal Rptr 800. 
The well-established rule is that in the ab-
sence of any limitation or provision to the 
166 
contrary in the offer, the acceptance of an offer 
is complete and the contract becomes binding 
upon those parties when the offeree deposits 
the acceptance in the post box. Reserve Ins. 
Co. v Duckett. 249 Mel 108. 238 A2d 536. 
p 389, n 9—Darling v Nincteen-Eighty Corp. 
— Iowa —, 176 NW2d 765 (offeree's mail-
ing papers to his own agent did not consti-
tute acceptance). 
Additional case authorities for section: 
Where a written acceptance of an offer is 
deposited in the mail one day and received by 
the offeror two days later, telephoned revoca-
tion of the offer on the intervening day was 
ineffective, the agreement becoming binding 
upon mailing of the acceptance. Kennedv v 
Erie Ins. Exchange.. 64 Pa D & C2d 227,' 35 
Lch Co LJ 70. 
§ 4 9 . — A u t h o r i z a t i o n 
Practice aids: An Acceptance Must Be Prop-
erly Stamped and Addressed. I Williston on 
Contracts 3d ed § 84. 
Ihc of Mail or Telegraph Must be Autho-
rized if Contract is to be Completed by 
Sending Acceptance. I Williston on Con-
tracts 3d ed § 83. 
Restatement: 
As to what constitutes receipt of revocation, 
rejection, or acceptance of offer under Restate-
ment, Contracts 2d, see § 44, supra. 
§ 5 1 . —EfTect of r igh t to withdraw, or 
w i t h d r a w a l of, le t ter f r o m mail 
Practice aids: Withdrawal of Acceptance From 
Channel of Communication. 1 Williston on 
Contracts 3d ed § 86. 
§ 5 3 . A c c e p t a n c e by t e l e p h o n e 
Practice aids: 
Acceptance by Telephone or Teletype. 1 
Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 82A. 
Restatement: 
Acceptance given by telephone or other me-
dium of substantially instantaneous two-way 
communication is governed by the principles 
applicable to acceptances where the parties are 
in the presence of each other. Restatement, 
CONTRACTS 2d § 64. 
p 392, n 14—Sims v United Bridge & Iron 
(OldaH02 P 2 d 9 l l . 
p 392, n 15—Pierce-v Folcv Bros., Inc. 283 
Minn 360, 16S NW2d 346. 
§ 54 . A c c e p t a n c e by te legraph—of te le -
g r a p h i c offer 
Practice aids: Acceptance by Telegraph. 1 
Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 82. 
Restatement: 
As to time when rejection or counter-offer 
terminates power of acceptance, according to 
Restatement, Contracts 2d, see § 39, supra. 
(17 Am Jur 2d Supp] 
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demand that he comply with his ofTcr, asking time to consider, and by a sub-
sequent oiler of a compromise which is rejected.17 
3. QUALIFIED OR CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE 
§ G2. Generally; necessity that acceptance comply with ofTcr. 
The rule is fundamental that an acceptance must comply with the terms of 
the offer18—that is, in order to form a contract, the ofTcr and acceptance must 
express assent to one and the same thing,19 and there must be no substantial or 
material20 variance between them.1 An ofTcr imposes no obligations until ac-
cepted according to its terms,2 without qualification or departure.3 So too, in 
order that a binding and enforceable contract may arise out of the doing of 
an act in consequence of an ofTer, the act must be done in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the offer.* 
17. Page v Shainwald, 169 NY 246, 62 NE 
356. 
18. Baird v Pratt (CA8) 148 F 825; Gram 
v Mutual Life Ins. Co. 300 NY 375, 91 NE2d 
307. 
21 U of Cincinnati L Rev 68. 
An acceptance must be coextensive with the 
offer. Podany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 
NW2d 193. 
An acceptance must be as specific as the 
ofTcr. Valashinas v Koniuto, 283 App Div 
13, 125 NYS2d 554, add 308 NY 233, 124 . 
NE2d 300. 
19. Phoenix Tron & Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. 
(CA6) 253 F 165. 1 ALR 1497; Allen v 
Bissingcr & Co. 62 Utah 226, 219 P 539, 31 
ALR 376 (holding that the acceptance of 
an offer to furnish a copy of the official re-
port of a hearing before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission by affirming interest in 
"your official report of the different changes 
in the handling of freight"' and the ordering 
of a copy of the same constituted a contract 
for the copied stenographic report of the tes-
timony taken at the hearing). 
There must be a meeting of the minds of 
the parties upon identical terms. Allis-Chal-
mcrs Mfg. Co. v Curtis Electrical Co. 153 
Tex 118, 264 SW2d 700. 
20. Immaterial or minor differences or vari-
ances between the offer and acceptance will 
not prevent tkc formation of a contract. § 65, 
infra. 
1. Isclin v United States, 271 US 136, 70 
L ed 872, 46 S Ct 458; Beer v Mackin, 145 
US 629, 36 L ed 812, 12 S Ct 977: Ship-
man v District of Columbia, 119 US 140, 
30 L ed 337, 7 S Ct 134; Phoenix Iron & 
Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. (CA6) 253 F 165, 1 
ALR 1497; Koehlc v Tiller (Fla) 42 So 2d 
363; Quinn v Daly, 300 III 273, 133 NE 
290; Brach v Mattcson, 298 III 387, 131 
NE 804; Shaw v Ingram-Day Lumber Co. 
152 Ky 329, 153 SW 431; Thomas v Ledger, 
274 Mich 16, 263 NW 783; United Cigar 
Stores Co. v llollister, 185 Minn 534, 242 
NW 3; Williams v Emerson-Brantingham 
Implement Co. (Mo App) 198 SW 425; 
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Anderson v Stewart, 149 Neb 660, 32 NW 
2d 140, 3 ALR 250; McConc v Ecclcs, 42 
Ncv 451, 181 P 134; Richardson v Greens-
boro Warehouse & Storage Co. 223 NC 344, 
26 SE2d 897, 149 ALR 201; Kvalc v Keane, 
39 ND 560, 168 NW 74, 9 ALR 972; St. 
Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v Nix, 101 Okla 
197, 224 P 982; Northwestern Agencies v 
Flynn, 138 Or 101, 5 P2d 530; Southern 
Bridge Co. v Askew, 119 SC 19, 111 SE 
790: Canton Cotton Mills v Bowman Over-
all Co. 149 Tenn 18, 257 SW 398; Hancock 
v Fletcher, 113 W Va 624, 169 SE 457. 
Jordan v Norton, 4 Mces & W 155, 150 
En£ Reprint 1382. 
Annotation: 3 ALR2d 257, § 1. 
Williston, Contracts 3d ed § 73. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 59. 
2. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v Columbus 
Rolling Mill Co. 119 US 149, 30 L ed 376, 
7 S Ct 168; Tillcy v Cook County, 103 US 
155, 26 L ed 374; First Nat. Bank v Hall, 
101 US 43, 25 L cd-822. 
The acceptance must be in the exact terms 
of the offer. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v Curtis 
Electrical Co. 153 Tex 118, 264 SW2d 700. 
The acceptance must be in exact accord-
ance with the offer. Wusslcr v Peterson (Mo) 
270 SW2d 12. „ 
3 . Northeastern Constr. Co. v Winston- • 
Salem (CA4) 83 F2d 57, 104 ALR 1142; 
Polhamus v Roberts, 50 NM 236, 175 P2d 
196, 170 ALR 991. 
A difference as to the form of a contract 
Is just as effective "to prevent entering into 
a contract as one as to substance. Phoenix 
Iron & Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. (CA6) 253 
F 165, 1 ALR 1497. 
An offer to take a certain sum in cash 
for land is not accepted, so as to bind the 
parties, by a contract which leaves the buyer 
at liberty to withdraw by forfeiting a de-
posit of one-quarter of that sum or to pay 
the remainder within 60 days. Stilt v Huidc-
kopcr, 17 Wall (US) 384. 21 L ed 644. 
4. Scott v People's Monthly Co. 209 Iowa 
503, 228 NW 263, 67 ALR 413. 
0 4 3 
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The acceptance, to be effective, must be unequivocal and unconditional,5 
and it may not introduce additional terms and condition^.6 If a condition is 
affixed to the acceptance by the party to whom the offer is made, or any 
modification of or change in the offer is made or requested, there is a rejection 
of the offer7 which put:; an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made 
the original offer renews it or assents to the modification suggested.8 The effect 
of an acceptance containing conditions not found in the offer is to make a 
counterproposal, upon which the parties have not yet agreed, but which is open 
for acceptance or rejection.9 A qualified acceptance is simply a counteroffer,10 
and this is true by statute in some states.11 It is also a general rule that where 
an offer is made to a particular person, a reply which attempts to substitute 
or add another as a party to the proposed contract, -for direct performance of 
or participation in the fulfilment of the obligation involved or a material part 
thereof, is tantamount to a counteroffer and in effect a rejection of the offer.12 
87 ALR2d 661, § 7 (prize Annotation: 
contests). 
In order to make performance of a thing 
proposed sufficient as an acceptance of the 
proposal, the performance must be made in 
accordance with the terms of the proposal 
as to amount, as to quality, as to fitness for 
the purpose intended, and as to the time 
of delivery. Barber-Green Co. v M. F. Dol-
lard, Jr., Inc. 239 App Div 655, 269 NYS 
2H,a iTd 267 NY 545, 196 NE 571. 
The purchaser of goods from a corpora-
tion is not entitled to his percentage in a pro-
posed profit-sharing scheme devised by the 
corporation, where he did not comply with 
the condition upon which the offer of a right 
to a participation in the profits was rested, 
namely, that he would for the following year 
deal exclusively with such corporation. D. 
R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v Corn Products Rcf. 
Co. 236 US 165, 59 L cd 520, 35 S Ct 398. 
• 5. Wusslcr v Peterson (Mo) 270 SW2d 12; 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v Curtis Electrical 
Co. 153 Tex 118, 264 SW2d 700. 
Williston, Contracts 3d cd § 72. 
6. Podany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 NW 
2d 193. 
25 U of Cincinnati L Rev 68. 
One accepting an offer has no right to im-
pose additional terms or to introduce new and 
substantially different conditions not found in 
the offer. Richardson v Greensboro Ware-
house & Storage Co. 223 NC 344, 26 SE2d 
897, 149 ALR 201. 
7. Ban- v Lapslcy, 1 Wheat (US) 151, 4 
L ed 58: Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v WilkofT 
Co. (CA6) 253 F 165, 1 ALR 1497; Baird 
v Pratt (CA8) 148 F 825; Montgomery 
Gaslight Co. v Montgomery, 87 Ala 245, 
6 So 113; Smith v School Dist. 187 Ark 
405, 59 S\V2d 1022: Four Oil Co. v United 
Oil Producers, 145 Cal 623, 79 P 366 (hold-
ing that an acceptance of an offer to sell 
crude oil of 15° gravity, with the added 
stipulation that it must be of that gravity 
at 60° Fahrenheit, is not sufficient to 
constitute a binding contract) ; Corcoran v 
(17 Am Jur 2 d ] — 2 6 
White, 117 111 118, 7 NE 525: Cedar Rapids 
Lumber Co. v Fisher. 129 Iowa 332, 104 
NW 595: Thomas v Ledger, 274 Mich 16, 263 
NW 783; State ex rel. Johnson v Blair, 331 
Mo 1072, 174 SW2d 051; Jones v Great North-
ern R. Co. 68 Mont 231, 217 P 673, 37 ALR 
754: Anderson v Stewart, 149 Neb 660, 32 
NW2d 140, 3 ALR2d 250: McConc v Ecclcs, 
42 Ncv 451, 181 P 134: Barrow S. S. Co. v 
Mexican C. R. Co. 134 NY 15, 31 NE 261; 
Mactier v Frith. 6 Wend (NY) 103: Ruckcr 
v Sanders, 182 NC 507. 109 SE "57: Horean 
v Russell, 24 ND 490. 140 NW 99: Sossa-
mon v Littleiohn, 241 SC 478. 129 SE2d 124: 
Crews v Sullivan, 133 Va 478. 113 SE 865: 
Weaver v Burr. 31 W Va 736, 8 SE 713: 
Todorovich v Kinnickinnic Mut. Loan cc 
Bide. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298 NW 226, 135 
ALR 818. 
Williston, Contracts 3d ed £ 77. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS £$ 6 ' \ 72. 
8. As to acceptance of conditions by the of-
feror, see § 66, infra. 
9. Bvford v Gates Bros. Lumber Co. 216 
Ark 400, 225 SW2d 929: Richardson y 
Greensboro Warehouse £ Storage Co. 233 
N C 344, 26 SE2d 89,7, 149 ALR 201. 
5 Ark L Rev 218. 
A reply to an ofTor, thourh purporting to 
accept it, which zdds qualifications or re-
quires performance of conditions, h not an 
acceptance but a counteroffer. Poihamus v 
Roberts, 50 NM 236, 175 P2d 196, 170 ALR 
991. 
10. Hall v Mutual Life Ins. Co. 282 App 
Div 203, 122 NYS2d 239, afTd 306 NY 9U9, 
119 NE2d 598. 
21 U of Cincinnati L Rev 68. 
A qualified acceptance amounts to a re-
jection and constitutes a counteroffer. Po-
dany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 NW2d 
193. 
11 . Fry 
1224. 
Foster, 179 Okla 393, 65 P2d 
12. Bank of Buchanan Countv v Continental 
Nat. Bank (CA8 Mo) 277 F 385; Wilson v 
401 
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The offeree, having once rejected the offer by a conditional acceptance, can-
not afterward revive it by tendering an unconditional acceptance of it.13 
One who has submitted a countcrproposition cannot without the assent of the 
other party withdraw or abandon it, and then accept the original offer.14 
In order to give the rejected offer any new vitality, there must be a renewal 
of it, or renewed assent to it, by the party who made it,16 which may be in-
ferred, for example, from the fact that the parties conducted business under 
the conditional acceptance.10 
§ G3. Differences regarding place of performance, payment, or delivery. 
The general rule is that an acceptance which specifies a different place of 
performance from that stated or implied in the offer will not consummate a 
contract.17 Accordingly, it may be said generally that an acceptance which 
specifies a different place for payment of the purchase price or of delivery 
from that stated in the offer or implied as a matter of law is not such an 
unequivocal and unconditional acceptance as to create a binding contract.13 
This rule is subject to the limitation that where an unqualified acceptance 
is made, it will not be neutralized or destroyed by a mere suggestion or re-
quest, not intended as a condition of the acceptance, that payment or delivery 
be made at a place other than the place specified in the offer or implied as a 
matter of law.19 Similarly, it has been held that where an offer specifies no 
Windolph, 103 NJ Eq 275, 143 A 316; Pol-
hamus v. Roberts, 50 NM 236, 175 P2d 196, 
170 ALR 991; Frick & Lindsav Co. v Johns-
town & S. R. Co. 271 Pa 536, 115 A 837; 
Dorsey v Strand, 21 Wash 2d 217, 150 P2d 
702. 
Annotation: 170 ALR 996. 
13. Isclin v United States, 271 US 136, 
70 L ed 872, 46 S Ct 458; Minneapolis & 
St. L. R. Co. v Columbus Rolling Mill Co. 
119 US 149, 30 L ed 376, 7 S Ct 163; Tilley 
v Cook County (Tillcv v Chicago) 103 US 
155, 26 L ed 374; Baird v Pratt (CA8) 
148 F 825; Montgomery Gaslight Co. v 
Montgomery, 87 Ala 245, 6 So 113: Role-
son v Blount, 143 Ark 307, 220 SW 31 ; 
Four Oil Co. v United Oil Producers, 145 
Cal 623, 79 P 366; Shaw v Ingram-Day Lum-
ber Co. 152 Ky 329, 153 SW 431; Spraguc v 
Hosie, 155 Mich 30, 118 NW 497; Lewis v 
Johnson. 123 Minn 409, 143 NW 1127; State 
ex rcl. Johnson v Blair, 351 Mo 1072, 174 
S\V2d 851; McCone v Ecclcs, 42 Ncv 451, 
181 P 134; Rucker v Sanders, 182 NC 607, 
109 SE 857; C. R. Shaw Wholesale Co. v 
Hackharth, 102 Or 80, 201 P 1066; Sossa-
mon v Littlcjohn, 241 SC 478, 129 SE2d 
124; Canton Cotton Mills v Bowman Overall 
Co. 149 Tcnn 18, 257 SW 398; Mcascll v 
Baruch, 152 Va 460, 147 SE 203; Crewi T 
Sullivan, 133 Va 478, 113 SE 865. 
An offer by one who has secured an op-
tion for the purchase of real property, which 
departs from the terms of the option as to 
the time of payment of the purchase price, 
amounts to a rejection of the option, and such 
option may not be revived by a subsequent 
unconditional acceptance. Beaumont v Pricto, 
249 US 554, 63 L cd 770, 39 S Ct 383. 
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14. Bokcrn v Loud (Mo App) 108 SW2d 
1049. 
16 Tex L Rev 260. 
15. Thomas v Ledger, 274 Mich 16, 263 
NW 783; Lewis v Johnson, 123 Minn 409, 
143 NW 1127; Bokcrn v Loud (Mo App) 
108 SW2d 1049; Todorovich v Kinnickinnic 
Mut. Loan & Bid*. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298 
NW 226, 135 ALR 818. 
16 Tex L Rev 260. 
16. McKell v Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 
(CA6) 175 F 321, writ of cert den 220 US 
613, 55 L ed 609, 31 S Ct 717; Hampton v 
Lee, 49 Idaho 16, .235 P 1023; Rucker v 
Sanders, 182 NC 607] 109 SE 857. 
17. McCutchan v Iowa State Bank, 232 
Iowa 550, 5 NW2d 813 (place of payment 
and dclivcrv); De Jongc v* Hunt, 103 Mich 
94, 61 NW 341 (place of payment); Frirk & 
L. Co. v Johnstown & S. R. Co. 271 Pa 
536, 115 A 837 1 place of delivery). 
Annotation: 3 ALR2d 257, 258, §§ 1, 2. 
18. Sawyer v Brossart, 67 Iowa 673, 25 NW 
876 (place of payment); Egger v Nesbitt, 122 
Mo 667, 27 SW 335 (place of payment); 
Anderson v Stewart, 149 Neb 660, 32 NW2d 
140, 3 ALR2d 660 (place of payment and de-
livery); Hall v Jones, 164 NC 199, 80 SE 
228 (place of payment and delivery). 
Annotation: 3 ALR2d 257, § 2. 
An acceptance of an offer to sell or to buy 
personal property, stipulating a different place 
for delivery than the place expressly stated 
in the offer, does not create a binding con-
tract. See SALT.S (1st ed § 51 Supp) . 
19. Chournos v Evona Inv. Co. 97 Utah.v 
[17 Am Jur 2d] 
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place for closing the transaction, the fact that the offeree accompanies his 
acceptance with a suggestion as to a place of closing will not constitute such a 
variance from the offer as to make the acceptance incfTcctivc.20 Of course, if 
the ofTeror assents to the offeree's acceptance changing the place of payment 
or delivery, a contract will result.1 
§ 64. Stipulation as to terms or conditions which wrouIcl be implied. 
It is well settled that an offeree's acceptance is not conditional and there-
fore insufficient merely because it recites terms or conditions that would in 
any event have been implied from the original offer,2 inasmuch as such an 
acceptance introduces nothing new into the contract.3 Accordingly, since an 
offer to sell implies that the title is marketable, an acceptance calling for a 
marketable title docs not introduce a new condition which prevents the forma-
tion of the contract.4 Moreover, although the offeree expressly qualifies his 
acceptance by making it a condition thereof that he is to have a right to which 
he would by law have been entitled if his acceptance had been absolute in 
terms, there being no reference to such right in the offer, it seems that the 
acceptance is in reality absolute, does not vary from the offer, and operates to 
form a contract.6 There is some authority, however, to the effect that an ac-
ceptance of an offer which makes no mention of a certain right of the offeree, 
which he would have as a matter of law if the offer should be accepted ab-
solutely, conditional on the offeror's agreeing that he should have such right, is 
a qualified acceptance and such as to prevent the formation of a contract unless 
the offeror thereafter in some way agrees thereto.6 
§ 65. Collateral or immaterial matters; inquiries, requests, suggestions, or 
directions. 
It must not be infened, from the rule that an acceptance must be uncon-
ditional, that the mere mention in a letter of acceptance of matters upon 
which the acceptance of the proposition does not depend prevents the contract 
from being completed.7 There is authority to the effect that although an ac-
F 340, 1 ALR 1485, holding that a provisior 
in an acceptance of an application for loan: 
on vessels to make the advance when th( 
lender's attorney ad\ises him that the title i: 
Rood does not introduce a new term which 
prevents the formation of a contract enforce 
able arainst the borrower, although the ab 
stract u never furnished or the title passcc 
upon. 
5. Sec Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v Wilkof 
Co. (CA6) 253 F 1G5, 1 ALR 1197, in which 
it was said that it was unnecessary to dccid< 
this poinL 
6. Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. 
supra, in which it was said that the partie 
did net aqrec as to the form of the contrac 
in that the offeror intended the contract t< 
be in the form of the offer, whereas the of 
fcrcc intended the contract to embrace a tern 
expressly giving the offeree the riqht to whicl 
he would have been entitled without such ex 
press provision. 
7. Townscnd v Stick (CA4 NC) 158 F2< 
142; Radford v Practical Premium Co. 12. 
Ark 199, 188 SW 562; Moore v Picrson, ( 
Iowa 279; Johnson v Federal Union Surer 
40: 
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335, 93 P2d 450, rch den 97 Utah 316, 94 
P2d 470; Turner v McCormick, 56 W Va 
161, 49 SE 28; Curtis Land & Loan Co. v 
Interior Land Co. 137 Wis 341, 113 N\V 353. 
Annotation: 3 ALR2d 258, § 3. 
20. Winslow v Moore (Sup) 17 NY Week 
Dig 429. 
1. L. & E. Wcrtheimer, Inc. v Wchlc-IIart-
ford Co. 126 Conn 30, 9 A2d 279, 125 ALR 
985; Ely v Joslin, 111 Kan 630, 203 P 628. 
Annotation: 3 ALR2d 261, § 3. 
2. Curtis Land & Loan Co. v Interior Land 
Co. 137 Wis 341, 118 NW 853. 
Hussey v Ilornc-Payne, LR 8 Ch Div 
(EnK) 670 (CA), afTd LR 4 App Cas 311. 
Annotation: 1 ALR 1503. 
5 Ark L Rev 218. 
Williston, Contracts 3d ed § 78. 
3 . Morse v Tillotson 5: W. Co. (CA2) 253 
F 340, 1 ALR 1485; Bvford v Gates Bros. 
Lumber Co. 216 Ark 400, 225 SV/2d 929. 
4. Morse v Tillotson & W. Co. (CA2) 253 
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crpt.inrc which introduces a new term as part of the proposed contract is 
insufficient, the mere addition to the acceptance of a collateral or immaterial 
requisition not warranted by the terms of the offer does not prevent the con-
tract from being completed.8 Thus, immaterial or minor differences or vari-
ances between the oflcr and acceptance will not prevent the formation of a 
contract.9 Although a request for a change or modification of a proposed con-
tract made before an acceptance thereof amounts to a rejection of it, a mere 
inquiry as to whether one proposing a contract will alter or modify its terms, 
made before acceptance or rejection, does not amount to a rejection; and if 
the offer is not withdrawn, it may be accepted within a reasonable time.10 
Requested or suggested modifications of an offer will not preclude the for-
mation of a contract where it clearly appears that the offer is positively ac-
cepted regardless of whether the requests are granted.11 Where the accept-
ance of an offer is initially unconditional, the fact that it is accompanied with 
a direction or request looking to the carrying out of its provisions, but which 
does not limit or restrict the contract, does not render it ineffectual or give 
it the character of a counteroffer.12 This rule has been held to apply to a 
request for information as to the manner of remitting the price,13 to a request 
to a proposed seller of real estate to fix the date for closing the transaction,14 
to a buyer's suggestion for a time and place of closing made in accepting an 
offer which specified no time for closing, and to a mere suggestion or request 
that pavment or delivery be made at a place other than that specified in the 
offer.15 '• 
Co. 187 Mich 454, 153 NW 788; Foster v 
West Pub. Co. 77 Okla 114, 186 P 1083; 
Dc Moss v Bervllium Corp. 358 Pa 470, 58 
A2d 70; Weaver v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SE 
7-13. 
Williston, Contracts 3d cd § 79. 
The requirement, by one who has con-
tracted to purchase real estate from a cor-
poration, of further resolutions on its part for 
the completion of the transfer does not show 
a refusal to accept the oflcr of sale. Western 
Timber Co. v Kalama River Lumber Co. 42 
Wash 620, 85 P 338. 
8. Foster v West Pub. Co. 77 Okla 114, 
186 P 1083. 
Re Abcraman Iron Works (Eng) LR 4 Ch 
532. 
9. Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse &. 
Storage Co. 223 NC 344. 26 SE2d 897, 149 
ALR 201, holding that where a contract con-
sisting of an ofTcr and acceptance is in several 
writings, the court will not be astute to de-
tect immaterial differences in the phrasing 
of the ofTcr and acceptance which might de-
feat the contract, but will try to give to each 
writing a reasonable interpretation under 
which substantial justice may be reached ac-
cording to the intent of the parties. 
An ofTer and its acceptance must receive 
a reasonable construction, and the proposer is 
bound by its acceptance in that sense; im-
material variances between the ofTer and its 
acceptance will be disregarded. Fanners' 
Produce Co. v McAlcster Storage & Com. 
Co. 48 Okla 488, 150 P 483. 
404 
Merely describing the basis of calculating 
the price of sugar in acceptance of an order 
a little differently from what it was in the 
order docs not prevent the contract from 
becoming binding if there is no diflcrcnce in 
meaning. A. B. Small Co. v American Sugar 
Rcf. Co. 267 US 233, 69 L cd 589, 45 S Ct 
295. 
10. Foster v West Pub. Co. 77 Okla 114, 186 
P 1033; Turner v McCormick, 56 W Va 161, 
49 SE 28. 
Stevenson v McLean (Eng) LR 5 QB Div 
346. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 62. 
1 1 . Podany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 
N\V2d 193; Turner v McCormick, 56 W Va 
161, 49 SE 28. 
21 U of Cincinnati L Pvev 68. 
12. Valashinas v Koniuto, 283 App Div 
13, 125 NYS2d 554, afld 308 NY 233, 124 
NE2d 300. 
Acceptance of an option and subsequent 
performance are. duTcrrm matters; and where 
the acceptance is unconditional, suggestions 
or demands as to performance, not qualifying 
or rendering the acceptance conditional upon 
compliance with such demands, will not in-
validate such acceptance. Horgan v Russell, 
24 ND 490, 140NW99 . 
13. Clark v Dales (NY) 20 Barb 42. 
14. Baker v Packard, 112 App Div 543, 98 
NYS 804, afTd 189 NY 524, 82 NE 1124. 
15. § 63, supra. 
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§ 66. Consent by offeror to conditions, qualifications, or changes. 
Where an offeree docs not accept the offer as made but makes a qualified 
or conditional acceptance, there is no contract unless the offeror consents to 
the qualification or condition tendered by the offeree.10 Undoubtedly, an 
ofTcree has the right to make his acceptance depend upon any fact he might 
name, including the approval of the offer by his a t torney; and if the offeror 
assents to the condition or to any qualification or difference between the offer 
and acceptance he is bound by it.17 This applies to differences between the 
offer and acceptance as to the place of payment or delivery.18 
An express assent to new terms and conditions attached to the acceptance 
of an offer is not necessary in order to make such terms and conditions a 
par t of the contract . Any language or conduct on the par t of the original 
offeror showing his assent to the new terms and conditions will be sufficient.19 
Where an original offeror, after receiving an alleged acceptance of his offer 
containing addit ional or changed conditions or terms, corresponds with the 
offeree concerning the shipment or delivery of the subject mat te r of the agree-
ment, this has been held to show his assent to the additional conditions or 
terms.20 O n the other hand , it has been held that mere silence on the part of 
the offeror will not consti tute an acceptance by him of added or altered con-
ditions or terms at tached to the offeree's acceptance of the original offer, in 
the absence of an agreement tha t silence shall have such effect, where there 
is no duty on the pa r t of the original offeror to reject such conditions or terms.1 
Under some circumstances, however, even silence on the part of the original 
offeror may constitute an acceptance of the conditions or terms attached to 
the offeree's "acceptance" of the original offer.2 Where the original offeror, 
16. Greenwich Bank v Oppenhcim, 133 App 
Div 536. 118 NYS 297; Todorovich v Kinnic-
kinnic Mut. Loan & Bldg. Asso. 233 Wis 
39, 298 NW 226, 135 ALR 818. 
Annotation: 135 ALR 822. 
17. Roto-Lith. Ltd. v F. P. Bartlctt & Co. 
(CA1 Mass) 297 F2d 497 (in which a 
buyer was held hound bv a disclaimer of war-
ranty in the seller's acknowledgment of the 
order, where the buyer accented the goods 
with knowledge of the condition specified in 
the acknowledgment): Wilhclm v Wood, 151 
App Div 42, 135 NYS 930. 
Annotation: 135 ALR 822. 
A contract is consummated by a telegram 
to a vendor containing the proposed tf-rms 
of the contract, to which the vendor replies 
accepting the terms, but adding, "if you will 
give us time to fill," which in turn is ac-
cepted by the vendee in a letter treating the 
telegram as an acceptance of the offer, in-
closing shipping instructions, adding a desire 
to have the shipment made at once, if pos-
sible, and asking for a confirmation on the let-
ter. Farmers' Produce Co. v McAlester Stor-
age & Com. Co. 48 Okla 488, 150 P 483. 
18. § 63, supra 
19. Roto-Lith. Ltd. v F. P. Bartlett & Co. 
(CA1 Mass) 297 F2d 497 (acceptance of 
goods by buyer with knowledge of a disclaimer 
of warranty in seller's acknowledgment of or-
der ) ; American Lumber & Mfg. Co. v Atlantic 
Mill & Lumber Co. (CA3 Pa) 290 F 632: 
McKr-11 v Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (CA6 
Ohio) 171 F 3 2 \ afTd 186 F 39. cert den 
220 US 613. 5r> L ed 609. 31 S Ct 717: Earle 
v Anscll. 157 Mass 29 k 32 NE 16S: Russell 
v Falls Mfg. Co. 106 Wis 329, 82 NW 134. 
Annotation: 135 ALR C22. 
H i e words "forward papers, draft attached.** 
in a buver's telegram accepting the seller's 
counteroffer for sale of whisky, does not so 
qualify the acceptance as to deprive it of the 
positive and unequivocal character necessary 
to consummate a contract, it appearing from 
previous telegrams that the procedure sug-
gested thereby had been tacitly assented to 
bv the narties. L. & E. Wcrthcimer, Inc. v 
Wehle-IIartford Co. .126 Conn 30, 9 A2d 
279, 125 ALR Stt5. 
20. Wilson v White. 161 Cnl 453. 119 P 
895; Riverside Coal Co v Elman Coal Co. 
1H Conn 492. 159 A 2"0: Russell v Falls 
Mfg. Co. 106 Wis 329, 82 NW 134. 
1. Columbia Malting Co v Clausen-Flana-
gan Corp. (CA2 NY) 3 F2d 547: Cincinnati 
Equipment Co. v Big Muddv River Consol. 
Coal Co. 15.3 Ky 247, 164 SW 794; Blaisdell 
Filtration Co v M. L. Bavard & Co. 311 
Pa 6, 166 A 234: Todorovich v Kinnickinnic 
Mut. Loan & Bldg. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298 NW 
226, 135 ALR 818. 
Annotation: 135 ALR 822. 
2. Lamis v Des Moines Elevator Jt Grain 
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after receiving an alleged acceptance containing additional or altered condi-
tions or terms, performs his part of the agreement or the new or altered con-
ditions or terms in whole or in part, he thereby manifests his acceptance 
thereof,3 except where the ofTcrce had no notice or knowledge of such con-
duct.4 
E. FORMAL REQUISITES 
§ G7. Generally; necessity of writing. 
A contract need not be in writing unless a statute requires it.6 Conversely, 
an oral or parol contract is unenforceable where a statute requires it to be 
in writing.6 The principal statute making such a requirement is the statute 
of frauds, which applies only to the contracts specified therein.7 Also, where 
the parties indicate a definite intention not to be bound until a written agree-
ment has been made, such an agreement is prerequisite to the formation of a 
contract.8 But no principle of law makes it necessary that a new contract upon 
the same subject between the same persons shall be reduced to writing simply 
because the old contract was written.9 
Except for some contracts, such as insurance contracts, the form of which 
may be closely regulated by statute,10 the form in which a written contract is 
drawn is immaterial, as long as it is legible.11 Thus, where a contract which 
need not be in writing is reduced to writing, it is not necessary that it should 
be expressed in a particular form.12 For instance, although a receipt is, as 
Co. 210 Iowa 1069, 229 NW 756: Wheeler 
v Klaholt, 178 Mass 141, 59 NE 756. 
Annotation: 3 35 ALR 824. 
3. McKcll v Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (CA6 
Ohio) 175 F 321, affd 186 F 39, cert c!cn 
220 US 613, 55 L cd 609, 31 S Ct 717; 
Gallagher v Equitable Gaslight Co. 141 Cal 
699, 75 P 329; Johnson v M. J. O'Ncil, Inc. 
182 Minn 232, 234 NW 16; Fry v Foster, 179 
Okla 398, 65 P2d 1224. 
Annotation: 135 ALR 826-832. 
As to application of this principle in the 
case of sales of personal property, sec SALES 
(1st cd § 51). 
4. The performance by the original offeror 
of all the conditions attached by the offeree 
to his acceptance of the offer is insufficient 
to indicate the offeror's acceptance thereof 
where the offeree had no knowledge or notice 
of such conduct. Todorovich v Kinnickinnic 
Mut. Loan & Bldg. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298 
NW 226, 135 ALR 818. Annotation: 135 
ALR 827. 
5. Sullivan v Bryant, 40 Okla 80, 136 P 
412; Fish v Capuell, 18 RI 667, 29 A 840. 
Practice Aids.—Instruction as to determin-
ing content of oral contracts. 6 AM JUR P L 
& PR FORMS 6:663. 
6. Schaal v Race (Fla App) 135 So 2d 
252. 
7. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS (1st cd §§4 ct 
scq.). 
As to the necessity of acknowledgment un-
4 0 6 
der certain statutes, see 1 Am Jur 2d, AC-
KNOWLEDGMENTS §§ 4 ct seq. 
8. §§26 ct seq., supra. 
9. Teal v Bilby, 123 US 572, 31 L ed 263, 
8 S Ct 239. 
10. Sec INSURANCE (Rev ed § 187). 
As to the right of a state to prescribe, by 
statute, standard form* of policies, sec INSUR-
ANCE (Rev cd § 59) . " 
11 . While a contract may be printed, type-
written, or written in ink or pencil, an inde-
cipherable scrawl docs not constitute a con-
tract. Where the parties undertake to put 
their agreement in writing and express its cru-
cial terms by characters or symbols so illegible 
that the court cannot determine the signifi-
cation of that which is on the paper, no con-
tract in writing has been made. Arr.rblou 
v New York, N. II. & H. R. Co. 225 Mass 
235, 114 N E 2 9 7 . 
Practice Aids.—Forms of contracts. 3 AM 
JUR LEGAL FORMS 3:971-3:978. 
— Advertising contracts. 1 AM J U R LECAL 
FOUMS 1:424-1:539. 
12. Generally, contracts need not take a pre-
scribed form, but are spelled out of the phras-
ing adopted by the parties. Edison Electric 
Illuminating Co. v Thacher, 229 NY 172, 128 
NE 124. 
Any memorandum in writing, regardless of 
its form and whether payable in money or in 
specific property, whereby a debt based on a 
consideration is acknowledged by one as ow-
ing to another to whom the memorandum is 
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F.Male of Maguirc. 204 Kan G8(>. 4GO P2d 358, 
mod 20G Kan i, 4 7f> KM 6T8. 
p 397, n 18—Riverside Fence Co. v Novak, 273 
Cal App 2d G5C), 78 Cal Rptr 53(3. 
An option holder may recover damages for 
breach of an option contract without a lender 
of the purchase price agreed upon in the op-
lion contract. Fullington v M. Pcnn Phillips Co. 
238 Or 321, 395 P2d 124, 12 ALRSd 1121. 
Additional case authorities for section: 
Where provisions of an option contract pre-
scribe the particular manner in which the op-
tion is to be exercised, they must be strictly 
followed, but where the contract merely sug-
gests and does not require a particular manner 
of communicating exercise of the option, an-
other means of communication is not pre-
cluded. Palto Alto Town 8c Country Village, 
Inc. v BBTC Co., 11 Cal 3d 494, 1 13 Cal Rptr 
705, 521 P2d 1097. 
An option falls within the term "proposal," 
as used in the statute relating to the mode of 
communicating acceptance of a "proposal." 
Palto Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v 
HBTC Co., 11 Cal 3d 494, 113 Caf Rptr 705, 
521 P2d 1097. 
An optionee will be excused from strict com-
pliance with the terms of an option agreement 
where the failure to comply is not due to wilful 
or gross negligence on his part but is rather 
the result of an honest and justifiable mistake; 
equity will also excuse strict compliance where 
such is prevented by some act of the oplionor 
such as waiver or misleading representations or 
conduct. Cattle Feeders, Inc. v Jordan (Tex Civ 
App) 549 S\V2d 29. 
A telegram addressed to the owners of stock 
in a co-operative apartment which stated "I 
wish to exercise the option to buy apartment 
please advise" clearly apprised the owners of a 
binding intent to exercise the option to pur-
chase and was therefore a valid exercise of the 
option; the import of the telegram was clear 
and unambiguous and no special form or 
words were necessary to constitute proper writ-
ten notice under the agreement. Cohen v No-
noo (1979) 101 Misc 2d 1037, 422 NYS2d 574. 
§ 6 1 . —Time of exercise; delay 
Practice aids: Timeliness of notice of exercise 
of option to purchase realty, 87 ALR3d 805. 
Option to purchase real property as af-
fected by optionor's receipt of offer lor, or 
sale of. larger tract which includes the op-
tioned parcel. 34 AUR4th 1217. 
p 397, n 20— 
Annotation: Validity of option to purchase-
real ty as affected by indefiniteness of term 
provided for exercise. 31 ALR3d 522. 
p 398, n 11—Steele v Northup, 259 Iowa 443, 
143N\V2d 302. 
Additional case authorities for section: 
Although time is of essence in option agree-
ments, notice to optionor in form of written 
168 
letter by optionee's attorney declaring intention 
to purchase property in accordance with previ-
ously executed option agreement was fully ef-
fective and timely where option agreement re-
quired notice no later than September l and 
where letter exercising option was received bv 
optionor on August 29, even though no tender 
of purchase price was made at that time nor 
any specific provision of option agreement ex-
pressly set forth particular time for payment, 
particularly where exact purchase price was 
indefinite and dependent upon settling of past 
and future accounts between parties to option 
agreement. Loose v Brubachcr, 2I9 Kan 727, 
549 P2 d 9 9 i . 
The depositing of a written notice of the 
exercise of an x>ption to purchase realty on 
October 21. the date stipulated in the option 
contract as being the last date for giving notice 
to exercise the option, was untimely, in the 
absence of any provision in the option agree-
ment, where the notice was received by the 
owner of the property two days after die expi-
ration date of the option; the option agreement 
provided that failure to give timely notice-
within the option period would terminate the 
option. Salinen v Frankson (Minn) 245 N\V2d 
839, 87 ALR3d 800. 
§ 62. Generally; necess i ty that accep-
tance comply with offer 
Practice aids: Acts constituting rejection of 
contract offer. 27 AM Jt R PROOF OF FACTS 2d 
605. 
Qualified or Conditional Acceptances Are 
Counter-Offcrs and Reject Original Oiler. 1 
Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 77. 
If Offer Prescribes Place, Time, or Manner 
of Acceptance, Its Terms Must Be Complied 
With. 1 Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 76. 
Acceptance Must Comply With Terms of 
Offer. 1 Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 73. 
Acceptance Must Be Unequivocal. 1 Willi-
ston on Contracts 3d ed § 72. 
Gedid, A Background to Variance Prob-
lems Under >bc Uniform Commercial Code: 
Toward a Contextual Approach. 22 Duq LR 
595, Spring, 19S4. 
Restatement: 
As to acceptance bv silence or exercise oi 
dominion, according to Restatement, Contract? 
2d, see § 4 7^ supra". 
An offeree's power of acceptance is termi-
nated by the non-occurrence of any condition 
of acceptance under the terms of the offer. 
Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 36(2). 
A counter-offer is an offer made by an of-
feree to hts^oCfcror relating to the same matter 
as the original offer and proposing a substi-
tuted bargain differing from that proposed by 
the original offer. 
An offeree's power of acceptance is termi-
nated by his making of a counter-offer, unless 
the offeror has manifested a contrary intention 
or unless the counter-offer manifests a contrary 
intention of the offeree. Restatement, CON-
TRACTS 2d § 39. 
{17 Am Jur 2d Supp 
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Where notification is essential to acceptance 
by promise, the oileror is not hound by an 
acceptance in equivocal terms unless he reason-
ably understands it as an acceptance. Restate-
ment, CONTRACTS 2d § 57. 
An acceptance must comply with the iequ ip-
ments of the oiler as to the promise to be 
made or the performance to be rendered. Re-
statement, CONTRACTS 2d § 58. 
A reply to an oflcr which purports lo accept 
it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to 
terms additional to or different from those 
offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-
offer. Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 59. 
p 400, n 19— 
One of the essential elements for the forma-
tion of a contract is a manifestation of assent 
by the parlies to the terms thereof. It is essen-
tial that those parties assent to the same thing 
in the same sense and that their minds meet on 
the essential terms and conditions. The Uni-
form Commercial Code has not made any 
change in the basic law. Kuclid Engineering 
Corp. v Illinois Power Co. 79 111 App 2d 145. 
223 NE2d 409. 
p 400, n 1— 
The rule peculiar to offers to the effect that a 
conditional acceptance is in itself a rejection of 
the oflcr is not applicable to an option contract 
that is supported by a consideration and fixes a 
lime limit for election. Humble Oil & Refining 
Co. v Westsidc Invest. Corp. (Tex) 428 S\V2d 
92. 
p 4 0 1 , n 9— 
Where a supplemental agreement covering 
extra work at a slated price was signed by ihe 
contractor under protest and with notification 
of the other party that claim would be filed for 
items not covered by agreement, the contrac-
tor's act constituted a counteroffer adding new-
terms and conditions to the original offer. Slate 
Highway Dept. v Wright Contracting Co. 107 
Ga App 758, 131 SK2d 808, 1 ALR3d 1260. 
Additional case authorities for section: 
Terms of acceptance of oflcr lo purchase all 
the issued and outstanding capital slock of 
corporation were not additional proposals con-
stituting a rejection and counteroffer but were 
an integral part of the offer and acceptance 
where the attachment and signed offer, when 
considered together, constituted a written 
memorandum sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds. Kagel v First 
Commonwealth Co. (DC Cal) 409 F Supp 
1396, afl'd (CA9 Cal) 534 F2d 194 (applying 
California law). 
In action for damages arising out of alleged 
breach of contract to pay fee to plaintiff for 
obtaining financing, condition attached to letter 
of commitment to make loan that operating 
company could not be sold without lender's 
approval was counter-offer, rather than accep-
tance, and, in absence of any action by defen-
dant corporation evidencing agreement lo con-
dition, there was no acceptance of counter-offer 
(17 Am Jur 2d SuppJ 
and defendant was not liable for fee. Fleming v 
Parkview Colonial Manor Invest Co 31 *M 
App 3d 6. 333 NF.1M 587. 
In an action bv an attempting purchaser of 
real estate in which the purchaser alleged 
breach of contract and misrepresentation bv 
the seller and sought specific performance and 
money damages, the trial court properly dis-
missed the breach of contract causes of action 
where the seller did not effectuate a binding 
acceptance of the purchaser's offer in that the 
seller imposed the conditions that the pur-
chaser accept the property "as is—where is," 
that the purchaser prepare an offer in contract 
form that would be subject to the approval of 
the seller's "legal authorities," and that the 
purchaser resolve the contingencies in its offer 
by a certain date or else forfeit the deposit. 
Chain Locations of America, Inc. v T.I.M.E.-
DC, Inc. (1981, 3d Dept) 81 App Div 2d 993. 
440 NVS2d 69. 
Further negotiations were contemplated re-
garding method of financing purchase, and no 
contract was created, where defendant made 
offer to buy "if the arrangements can be 
made," lo which plaintiff responded favorably, 
but reserved "issues that we should settle" 
concerning finances. Blakev v McMurrav (1965. 
3d Dept) 110 App Div 2d 998. 488 NYS2d 
286. 
§ 6 3 . Differences r e g a r d i n g p l ace of per -
f o r m a n c e , p a y m e n t , o r de l ive ry 
Additional case authorities for section: 
No contract existed where defendant ofiered 
via telegram to purchase machinery at stated 
price "FOB, our tri:.k, vour plant, loaded" and 
plaintiff responded via telegram which pur-
ported to accept at same stated price but on an 
"as is, where is" basis. Koehring Co. v Glo-
wacki (1977) 77 Wis 2d 497, 253 NW2d 64. 
§ 6 4 . S t ipu la t ion as to t e r m s o r cond i -
t ions which would b e impl i ed 
p 403, n 5— 
An optionee's insertion in his acceptance of a 
condition which merely expresses that winch 
would be implied in fact or in law by the offer 
does not preclude the consummation of the 
contract, since such a condition involves no 
qualification of the acceptor's assent to the 
terms of the offei. Burkhcad v Farlow, 266 NC 
595, 146 SK2d 802. 16 ALR3d 1416. 
§ 6 5 . Col la te ra l or i m m a t e r i a l m a t t e r s ; 
i nqu i r i e s , r eques t s , s u g g e s t i o n s , o r 
d i r e c t i o n s 
Practice aids: Added Terms Requested as Fa-
vor Do Not Invalidate Acceptance. 1 Willi-
ston on Contracts 3d ed § 79. 
Conditions Which Do Not Qualify Offer 
Do Not Impair Acceptance. 1 Williston on 
Contracts 3d ed § 78. 
Restatement: 




addition U> the irnns of tlic oJfci is no! thcjcby 
invalidated unless the acceptance is made to 
depend on an assent to the changed or added 
terms. Restatement. CONTRACTS 2d § 01. 
p 404, n 8—Wallerius v Hare, 200 Kan 578, 
438 T2d 05. 
p404 , n 11 — 
A mere injury as to whether one proposing a 
contract will alter or modify its terms docs noi 
amount to a rejection. Javbc Constr. Co. v 
Beco, Inc. 3 Conn Cir 400, 210 A2d 208. 
p 404, n 12— 
Where the terms of settlement agreement 
were fully undersiood by both parties, a re-
quest lhat checks be made payable in a certain 
manner did not have the effect of destroying 
the agreement that the parties had entered 
into. Aetna Ins. Co. v Sanchez ( l e x Civ App) 
391 SW2d 184. 
§ 66 . C o n s e n t by offeror to c o n d i t i o n s , 
qual i f ica t ions , o r c h a n g e s 
p 405, n 19—V'Soke v Barwick (CA2 NY) 404 
F2d 495, cert den 394 US 921, 22 L Ed 2d 
454, 89 SCt 1197. 
p 405, n I — 
Execution by the offeree of a supplemental 
contract under notification to the offeror that 
an additional claim would be filed for items not 
covered therein constituted a counteroffer, and 
the original offeror's subsequent execution of 
the contract did not amount to acceptance of 
the counteroffer in absence of notification to 
the original offeree as to acceptance or not of 
the counteroffer. State Highwjv Dept. v Wright 
Contracting Co. 107 Ga App 758, 131 SF.2d 
808. 1 ALR3d 1200. 
Additional case authorities for section: 
A letter sent by the seller of a condominium 
in response to a counteroffer by a prospective 
buyer did not constitute an acceptance of the 
buyer's counterotlcr. where the letter did not 
acknowledge a precision dealing with the buy-
er's proposal that the parlies split the broker-
age fee which proposal the buver had made a 
condition of his counteroffer. Mintzberg v Go-
lesianeh (1980. Fla App 03) 390 So 2d 759. 
§ 67 . Genera l ly ; necess i ty of w r i t i n g 
Practice Aids: General contract form. 5 AM 
Jt'R LKGAL FORMS 2d 08.14. 
Number of copies. 5 AM Jt'R LEGAL FORMS 
2d. Contracts $68:129. 
Restatement: 
As to effect of contracts under seal, gener-
ally, according to Restatement. Contracts 2d, 
see 08 Am Jur 2d. Seals § 11. 
p 407, n 20— 
The fact that a contract was drawn by a 
person not entitled to practice law docs not 
affect its legalitv as between the parties to it. 
Frank v Moore 1 Ohio App 2d 90, 30 Ohio 
170 
Ops 2d ) 12, 92 Ohio L Abb 225, 198 NE2d 82 
(realtor). 
Additional case authorities for section: 
The anticipated fi\c-year lease of a restaurant 
with an option to renew never came into exis-
tence where the parties involved intended to 
enter a written lease but never reached any 
complete agreement as to the precise rental to 
be paid. Bruhl v White (La App) 346 So 2d 
734. 
An alleged oral employment agreement 
wherein plaintiff was to receive a 10^o commis-
sion for each construction contract he obtained 
for defendant is, hot unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law, 
§ 5-701) since the employment agreement was 
one of an indefinite hiring, terminable at will, 
and hence not within the statute, since it might 
be performed within one year. Zinn v Bernic 
Constr., Inc. (1979) 99 Misc 2d 510, 410 
NYS2d 725. 
§ 70 . S i g n a t u r e 
Practice aids: Testimonium—General form. 5 
AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, Contracts § 08:16. 
Restatement: 
As to effect of contracts under seal, gener-
allv, according to Restatement, Contracts 2d, 
see 08 Am Jur 2d, Seals § 1 1 . 
Where a grantee or promisee accepts a 
sealed document which purports to contain a 
return promise by him, he makes the return 
promise. But if he does not sign or seal the 
document his promise is not under seal, and 
whether it is binding depends on the rules 
governing unsealed contracts. Restatement, 
CONTRACTS 2d § 107. 
The promisee of a promise under seal is not 
precluded from enforcing it as a sealed con-
tract because he has not signed or sealed the 
document, unless his doing so was a condition 
of the delivery, whether or not the document 
contains a promise by him. Restatement, CON-
TRACTS 2d § 109. 
p 408, n 12—Nelkin v Marvin Hime Sc Co. 228 
Cal App 2d 744, 39 Cal Rptr 701. 
Western Bank v Morrill, 245 Or 47, 420 P2d 
1 19 (release). 
Additional case authorities for section: 
A directors advertising agreement constitut-
ing the contract between a customer and the 
telephone company for classified advertising 
was enforceable, notwithstanding that the 
agreement was never signed by the customer; 
the telephone company was justified in believ-
ing the customer*had accepted the terms and 
conditions of the written agreement, where the 
customer did not notify the company of any 
proposed changes, and paid the monthly ser-
vice charge. Richard A. Berjian, D.O., Inc. v 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. (1978) 54 Ohio St 2d 147, 
8 Ohio Ops 3d 149, 375 NE2d 410. 
Where neither the dealer nor his authorized 
agent has signed an automobile sales contract 
containing the words "The order is not valid 
{17 Am Jur2dSvpp] 
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stitution of a principal for an agent is not the substitution of a new cred-
itor.6 
Furthermore, in many jurisdictions it has also been held that a novation 
may be accomplished by the substitution of a new party to a contract, whereby 
the rights and liabilities of an original party are extinguished.6 
§16. Consent of parties. 
It is a well-settled principle that an essential element of every novation 
is a new contract to which all the parties concerned must agree,7 and in the 
absence of such agreement or consent a novation cannot be affected.8 In most 
jurisdictions assent to the terms of a novation need not be shown by express 
words, but may be implied from the facts.and circumstances attending the 
transaction and conduct of the parties thereafter.9 
Practice Aids.—Creation of joint tenancy 
in chose in action by novation. 10 AM J U R 
LEGAL FORMS, NOVATION, Form 10:116. 
5. Hobson v Davidson, 8 Mart (La) 422. 
6. Law v San Francisco Gas & E. Co. 168 
Cal 112, 142 P 52; Fletcher American Co. v 
Culbertson, 215 Ky 695, 286 SW 984; Detroit 
Postage Stamp Service Co. v Schermack, 179 
Mich 266, 146 NW 144; Peters v Poro, 96 
Vt 95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615. 
A novation is effected where the defendant 
agrees with the plaintiffs, who own three 
buildings,, tq supply all three buildings with 
steam, and subsequently the plaintiff sells two 
of the buildings', t|ie defendant consenting to 
an assignment of the contract and agreeing 
to supply the purchaser. Law v San Fran-
cisco Gas & E. Co. 168 Cal 112, 142 P 52. 
A novation is effected in case a wholesaler, 
upon receiving notice from a retailer that he 
has sold his business and that the purchaser 
will assume the obligations of the retailer 
to the wholesaler, takes from the purchaser 
and credits upon the account notes which ex-
tend the time of payment, and provide for ex-
change and collection fees and security for 
other indebtedness which may arise between 
the parties, although the wholesaler subse-
quently notifies the retailer that he will be 
released only in case the notes are paid. 
T. W. Stevenson Co. v Peterson, 163 Wis 
258, 157 NW 750. 
7. Western Machinery Co. v Northwestern 
Improv. Co. (CA9 Wash) 254 F2d 453: City 
Nat. Bank v Fuller (CAB) 52 F2d 870, 79 
ALR 71; Perry v Gallagher, 17 Ala App 114, 
82 So 562; Alaska Creamery Products, Inc. 
v Wells (Alaska) 373 P2d 505: Colley v 
Chowchilla Nat. Bank, 200 Cal 760, 255 P 
188, 52 ALR 569; Forrest v Royal Ins. Co. 
88 Cal App 88, 262 P 820: Smith v Missouri 
State L. Ins. Co. 45 Ga App 383, 165 SE 
168: Cox v Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. 180 
Ind 495, 103 NE 337; Eitzen's Estate v Lau-
man, 231 Iowa 1169, 3 NW2d 546; Barnes v 
Hckla F. Ins. Co. 56 Minn 38, 57 NW 314; 
Hi Franco v Steinbaum (Mo App) 177 SW 
2d 697; Tannhauser v Shea, 88 Mont 562, 
158 Am Jur 2d}—34 
295 P 268, 74 ALR 1021; Kirkup v Anaconda 
Amusement Co. 59 Mont 469, 197 P 1005, 17 
ALR 441; M. K. Goctz Brewing Co. v Wain, 
92 Neb 614, 139 NW 230; Heaton v Angier, 
7 NH 397; Griggs v Day, 136 NY 152, 32 
NE 612, motion for reh den 137 NY 542, 32 
NE 1001; Grant-Holub Co. v Goodman, 23 
Ohio App 540, 156 NE 151; Fuller v Stout, 
66 Okla 15, 166 P 898; Montgomery v Hall, 
229 Or 428, 366 P2d 909; Collyer v Moulton, 
9 RI 90: Chastain v Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex 
322, 257 SW2d 422; Arlington Towers Land 
Corp. v McFarland, 203 Va 387, 124 SE2d 
212; Lutz v Williams, 79 W Va 609, 91 SE 
460; T. W. Stevenson Co. v Peterson, 163 Wis 
258, 157 NW 750. 
Annotation: 61 ALR2d 755, 769, $ 4; 124 
ALR 1498. 
In order for a novation to be legally effec-
tive, it must occur before the expiration of 
the original agreement to which it pertains, 
and all parties to the original agreement, as 
well as all substituted parties, must assent 
thereto. Frederick C. Smith Clinic v La-
strapes, 111 Ohio App 42, 13 Ohio Ops 2d 
411, 170 NE2d 497. 
8. Western Machinery-Co. v Northwestern 
Improv. Co. (CA9 Wash) 254 F2d 453: 
Alaska Creamery Products, Inc. v Wells 
(Alaska) 373 P2d 505; Garthofner v Ed-
monds, 74 Cal App 2d 15, 167 P2d 789; Ex-
change Lumber & Mfg. Co. v Thomas, 71 
Idaho 391, 233 P2d 406; Eitzen's Estate v 
Lauman, 231 Iowa> 1169, 3 NW2d 546; 
Andres v Morgan, 62 Ohio St 236, 56 NE 
875; Poc v Dixon, 60 Ohio St 124, 54 NE 
86; Montgomery v Hall, 229 Or 428, 366 P 
2d 909; Arlington Towers Land Corp. v 
McFarland, 203 Va 387, 124 SE2d 212. 
9. United States use of fackson Ready-Mix 
Concrete v Hyde Constr. Co. (DC Okla) 236 
F Supp 770; Eitzen's Estate v Lauman, 231 
Iowa 1169, 3 NW2d 546; Philadelphia & R. 
Coal & I. Co. v Willinger, 137 Md 46, 111 
A 132, 12 ALR 1542; Clark v General Clean-
ing Co. 345 Mass 62, 185 NE2d 749; Detroit 
Postage Stamp Serv. Co. v Schermack, 179 
Mich 266, 146 NW 144; Fuller v Stout, 66 
529 
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Under the civil law of Rome, novation took place only when the con-
tracting parties expressly disclosed that their object in making the new contract 
was to extinguish the old one.10 A similar view has been taken in some 
jurisdictions in the civil-law tradition and has been incorporated into some 
of the modern codes.11 Thus, it has been held that a delegation by which 
the debtor gives to the creditor a new debtor, who obligates himself to such 
creditor, does not operate as a novation, unless the creditor has expressly 
declared that he intends to discharge the original debtor, upon application 
of the maxim of the civil law "delegatus debitor est odiosus in lege."12 Some 
of the Louisiana cases, however, appear to modify the strictness of this rule 
slightly in holding that the release either must be expressly declared, or must 
so clearly result from the record of the facts and circumstances attending the 
transaction that no doubt can exist as to the intentions of the parties in regard 
to it.13 
§ 17. —Debtors. 
In order to constitute a contract of novation by the substitution of a new 
debtor, the latter must participate in and consent to the arrangement and 
thereby assume the discharge of the obligation to the creditor.14 Without 
such consent by the new debtor, the creditor can have no action against 
him, since there is, in such case, no privity between them.15 Moreover, the 
original debtor should also be consulted and must consent to the agreement.16 
Okla 15, 166 P 898; Klinkoosten v Mundt, 36 
SD 595, 156 NW 85; Peters v Poro, 96 Vt 
95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615; Barnes v Crock-
ett, 111 Va 240, 68 SE 983; T. W. Stevenson 
Co. v Peterson, 163 Wis 258, 157 NW 750. 
As to assent of creditors to novation, see 
§ 18, infra. 
As to assent of debtors to novation, see 5 17, 
infra. 
As to presumptions in actions involving 
novations, generally, see § 32, infra. 
As to sufficiency of proof of novation, gen-
erally, see § 33, infra. 
10. Hayes v Claterbaugh (La App) 140 So 
2d 737; Peters v Poro, 96 Vt 95, 117 A 244, 
25 ALR 615; Drown v Forrest, 63 Vt 557, 
22 A 612. 
11. Bonncmer v Negrete, 16 La 474; Stude-
baker Bros. Mfg. Co. v Endom, 51 La Ann 
1263, 26 So 90. 
12. Sucker State Drill Co. v Loewer, 114 La 
403, 38 So 399. 
Where a new firm succeeds to the business 
of one that has been dissolved, and assumes 
the debts of the old firm and transfers them 
to its books, and the creditor makes fre-
quent demands on both firms, it is not suf-
ficient to show a release of the old firm. Car-
riere v Labiche, 14 La Ann 208. 
13. Berges v Daverede (La) 23 So 891; 
Rachel v Rachel, 11 La Ann 687; Short v 
New Orleans, 4 La Ann 281. 
14. Bonnemer v Negrete, 16 La 474; Green-
wood Leflore Hospital Com v Turner, 213 
530 
Miss 200, 56 So 2d 496; W. Crawford Smith, 
Inc. v Watkins (Mo App) 425 SW2d 276; 
Kirkup v Anaconda Amusement Co. 59 Mont 
469, 197 P 1005, 17 ALR 441; M. K. Goetz 
Brewing Co. v Wain, 92 Neb 614, 139 NW 
230; Collyer v Moulton, 9 RI 90; Peters v 
Poro, 96 Vt 95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615. 
Practice Aids.—Novation by substitution 
of new obligor. 10 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS, 
NOVATION, Forms 10:105 et scq. 
15. M. K. Goetz Brewing Co. v Wain, 92 
Neb 614, 139 NW 230. 
16. Blank v Michael, 208 Iowa 402, 226 
NW 12; Bonnemer v Negrete, 16 La 474; Lin-
coln Nat. L. Ins. Co. v Rider, 171 Okla 262, 
42 P2d 842; Lutz v Williams, 79 W Va 609, 
91 SE 460. 
Annotation: 124 ALR 1498, 1500. 
While the consent of the original debtor to 
the assumption of his debt by a third person 
doubtless is essential to a novation, ordinarily 
the necessity of such consent is not stressed, 
since there is a presumption of his consent to 
such act for his benefit, although he may be 
said to have a right of disclaimer. F. I. Som-
crs & Sons, Inc. v Le Clerc, 110 Vt 408, 8 
A2d 663, 124 ALR 1494. 
In F. I. Somcrs & Sons, Inc. v Le Clerc, su-
pra, it was held that if necessary to effect a 
novation, the consent of a mother to her 
daughter's assumption of the mother's debt 
to a storekeeper might be presumed from the 
relationship between the original debtor ana 
the new debtor, their living together, the 
mother's inability to pay, and the long period 
[58 Am Jur 2d] 
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however, that express notice of withdrawal must be given. It is sufficient to 
constitute a withdrawal thai knowledge of acts by the offeror inconsistent with 
(lie continuance of the oiler is brought home to the offeree,63 as where the 
offeror sells the property to a third person.64 
§ 2 1 . —Rejection of offer. 
The rejection of an offer to purchase or sell real estate terminates the offer, 
and subsequent acceptance of the offer is ineffectual unless it has been 
renewed or the offerer assents to such subsequent acceptance.65 As in the case 
of contracts generally,66 an acceptance which differs from the offer or imposes 
conditions not contained therein is a rejection of the offer, >and a subsequent 
unconditional acceptance before the offer is expressly withdrawn is ineffec-
tual.57 It seems that the same would be true as to a demand for a modification 
of the terms of the offer without indicating any intention to accept, although a 
mere inquiry as to whether the person making the offer would modify it does 
not amount to a rejection of the offer.58 
§ 22. Communication by mail. 
As in the case of contracts generally,59 a binding contract for the sale of land 
may be made by a letter mailed from the buyer or seller making an offer, and 
the acceptance by letter by the party to whom it is made.60 An offer sent 
through the mail must be communicated to the offeree and is not completed 
upon posting, but upon its receipt by the offeree.61 For the purpose of 
consummating the contract, however, where the offer is made by mail or 
otherwise contemplates and authorizes an acceptance by mail, the acceptance 
dates from the time the letter of acceptance is duly mailed, without regard to 
the time of its receipt or whether it is in fact received.62 In such cases, the 
53. Hoover Motor Express Co. v Clements 
Paper Co. 193 Tenn 6. 241 SW2d 851; Weaver 
v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SF 743; Frank v 
Suatford-Handcock, 13 Wyo 37, 77 P 134. 
54. Coleman v Appleganh, G8 Md 21, 11 A 
284; William Weisman Reahv Co. v Cohen, 157 
Minn 161. 195 NW 898; Frank v Stratford-
Handcock. 13 Wyo 37, 77 P 134. 
In this connection, see Am l^w Inst Restate-
ment, CONTRACTS, Vol. 1 § 42. 
55. Lewis v Johnson. 123 Minn 409, 143 NW 
1127 (holding thai an ofFer in writing for the 
sale of land by a prospective vendor, being 
rejected by the prospective \endee, cannot 
thereafter be accepted by the vendee unless the 
vendor's assent thereto is in writing); Fgger v 
Nesbit. 122 Mo 667, 27 SW 385. 
A vendee's express and unconditional repu-
diation of a contract for the purchase of really 
has been held not withdrawn by the vendee's 
subsequent offer to take the property, condi-
tioned upon the clearance of an easement to 
which the sale was subject under the terms of 
the contract. Freedman v St. Matthias Parish, 
37 Cal 2d 16, 230 P2d 629, 31 ALR2d 1. 
Generally, as to revocation of offer by rejec-
tion, see 17 Amjur 2d, CONTRACTS § 39. 
196 
56. See 17 Amjur 2d, CONTRACTS § 62. 
57. Fgger v Nesbit, 122 Mo 667. 27 SW 385; 
Weaver v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 S t 743. 
A Hat sum mentioned in an offer of pur-
chase, in reply to which the offeree submits a 
counterproposal based on monthly payments 
without specifying the toTal amount, cannot be 
taken as representing the total purchase price 
under the counterproposal, since, by submit-
ting the counterproposal, the offeree rejects in 
toto the terms of the original offer. Todorovich 
v Kinnickinnic Mut. Loan &: Bldg. Ass'n. 238 
Wis 39. 298 NW 22£, 135-ALR 818. 
58. Turner 
SF 28. 
McCormick. 56 W Va 161, 49 
59. See 17 Amjur 2d, CONTRACTS § 48. 
60. Moore v Pierson. 6 Iowa 279; Gates v 
Dudgeon. 173 NY 426. 66 NE 116; Curtis 
Land & Loan Co. v Interior Land Co. 137 Wis 
341, 118 NW853. 
61 . Caldwell v Cline, 109 W Va 553, 156 SE 
55, 72 ALR 1211. 
62. Patrick v Bowman, 149 US 411, 37 L Ed 
790, 13 S Ct 811; Kempncr v Cohn. 47 Ark 
055 
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courts, upon balancing conveniences and inconveniences, have deemed it 
more consistent with the purpose and intention of the pan ties to consider the 
contract complete and absolutely binding on the transmission of the accept-
ance through the post as the medium of communication which the parties 
themselves contemplate, instead of postponing its completion until the accept-
ance has been received by the offeror. By treating the post office as the agency 
of both parties, the courts have managed to harmonize the legal notion that it 
is necessary that the minds of the parties meet with the equally well-estab-
lished principle that the determination to accept is ineffectual if not communi-
cated either actually or by legal implication.63 Therefore, a letter withdrawing 
the offer is ineffectual for that purpose although mailed before the letter of 
acceptance, if it was not received until after the letter of acceptance was 
mailed.*4 
Whether a contract is consummated b\ the posting of a letter accepting an 
offer is dependent upon whether acceptance b\ mail was authonzed When an 
offer to sell is made to the other party personally, the proposer is ordinarily 
entitled to personal notice that his offer has been accepted In the absence of 
proof of any agreement on his part that notice of acceptance might be sent to 
him by mail, or that notice so sent has been actual!) receded bv him within 
the lime limited, there has been no notice of such acceptance; unless the 
acceptance of the offer has been communicated to the person making it, it is 
of no avail.65 In such a case a letter of acceptance, although mailed to the 
person by whom the offer was made, remains until delivered to the addressee 
subject UD the control of the sender, and he may recall his acceptance at an\ 
time before actual delivery of the letter.66 
In cases where acceptance by mail is authorized, it must appear that the 
letter of acceptance was actually placed in the post office, and directed to the 
proper place of the person making the offer67 If a lettei containing an offer to 
sell requires that acceptance be made within a certain time, such requirement 
must be complied with,68 and if no time is fixed, the acceptance must be within 
a reasonable time, but in determining whethei the acceptance was within a 
reasonable time, a difference is made between an offer to sell land and one to 
sell personalty of a character whose value may be subject to violent fluctua-
tions, and a longer time may be taken in the former ca^c t.han m the latter63 
The fact that in the letter of acceptance a mistake is made in referring to the 
date of the letter containing the offer is immaterial, if it clearlv appears that 
the one containing the offer was the one referred to 70 
D CONSIDLRAiION. MUTUALITY 
§ 23. Generally. 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, an agreement for the sale of 
519, 1 SW 869, Scottish-American Mortg Co \ 
Davis, 96 Tex 504, 74 SW 17, Weaver v Burr. 
31 W Va 736.8 SL 743 
63. See 17 Am Jur 2d. CONTRACTS § 48 
64. Patrick v Bowman. 149 US 4 1 1. 37 L Ld 
790, 13 S Ct 811; Kempner v Cohn. 47 Ark 
519. 1 SW869 
65. Weaver \ Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SL 743 
i 66. Scottish-American Moiu* Co \ Davis, 96 
i , Tex 504. 74 SW 17* 
67. Weaver \ Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SL 74 3 
68. Cair v Duval 39 US 77 10 L Ld 361. 
. . Athc v Bartholemeu, 69 Wis 43. 33 N\S 110 Ld 
"*
k
 69. K empner v Cohn, 47 Ark 519. 1 SW 869 
(delay of 5 days held not unieasonable) 
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An employer may offer a promise of employment at specified 
wages in such a manner as to empower the off ere 3 to accept 
either by actually beginning work or by promising to go to 
work.64 Beginning work in response to the offer would nearly 
always justify the inference of a promise to complete it. Ac-
tual shipment of part of the goods ordered, if in accordance 
with an instalment order or with custom or course of dealing, 
may justify the inference of a promise that the balance will be 
shipped.^5 If the order is for shipment in one lot, shipment of 
less may operate as an acceptance and a breach at the same 
time,aG but it may also be no more than a return offer to sell the 
part shipped or a performance in accordance with an urgent re-
quest and for the accommodation of the buyer.57 
Ordinarily, one who makes an offer to sell property for a price 
contemplates a bilateral contract and expects a notice of accept-
ance. This is true even though the offer is in the form of an ir-
revocable option to buy. Nevertheless, in such a case the of-
feree can accept by making a tender of the price without other 
notice. If the offeror accepts the tender, the resulting payment 
may constitute full performance by the buyer and the result-
ing contract is unilateral. If the offeror rejects the tender, he 
is guilty of a breach of contract for which the buyer can maintain 
suit for damages or specific performance.58 
§ 78- Acceptance by Post 
As has already been stated, an offeror can specify any mode of 
acceptance that he pleases. By his offer he creates the power of 
acceptance; and he can limit it as he desires. Without regard to 
the mode in which he communicates his offer, he can require ac-
ceptance by telegraph, telephone, or letter; and he can require 
that it shall be received instead of merely started.61 But in order 
to limit the power of acceptance, he must either communicate 
the limitation to the offeree before the* latter accepts, or else 
make his offer in such manner and terms that the offeree has 
reason to luiow that his power is so limited. 
Where the parties are negotiating at a distance from each 
other, the most common method of making an offer is by send-
ing it by mail; and more often than not the offeror has specified 
no particular mode of acceptance. ..In such a case, it is now the 
prevailing rule that the offeree has power to accept and close 
the contract by mailing a letter, ot acceptance,, properly -stamped 
and addressed,62 within a reasonable.time. The.contractis re-
62. N.J.—Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. operative when despatched, unless 
J.Eq. 55 (1SG9). It is properly addressed and any 
Restatement, Contracts, § C7, reads: other precaution taken which is or-
"An acceptance sent oy mail or dinarily observed to insure safe 
otherwise from a distance is not transmission of similar messages."* 
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garded as made a t the time and place that the letter of acceptance 
is put into the possession of the post office department.63 
Various reasons have been given for so holding; and for a 
long time some learned theorists and judges denied that such 
was the rule and even that the courts had power to make it the 
rule. The objections have now mostly died away; and no one 
doubts that the courts can make such a rule, because they have in 
fact made it. In as much as the rule seems to be causing no great 
dissatisfaction, it may now be supposed that the courts are not 
likely to unmake it. 
The reason that is most often given for the rule is that the 
offeror, by sending his offer by mail, has made the post his 
agent to receive and carry the acceptance. Sometimes it is said 
that the post is the common agent of both parties.04 It requires 
only slight consideration to perceive that this reasoning is de-
fective. The term "agent" is generally used to refer only to 
some human person with power to act on his principal's behalf. 
The "post" is not a person, although there are many persons in the 
postal service; and it is by no act of any such person that the 
making of the contract is consummated. A letter box on the 
corner is neither a person nor an agent; and \ e t the acceptance 
is effective when the letter of acceptance is dropped into that 
box.65 It is the offeree himself (or some person authorized by 
him) who drops the letter in the box. It is he who has the power 
and who exercises it by his action. The "box" has no power and 
does no act. It is true that a postman may thereafter remove the 
letter from the box; but the contract has already been made and 
the removal has no legal operation. All this is equally true in 
case the letter is mailed by dropping it through the proper slit 
inside of a post office building. 
Sometimes it is said that the mailing of the^letter of accept-
ance makes the contract for the reason that by the act of mail-
ing the offeree puts the letter irrevocably out of his own posses-
sion and control. The present post office regulations provide, 
however, that the sender of a letter can regal 1 it. He can stop 
delivery by telegraphing ahead and can cause the return of the 
letter to himself. This is discussed in a later section. 
A better explanation of the existing rule seems to be that in 
such cases the mailing of a letter has long been a customary and 
expected way of accepting the offer. It is ordinary business 
usage. More than this, however, is needed to explain why the 
letter is operative on mailing rather than on receipt by the of-
feror. Even though it is business usage to send an offer by mail, 
it creates no power of acceptance until it is received. Indeed, 
G4. Eng.—It was so argued In 
Household Fire & C. Ace. Ins Co. v. 
Grant, 4 Ex.D. 21G (1ST9). 
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most notices sent by mail are not operative unless actually re-
ceived. 
The additional reasons for holding that a different rule applies 
to an acceptance and that it is operative on mailing may be sug-
gested as follows: When an offer is by mail and the acceptance 
also is by mail, the contract must date either from the mailing of 
the acceptance or from its receipt. In either case, one of the par-
ties will be bound by the contract without being actually aware 
of that fact If we hold the offeror bound on the mailing of 
13IO acceptance, he may change his position in ignorance of the 
acceptance; even though he waits a reasonable time before act-
ing, he may still remain unaware that he is bound by contract 
because the letter of acceptance is delayed, or is actually lost 
or destroyed, in the mails. Therefore this rule is going to cause 
loss and inconvenience to the offeror in some cases. But if we 
adopt the alternative rule that the letter of acceptance is not 
operative until receipt, it is the offeree who is subjected to the 
danger of loss and inconvenience. He can not know that his let-
ter has been received and that he is bound by contract until a 
new communication is received by him. His letter of accept-
ance may never have been received and so no letter of notifica-
tion is sent to him; or it may have been received, and the 
letter of notification may be delayed or entirely lost in the mails. 
One of the parties must cany the risk of loss and inconvenience.06 
We need a definite and uniform rule as to this. We can choose 
either rule; but we must choose one. We can put the risk on 
either party; but we must not leave it in doubt. The party not 
carrying the risk can then act promptly and with confidence in 
reliance on the contract; the party carrying the risk can insure 
against it if he so desires. The business community could no 
doubt adjust itself to either rule; but the rulSsthrowing the risk 
on the offeror has the merit of closing the deal more quickly and 
enabling performance more promptly. It must be remembered 
that in the vast majority of cases the acceptance is neither lost 
nor delayed; and promptness of action is of importance in all 
of them. Also it is the offeror who has invited the acceptance.67 
A third possibility has been suggested, but little considered. 
This is that the mailing of the acceptance shall consummate a 
conditional contract, one that at once becomes irrevocable by 
either party but that is conditional upon ^ actual receipt of the 
letter within a reasonable time by the offeror. To this rule, also, 
the business community could no doubt adjust itself; but it has 
no such advantages in the allocation of risk as to justify ad-
vocating its adoption at the present time.08 
If the offer has not itself been sent by mail, the theory that the 
post is the common agent of the parties breaks down. Also, 
there is so much the less reason for holding that the offeror has 
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authorized an acceptance by mail.00 As in all other cases, he 
may have expressly authorized such an acceptance. In some 
well-reasoned cases, it has been held that the power to accept by 
mailing a letter may rest upon facts other than an express or 
implied authorization. Even though the offer was not made by 
mail and there was no authorization, the existing circumstances 
may be such as to make it reasonable for the offeree to accept 
by mail and to give the offeror reason to know that the accept-
ance will be so made. Such may be usage and business practice. 
In such case, the acceptance is operative on mailing.70 
The fact that an offer is sent by wire is not itself evidence of an 
authorization to accept by mail—indeed it tends to show that a 
more speedy form of acceptance is desired. Yet the nature of 
the proposed contract, the time of the expected performance, 
the absence of price fluctuation, and other factors may be suf-
ficient to warrant a decision that an acceptance by mail is op-
erative on mailing.71 
An offeror can always so word his offer and so limit the power 
of acceptance as to make the receipt of the acceptance necessary 
to the creation of a contract Indeed, if he merely says ''Notice 
of your acceptance must be given within 30 days," this may be 
held to mean that the notice must be received within that time. 
It would be different if he says, "Please reply by return of post." 
The latter specifies a mode of communication but does not make 
receipt necessary. Where an already completed contract con-
tained a provision creating an option to be exercised by the giving 
of notice within a stated time, it has been held that it is not 
enough that the notice was mailed within that time.72 Here, the 
question is one of interpretation of language. Probably, when 
parties use the word "notice/' they usually mean a communica-
tion received. 
So, also, where in an already completed contract, a power of 
revocation or termination by notice is reserved, the notice is not 
operative until actually received.73 
If the circumstances are such that the acceptance is operative 
at starting it by mail or telegraph, the fact that it is delayed on 
the way7* or even that it is lost and never received "t5 does not 
affect the validity of the contract already made. This presup-
69. Scottish American Mortg. Co. v. Household Fire & C. Ace. Ins. Co. v. 
Davis, 74 S.W. 17, 9G Tex. G04, 97 Grant , 4 Ex.D. 21G (1S79), offor put 
Am.St.Rep. 932 (1903), held tha t ac- in the hands of offeree's soliciting 
ceptance by mail was not author- agent. 
ized since the offer was not by mail, Restatement, C o n t a c t s , §§ G4, GO. 
and tha t a mailed acceptance could 
therefore be recalled. 7 L Ok!.—Fanners ' Produce Co. v. 
McAlester Storage & Com. Co., 150 
7 0 # Eng.—Ilenthorn v. Fraser [1S92] P. 4S3, 48 Okl. 4SS, L R.A.191GA, 
2 Ch. 27, offer delivered In person; 1297 (1915). 
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poses that such loss or delay is not caused by the fault of the 
offeree. Of course, in these cases there is likely to be injury or 
inconvenience; but it is the risk of this that someone has to 
carry; that one is the offeror unless he has so made his offer as to 
prevent i t 
§ 79. Acceptance by Telephone 
In a few cases the courts have dealt with the making of a 
contract by telephone. Restatement, Contracts, § 65, states, 
"Acceptance given by telephone is governed by the principles 
applicable to oral acceptance where the parties are in the pres-
ence of each other". There is no comment; and no illustrations 
are given. The question before the courts has been as to the 
place at which the contract should be regarded as having been 
made. This has been held to be the place at which the offeree 
speaks the words of acceptance into the telephone transmitter.76 
When an acceptance is made orally in the presence of the of-
feror, there is no appreciable lapse of time between the act of 
speaking and the hearing of the sounds. Nevertheless, if the 
offeree knows or has reason to know that the offeror does not 
actually hear or understand his words of acceptance, a contract 
is not consummated. Undoubtedly the same is true in the case of 
an acceptance by telephone; and under some circumstances the 
offeree has more reason to doubt the effectiveness of his com-
munication by telephone than in the case of an acceptance face 
to face. 
§ 80. Withdrawal of a Letter of Acceptance from the Mails 
The postal regulations have for a long period made it possible 
for the sender of a letter to intercept it and prevent its delivery 
to the addressee. This has caused some doubt to be expressed 
as to whether an acceptance can ever be operative upon the mere 
mailing of the letter, since the delivery to the post office has not 
put it entirely beyond the sender's control. 
It is believed that no such doubt should exist. The question 
should not turn upon the total loss of power to control, but rather 
upon the reasonableness of regarding this as a proper method of 
accepting an offer. First, if the offeror expressly says that ac-
ceptance may be by the mailing of a letter, the offeree certainly 
has power to accept as thus authorized. The withdrawal of the 
letter, with the consent of the post office, would not make the 
acceptance inoperative, although it might prevent the offeror 
from ever knowing that his offer had been accepted. Secondly, 
if the offeror specifies that acceptance must be made by a com-
munication received by him, or by some mode other than the 
76. Bank of Yolo v. Sperry Flour 
Co., 74 P. 855, 141 Cal. 314 (1903). 
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cable by consideration, or a seal, and which is therefore a contract, 
is hereafter considered. Even a revocable offer, however, may be made 
not only to the public generally, but it may be made to a specified 
person or his assigns, and in such a case an assignee of the offeree, being 
within the terms of the offer, may accept it. Moreover, if after an 
offer is made to one person only, performance is tendered by another, 
though the offeror may refuse the tendered performance, yet if he 
does receive performance knowing that it is not tendeied by or on 
behalf of the offeree, he will be bound. The tender of the performance 
is, in effect, a new offer, and receipt of the performance an acceptance 
of this new offer.78 Even if performance is received by the offeror under 
the supposition that it was rendered by the offeree, the offeror on learn-
ing the truth must surrender the performance if this is possible (or if 
the performance consisted of property which he has resold, he must 
pay over the proceeds of the resale) or he will in effect have accepted 
a counter-offer. If, however, before notice of the facts such a situation 
has arisen that neither the performance nor any equivalent received 
for it can be returned the offeror is certainly not liable on an}' theory 
of contract and probably not liable quasi contractually,79 for the con-
duct of the seller in failing to disclose his identity is wanting in the 
good faith which the law generally requires of one who seeks to base 
a claim on a benefit received without request. 
§ 81. Acceptance in contracts by correspondence may be completed 
by mailing an acceptance.so 
Frequently contracts are made between parties at a distance and 
it is of vital importance to determine at what moment the contract is 
complete. If the mailing of an acceptance completes the contract, 
what happens thereafter, whether the death of either party, the re-
ceipt of a revocation or rejection, or a telegraphic recalling of the 
acceptance, though occurring before the receipt of the acceptance, 
will be of no avail; whereas, if a contract is not completed until the 
acceptance has been received, in all the situations supposed no contract 
will arise. I t was early decided that the contract was complete upon 
the mailing of the acceptance.81 The reason influencing the court was 
evidently that at the time of mailing acceptance there had been an 
overt manifestation of assent to the proposal. The court failed to 
consider that since the proposed contract was bilateral, as is almost 
invariably any contract made b}r mail, the so-called acceptance must 
73
 Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, supra, n. 77; Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Prather, 65 Aik. 27, 44 S. W J 
218. 
79
 Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, supra, n. 77; Boulton v. Jones, Shpra, n. 77. 
80
 Rest., Contracts, § 64. 
81
 Adams t>. LindseU, 1 B. <fc Aid. 681. 
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also have become effective as a promise to the offeror in order to cre-
ate a contract. The result thus early reached, however, has definitely 
established the law in England 82 and in the United States 83 and in 
Canada. It is, therefore, immaterial that the acceptance never reaches 
its destination.84 No distinction seems to have been taken in the cases 
between unilateral and bilateral contracts; yet a distinction in theory 
exists between transferring the ownership of property and conveying 
an idea. If an offer for a unilateral contract calls for the performance 
of an act by the offeree and that act can be performed by dispatching 
something through the mail, on well-recognized principles of the law 
of sales, title will pass and the act of the offeree will be complete as 
soon as the thing requested is sent. It has been settled since an early 
day that where goods are ordered from a distance, the delivery of 
them to a carrier, in accordance with the express or implied terms of 
the offer, transfers title to the buyer; that is, a unilateral contract is 
completed in which the performance by the offeree is the transfer of 
title at the moment of shipment, and the promise of the offeror to pay 
the price becomes a binding obligation at that time. If goods are 
ordered to be sent by mail there can be no doubt that the same principle 
applies and that a unilateral contract is complete when the goods are 
mailed. If instead of goods the offeree is requested to send money, 
the result is the same. As soon as the mono}' is sent it becomes the 
property of the offeror, and he is bound to perform his promise for 
which the money was the consideration. So if the offer requested the 
sending of a formal document by mail, title to the document would 
pass as soon as mailed.83 
In an offer to make an informal bilateral contract, however, the 
offeror requests a promise and not an act, and our law does not regard 
the mere delivery of an unsealed informal writing, such as a letter, 
as of itself creating an obligation. Accordingly in bilateral contracts 
made by correspondence, the question is, when has the offeree made 
the promise requested in the offer? It may be forcibly argued that-
making a promise is something which necessarily requires communica-
" D u n l o p v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 3S1; Household Fire Ins. Co. r. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 21G; 
Hcnthorn v. Eraser, [1S92] 2 Ch. 27. 
" T a y l o e v. Merchants' F. Ins. Co , 9 How. 390, 13 L. Ed. 187; Ferner v. Storer, 03 la. 
4S4, 19X. W. 2SS, 50 Am. Rep. 752; Shaw r. Ingram-Day Lum. Co., 152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W. 
431, L. R. A. 1915D 145; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99; Mactier v. Frith, 0 Wend. (X. Y.) 103, 
21 Am. Dec. 2G2; Trevor v. Wood, 30 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Dec. 511; Scottish American 
Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 90 Tex. 50-1, 74 S. W. 17, 97 Am. St. Rep. 932. Ace, Rest., Contracts, 
§§64, 67. Cf. McCulloch v. Ragle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 278. Whether tins case would 
now be followed in Massachusetts may be doubted. See Brauer v. Shaw, 108 Mass. 198, 
46 N. E. 617, 60 Am. St. Rep. 3S7. 
•« Rest., Contracts, § 64. 
85
 Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., supra, n. 83. 
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tion, and that sending a letter wliich never arrives is no more making 
a promise to the person addressed than talking into a telephone when 
there is no connection with the person addressed; and the rule that a 
bilateral contract is completed by mailing acceptance has been ably 
criticized, and contention made that actual communication should be 
required. But it is in accordance with all analogies in the formation 
of contracts that some outward indication of assent and of promises 
should be regarded by the law as essential rather than the actual com-
munication which is necessary for mental assent. If the law is open 
to criticism for taking the moment of mailing a letter as important, 
it is because that outward act is not so certain an outward indication 
that a promise has been made as a receipt of the letter by the offeror 
would be, and the law should select such an outward act as normally 
and ordinarily connotes the actual making of a promise by communica-
tion. In any event, the law is so well settled as to make discussion 
academic. 
§ 82. Acceptance by telegraph may be complete by dispatching a 
message; by telephone, on receipt of message. 
By analogy to the law governing contracts by mail, it is held that 
a contract by telegraph may be completed b\- delivering a telegraphic 
dispatch of acceptance for transmission at the receiving office of the 
telegraph company.&G The same analogy has been suggested in the 
case of contracts by telephone.87 The analogy between the telegraph 
and mail is by no means perfect, and the telephone presents still greater 
differences from the mail. In the United States, neither the telegraph 
nor the telephone has been operated by the government, except during 
war. In neither case is anything tangible sent by the offeree and re-
ceived b}r the offeror. In the use of the telegraph the risks of error are 
also vastly greater than in the case of mail. Nevertheless if the as-
sumption is sound that the offeror has impliedly assented'to the start-
ing of a telegram on its way, as the only necessary manifestation of 
acceptance, the result of the cases is unquestionably right. The 
difficult}' is because of the probability that such an assumption is 
based on a legal fiction. So far as the telegraph is concerned, however, 
the law is doubtless settled; but a contract by telephone presents quite 
as great an analogy to a contract made where the parties are orally 
addressing one another in each other's presence. It has not been sug-
M
 Rest., Contracts, §§6i, G7. Minnesota Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431; B a n k -
of Yo4o v. Sperry Flour Co., 141 Cal. 314, 74 P . 855, 65 L. It. A. 90; Butler v. Foley, 211 
Mich. C6S, 179 N. W. 34; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Doc. 511; Coivan v. O'Con-
ner, 20 Q. B. D. 640. 
87
 Bunk of Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., supra, n. SO; Carow Towing Co. v. The ' ' E d Mc-
WUliams," 46 Dora. L. R. 506. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 




CRANE, and ) 
, husband and ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., ) 
a Utah Limited Partnership; ) 
HEART MARKETING AND ) 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah ) 
Corporation, in its capacity ) 
as general partner of ) 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.; ) 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah ) 
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE ) 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) Civil No. #5~ - 21 I 
Come now Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, who complain 
of Defendants and for cause of action allege as follows: 
PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS 
1. TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., is a Utah Limited Partner-
ship . 
2. HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., is a Utah 
Corporation serving as general partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, 
LTD. 
0G5 o n l 
2 
3. LEISURE SPORTS, INC., is a Utah Corporation. 
4. DIXIE TITLE COMPANY is a Utah Corporation. 
5. Plaintiffs own a twenty-five percent (25%) interest 
as limited partners in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. In or about the month of November 1984, Plaintiffs 
entered into a certain "Agreement for Sale of LTD. Partnership 
Interest1' in which Plaintiffs1 appear as Sellers and TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD., appears as Buyer. A copy of the "Agreement for 
Sale of LTD. Partnership Interest" is attached, marked as 
Exhibit "A", and is incorporated by this reference. 
7. Among other things, Defendant TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., 
agreed to convey all of Unit 201, Building 1 of Timberbrook 
Condominiums to Plaintiffs, subject to an existing construction 
loan, which loan was to be released from the condominium upon 
completion of the sales of units in Phase I. 
8. All contingencies recited in the Agreement for Sale 
of LTD. Partnership Interest have occurred, and Plaintiffs 
have performed all conditions required of them to be performed. 
9. Defendant TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., has failed and 
refused to convey to Plaintiffs the real property to which 
they are entitled. Plaintiffs are entitled to specific 
performance on the part of Defendant TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., 
and its general partner, HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
06(5 002 
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10. In the event that Defendants TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, 
LTD., and HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., do not 
convey the condominium to Plaintiffs as required by the 
agreement, Plaintiffs will suffer damages in the amount of 
$150,000.00. 
11. Any defense raised to this First Cause of Action by 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., and/or HEART MARKETING AND 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., will be raised in bad faith and Plaintiffs 
will be entitled to the award of reasonable attorney fees 
under the provision of UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against 
Defendants TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., and HEART MARKETING 
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., its general partner, requiring specific 
performance of the "Agreement for Sale of LTD. Partnership 
Interest11 by said Defendants and requiring conveyance of the 
real property described above to Plaintiffs, or, in the 
event that specific performance is not deemed appropriate 
or is not made by Defendants TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., and 
HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPING, INC., that Plaintiffs be 
awarded judgment against said Defendants, jointly and 
severally, in the amount of $150,000.00, and Plaintiffs 
further pray that they be awarded reasonable attorney fees, 
pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), their costs of 




SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. In or about the month of November of 1984, Plaintiffs 
as Sellers and Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC., as Buyer, 
entered into a certain "Agreement for Sale of LTD. Partnership 
Interest11. A copy of said is attached, marked as Exhibit flBff, 
and is incorporated by this reference. 
13. All contigencies recited in said Agreement have 
occurred, and Plaintiffs have performed all conditions 
required of them to be performed. 
14. Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC., has failed and 
refused to pay to Plaintiffs the sum of $175,000.00 required 
to be paid to Plaintiffs by the terms of the "Agreement for 
Sale of LTD. Partnership Interest11. 
15. Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC., is indebted to 
Plaintiffs in the amount of $175,000.00, or, alternatively, 
its failure to pay said amount to Plaintiffs has damaged 
Plaintiffs in the amount of $175,000.00. 
16. Any defense raised to this cause of action by 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., will be raised in bad faith and 
Plaintiffs are entitled to the award of reasonable attorney 
fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), in the 
event that LEISURE SPORTS, INC., files any defense to this 
cause of action. 
17. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at the legal 
rate prior to judgment, and to interest at the judgment rate 
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from and after any judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiffs 
and against Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against LEISURE 
SPORTS, INC., in the amount of $175,000.00, for reasonable 
attorney fees if any defense is asserted in bad faith, for 
interest at the legal rate prior to judgment, for Plaintiffs1 
costs of court, for interest after judgment at the judgment 
rate, and for such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
18. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations set forth 
in their First and Second Causes of Action, above, as 
though fully stated herein. 
19. Defendant DIXIE TITLE COMPANY holds in escrow the 
Agreements for Sale of LTD. Partnership Interest stated 
above, the documents necessary to consummate said Agreements, 
and the sum of $175,000.00 owed to Plaintiffs. Said documents 
and monies are held for the use and benefit of the other 
parties to this action. 
20. Plaintiffs have demanded that Defendant DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY "close" the transactions referred to above, and 
disburse monies and documents in accordance with the Agreements 
stated. See letter from Dean A. Mixon, attorney for Plaintiffs, 
dated 18 February 1985 to DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, (Exhibit "C") 
and copy of telegram to DIXIE TITLE COMPANY (Exhibit M D n ) . 
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21. Despite Plaintiffs demands, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY has 
refused to deliver to Plaintiffs the documents and monies 
to which Plaintiffs are entitled. 
22. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order of this Court 
requiring DIXIE TITLE COMPANY to close the transactions 
referred to above, and to deliver to Plaintiffs the documents 
and monies to which Plaintiffs are entitled, together with 
interest upon said monies. In the event of failure of 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY to deliver said monies and documents, 
Plaintiffs will be damaged in the amount of $325,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against DIXIE 
TITLE COMPANY requiring said Defendant to deliver to Plaintiffs 
all documents held in escrow for Plaintiffs benefit, together 
with $175,000.00, plus interest, held by DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, 
and in the event that DIXIE TITLE COMPANY fails to deliver 
said documents and money, plus interest, to Plaintiffs, that 
Plaintiffs have judgment against DIXIE TITLE COMPANY in the 
amount of $325,000.00, together with interest before and 
after judgment at the applicable rate, and together with 
reasonable attorney fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953, 
as amended), if DIXIE TITLE COMPANY asserts in bad faith 
any defense to this cause of action. Further, Plaintiffs 
pray for an award of their costs of court and for such other 
and further relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
DATED: gtf June 1985. ' ^  ^ 
WILLARD R. B I S H O P J 
n r _ n Attorney for Plaintiffs 
7 
Plaintiffs' address: 
12671 Overbrooke Drive 
Santa Ana, CA 92705 
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Agreement made this day of
 # 1984, by and 
between Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership, 
(hereinafter "Buyer") and Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, 
(hereinafter "Seller"). 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of a^5% interest in Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. a Utah Limited Paitnership. 
2. The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an 
agreement wherein Seller shall purchase the limited partnership 
interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1 . Buyer agrees to assign and convey all of Unit «=3. / Q 
Building ) of Timberbrook Condominiums, at closing all of 
Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached 
hereto at Exhibit "A". Said Conveyance shall be subject to an 
existing construction loan which loan shall be released iron the 
condominium upon completion of the sales of Units in Phase 1. 
2. This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon 
closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and 
Loan Association. 
3. Closing shall occur through the cilices of Dixie Title 
Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
R20/13 072
 ( ) 0 8 EXHIBIT 
Utah. The assignment (Exhibit "A11} shall be deposited with Escrow 
Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing. 




Cliffl^Jd G. Crane 
I Bonnie Crane 
BUYER 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC. 
By &0^\ (IM^AA 
B^pryvC^iurch , P r e s i d e n t 
l u p s e l l J > G a n i d n 
( a i rman of t h e Board of 
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EXHIBIT "AM 
ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane (Seller) hereby assigns and 
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 5% interest as a limited partner, 
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Seller warrants as follows: 
1. That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances or claims against Seller's title; 
2. That Seller has the full power to convey said interest; 
3. Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the 
date of closing, and Seller hereby authorizes the Escrow Agent, 
Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the 
date of closing. 





J7 ,ry\ Udj2*zLX^ 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the day of November, 1984, personally appeared before 
074 
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me Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above 
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth* 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing In: 
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' ^ ^ MARYH. HEEDT 
^ • 6 ^ - ; NOTARY P'JOitC CALIFORNIA 
J v . i - V ^ ^ V PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN 
v ; > d * ^ OttANGF COUNTY 
M> C o m m i i s i o o O p i r e s Mar. 3 1 . K ' r f i 
On t h i s t h e ^ t h d a y of S'ebnMi^v 19 , before me, 
:•::•:;•::•:•/: M A p. V U :DT—: 







 ci.irroRD n. CHAMC
 AJJ!:. ;<o;i;in: CPA::F: «::'::,: 
persona l ly k n o w n to me 
.K>. proved to me on the basis of sa t i s fac to ry ev idence 
to be the person 's) whose namc(s) ._ ° -
w i t h in i ns t rumen t , and acknow ledged that 
WITNESS my hand and of f ic ia l seal. 
h'.v 
s u b s c r i b e d to the 
execu ted it. 
Notary 's Signature OTh-
AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Agreement made this day of , 1984 , by and 
between Leisure Sports, Inc. (hereinafter "Buyer") and 
Clifford G. Crane/and Bonnie Crane J (hereinafter "Seller"). 
j 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of a 20% interest in Timberbrook 
Village Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership. 
2. The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an 
agreement wherein Seller shall purchase the limited partnership 
interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Buyer hereby agrees to pay, at closing as hereinafter 
defined, the sum of One liundred Seventy-Five Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($175,000). 
2. Seller agrees to assign and convey at closing all of 
Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached 
hereto at Exhibit "A". 
3- This agreement and closing hereon shall ,be contingent upon 
closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and 
Loan Association. 
4. Closing shall occur through the offices of Dixie Title 
Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
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Utah. The assignment (Exhibit MA") shall be deposited with Escrow 
Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing. 
Agreement made the date first mentioned above. 
SELLER 
jM d^OA^K^ 
Cliif G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
BUYER 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC. 
By fcSOA^) 
. s e l l J > G a l l i a n 
fiairman of the Board of 





Ca 1 i i OT fi i a 
Pr .mr r - ss 
My t<vr>rrv 
^ A [ K H HEEDT 
P M \ : » v_ crpn.L \u 
19 _ _ , be fore mo, 




 f ' M i ' F O ! n <\ f 'PA!.'" AN^ : i n M N I E r PAM r ^ •'• — •' 
personal ly Knov.n to me 
1
 '" proxed to me on ihr» basis of sa t is fac tory ev idence 
to be the pp 'son(s) w h o s n namo(s) 1 1 ^ - _ _ s u b s c r i b e d to t h ^ 
w i th in i ns t rumen t , and a c k n o w l e d g e d that . ^ __ e x e c u t e d it 
W ! i NFSS r ly hand and offic lal s^ai 
07!) 
'i: 
Notary 's S ignature 
- : -^>--^^ 
EXHIBIT "A" 
ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Clifford G. Crane (and Bonnie Crane/ (Seller) hereby assigns an"d 
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 20% interest as a limited partner, 
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Seller warrants as follows: 
1. That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances or claims against Seller's title; 
2. That Seller has the full power to convey said interest; 
3. Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the 
date of closing, and Seller hereby authorizes the Escrow Agent, 
Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the 
date of closing. 
DATED this day of Nuvdnibui, 1904. ^ k o W < * 13 (Wt_^ 
SELLER 
CliffdJ^dl GTTrane A/ft/v^. 
^?t^V 
Bonnie Crane 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the day of November, 1984, personally appeared before 
-T-
0,80 
n* ^  
me Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above 
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing In: 
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C a l i i o rn i a State of 
County of 
0 r \ i n Co 55. 
VARY H HEtDT 
My Co mm.' 
^ 3 th 
On this the ' day of 
Feb r u a r y 
19 , before me, 
MARY l\. H E I l I v r * * * * * 
the unders igned rJotary Publ ic, personal ly appeared 
— * C L I F F O R D G. CHAIJ*?: AMI) ROMIHE CRANE 
•."i personal ly k n o w n to me 
•[•/• proved to me on tho basis of sa t i s fac to ry ev idence 
to be the person(s) whose name(s) r l r o _ . s u b s c r i b e d to the 
1/hev wi th in i ns t rumen t , and acknow ledged that 
WITNESS my hand and o f f ic ia l seal. (\ O • ; 
.executed it. 
Notary 's S ignature 
WEINFELD 6 MIXON 
A tAW CORPORATION 
6 0 1 NORTH PARKCtNTER DRIVE, SUITE 203 
S A N T A ANA, C A L I F O R N I A © 2 7 0 5 
February 18,1985 
Mr. Doug Westbrook 
Dixie Title Company 
205 E. Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
RE: CLIFFORD CRANE ESCROW 
Dear Mr. Westbrook: 
As I believe you know, our office represents Clifford 
G. and Bonnie Crane. Enclosed please find the following 
two original documents: 
1. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" 
to which my clients and Timberbrook Village Limited are parties; 
2. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" 
to which my clients and Leisure Sports Incorporated are parties. 
Enclosed please find, further, a copy of a document 
entitled "Substitution of Guarantee" dated November 20, 1984, 
between Nebraska Savings & Loan Association and Russell J. 
Gallian. You may proceed to close the transaction referred 
to in Mr. Gallian's February 11, 1985, letter to me, copy 
enclosed, as soon as you have received from Nebraska Savings 
& Loan Association their written affirmation o*f the validity 
of the "Substitution of Guarantor" document along with their 
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no 
obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings & Loan Association, 
either jointly or severally, either actual or contingent. 
There are three conditions to closing from our side: 
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the original 
of the above-referenced affirmation and warranty by Nebraska 
Savings & Loan Association; 
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully executed 
Warranty Deed to Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condomin-
iums ; 
TELEPHONE 
<7I<4) B 4 I - 6 6 4 8 
083 EXHIBIT 
CE1MFELD 8 MIXON 
A LAW C O R P O R A T I O N 
Mr. DOLV Westbrook 
February 18, 1985 
Page two 
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of $175,000 
into my client's account at Home Savings of American, 
179 N. Tustin, Orange, California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3 
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by Friday, 
March 8, 1985, you are instructed to return all documents 
to me and to terminate the escrow. If you have any question 
or comment, please do not hesitate to call. 
Very truly yours, 
WEINFELD & MIXON 
DAM/mw 
Enclosure 




-7 / ( / / 
DEAN A. MIXON 
c-v 
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07PM V-
4-053195S066002 P3/07/85 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP SNAB 
1 7145416648 MGM TORN SANTA ANA CA 03-07 g857P EST 
WEINFELD A^ -'D MIXON 
601 NORTH PARK CFNTER «203 
SANTA ANA CA 92705 
THIS IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE! 
714541664P TDRN SANTA ANA CA 26 03-07 0657P EST 
FON 8016P8J638 
MR DOUG WESTBROOK, DIXIE TITLE CO RPT DLY HGM COPY MESSAGE 
P05 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST GEORGE UT B4770 
THF MARCH 8 CLOSING REQUIREMENT REFERRED TO IN MY LETTER OF FEBRUARY 
18, 1985, IS WAIVED. THE ESCROW IS IRREVOCABLE. YOU ARE TO CLOSE AT 
ONCE. 
WEINFELD AND MIXON 
601 NORTH PARK CENTER «2P!3 







S2P5 MILL ST 
RFNO NV H95M2 06AM 
1-R15921A067 03/08/85 ICS IPMROCG RNO SNAA 
009^6 DH TDRN 3/8 
WEINFELD AND MIXON 
601 NORTH PARK CENTER «203 
SANTA ANA CA 92705 
YOUR MESSAGE 4-053195S066 2057 
DATED 3/8 
TO DOUG WESTBRDOK OF ST GEORGE UT 
WAS DELIVERED BY TELEPHONE AT 8|41AM PST 
ON 3/6 
AND ACCEPTED BY D L. 
THANK YOU FOR USING OUR SERVICE, 
WESTERN UNION 
5205 MILL ST 




GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
Attorney for Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 1339 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 8 4770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, Husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; HEART 
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, in its 
capacity as general partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.; 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER 
Civil No. SS- <£ $ / 
COMES NOW the Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., 
by and through its attorney, Russell J. Gallian, and hereby answers 
Plaintifffs Complaint on file herein as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
which relief may be granted. 
087 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant admits and denies as follows: 
1. Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
2. Defendant denies Paragraph 8. 
3. Defendant admits so much of Paragraph 9 that it has 
refused to convey to Plaintiffs real property, but denies the 
remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 9. 
4. Defendant denies Paragraphs 10 and 11. 
5. Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of Paragraphs 12 through 22, so denies the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
6. Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 5, and makes 
the same a part hereof by reference. 
7. Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., has not 
consummated the deal with Plaintiffs inasmuch as Plaintiffs changed 
the terms of the deal such that the new terms constituted a 
counteroffer by Plaintiffs. Defendant Heart Marketing and 
Development, Inc., thereafter withdrew its original offer to 
Plaintiffs before the Plaintiffs accepted Defendants1 original 
offer. 
8. Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., 
thereafter advised Dixie Title Company that their offer had been 
withdrawn and not to accept Plaintiffs' acceptance of the offer. 
9. Defendant gave notice to Plaintiff that it was withdrawing 
the offer, which notice was given before Plaintiffs accepted the 
n«« (V)1 
offer. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., 
prays the Court as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein be dismissed and 
they take nothing; 
2. That Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., 
recover its costs and disbursements incurred herein, including 
reasonable attorney's fees; 
4. That Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., be 
granted such other and further relief as may appear just and proper 
in the circumstances. 
DATED this Z V day of July, 1985. 
GMtfTlAtf, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
Russell J. Gallian 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid this ^ o "- day of July, 1985, 
to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit; 
Willard R. Bishop, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 279 
36 North 300 West 








GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
Attorney for Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 1339 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 8 4770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 





TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; HEART 
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, in its 
capacity as general partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.; 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., by and 
through its attorney, Russell J. Gallian, and hereby answers 
Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 




Defendant admits and denies as follows: 
1. Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
2. Defendant denies Paragraph 8. 
3. Defendant admits so much of Paragraph 9 that it has 
refused to convey to Plaintiffs real property, but denies the 
remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 9. 
4. Defendant denies Paragraphs 10 and 11. 
5. Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd*, is without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 
Paragraphs 12 through 22, so denies the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
6. Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 5, and makes 
the same a part hereof by reference. 
7. Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., has not consummated 
the deal with Plaintiffs inasmuch as Plaintiffs changed the terms of 
the deal such that the new terms constituted a counteroffer by 
Plaintiffs. Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., thereafter 
withdrew its original offer to Plaintiffs before the Plaintiffs 
accepted Defendants' original offer. 
8. Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., thereafter advised 
Dixie Title Company that it was withdrawing its offer to Plaintiffs 
and not to accept Plaintiffs' acceptance of the offer. 
9. Defendant gave notice to Plaintiff that it was withdrawing 




WHEREFORE, Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., prays the Court 
as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein be dismissed and 
they take nothing; 
2. That Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., recover its 
costs and disbursements incurred herein, including reasonable 
attorney's fees; 
4. That Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., , be granted such 
other and further relief as may appear just and proper in the 
circumstances. 
DATED this }^J day of July, 1985. 
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid this X>J ~ day of July, 1985, 
to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit; 
Willard R. Bishop, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 279 
36 North 300 West 







GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
Attorney for Defendant Dixie Title Company 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 1339 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 




TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; HEART 
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, in its 
capacity as general partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.; 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Defendant Dixie Title Company, by and through its 
attorney, Russell J. Gallian, and hereby answers Plaintifffs 
Complaint on file herein as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
ANSWER 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
093 
relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant admits and denies as follows: 
1. Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
2. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient 
to form a belief as to the truths of Paragraphs 5 through 17, so 
denies the same. 
3. Defendant admits and denies as set forth above in 
reference to Paragraph 18. 
4. Defendant admits Paragraphs 19 and 20. 
5. Defendant admits Paragraph 21 inasmuch as the terms of the 
escrow have not been made, and Dixie Title Company has no authority 
to close escrow. 
6. Defendant Dixie Title Company is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 
22, so denies the same. Dixie Title Company further states that it 
is a neutral escrow agent and is willing to follow the terms of the 
escrow agreement when all the conditions prior to closing of escrow 
are fulfilled. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
7. Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 6, and makes 
the same a part hereof by reference. 
8. Defendant Dixie Title Company is a neutral escrow agent 
which has no authority to act until all parties involved in this 
transaction have either completed all items necessary before closing 
can occur, or until the parties are all agreeable as to this 
094 
transaction, or until an order of the Court is entered instructing 
Dixie Title Company on how to fulfill its obligations as to this 
transaction. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Dixie Title Company prays the Court as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff1s Complaint on file herein be dismissed and 
he take nothing; 
2. That the Court Order that Dixie Title Company not be 
further involved in this lawsuit until a determination is made by 
the parties, or the Court, as to what Dixie Title Company should do 
in regards to this transaction; 
3. That Defendant Dixie Title Company recover its costs and 
disbursements incurred herein, including reasonable attorney's fees; 
4. That Defendant Dixie Title Company be granted such other 
and further relief as may appear just and proper in the 
circumstances. 
DATED this /,Jf day of July, 1985. 
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
095 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid this day of July, 1985, 
to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit; 
Willard R. Bishopf Esq, 
P. 0. Box 279 
36 North 300 West 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
ecre tary _j 
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GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
Attorney for Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 1339 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, Husband and wife, 
) ANSWER AND 
Plaintiffs, COUNTERCLAIM 
vs. 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; HEART ) 
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, in its ) 
capacity as general partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.; ) 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE ) Civil No. S3 Jl 81 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., by and through 
its attorney, Russell J. Gallian, and hereby answers Plaintiff's 
Complaint on file herein as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
007 
relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant admits and denies as follows: 
1. Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3f 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
2. Defendant denies Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
3. Defendant admits Paragraph 12. 
4. Defendant denies Paragraphs 13. 
5. Defendant admits that Leisure Sports, Inc., has failed to 
pay Plaintiffs the sum of $175,000.00, but denies the remaining 
allegations contained in Paragraph 14. 
6. Defendant denies Paragraph 15, 16, and 17. 
7. Defendant admits and denies as set forth above in 
reference to Paragraph 18. 
8. Defendant admits Paragraph 19. 
9. Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 
Paragraphs 20 through 22, so denies the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
10. Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 9, and makes 
the same a part hereof by reference. 
11. Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., has not consummated the 
deal with Plaintiffs inasmuch as Plaintiffs changed the terms of the 
deal such that the new terms in effect constituted a counteroffer by 
Plaintiffs. Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., thereafter withdrew its 
original offer to Plaintiffs before the Plaintiffs accepted 
Defendants1 original offer. 
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12. Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., thereafter advised Dixie 
Title Company that their offer had been withdrawn and not to accept 
Plaintiffs1 acceptance of the offer. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
13• Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 12, and makes 
the same a part hereof by reference. 
14. Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Leisure Sports, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Leisure Sports") borrowed money to pay Clifford Crane. 
These moneys were place into escrow with Dixie Title Company. 
15. Because the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants Clifford G. 
Crane and Bonnie Crane (hereinafter "the Cranes") did not accept 
Leisure Sports1 offer, and counteroffered, Leisure Sports withdrew 
their original offer. 
16. The Cranes have initiated a claim against Leisure Sports' 
funds in escrow, and because of such wrongful claim, Leisure Sports 
has been denied the use of these funds. 
17. Leisure Sports has been damaged thereby in the amount of 
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000.00), or such amount as may be 
proved in Court. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., prays the Court 
as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein be dismissed and 
they take nothing; 
2. That Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Leisure Sports, 
Inc., recover $100,000.00, or such amount as is proved at trial, for 
damages as per its Counterclaim; 
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3. That Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Leisure Sports, 
Inc., recover its costs and disbursements incurred herein, including 
reasonable attorney's fees; 
4. That Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Leisure Sports, 
Inc., be granted such other and further relief as may appear just 
and proper in the circumstances. 
DATED this jJp~day of July, 1985. 
GALLIAtf, £>RAKE & WESTFALL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid this /\S *- day of July, 1985, 
to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit; 
Willard R. Bishop, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 279 
36 North 300 West 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 




WILLARD R. BISHOP 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
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P . 0 . Box 279 
C e d a r C i t y , UT 847 20 
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~* h i r ihar* 1 n~U w i f e . 
P] a i i i t I f f s , 
v s . rPTT.Y TO' COUNTERCLAIM 
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Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, In 
its capacity as general partner 
Of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. ; 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY; a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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3. Answering paragraph 14, Plaintiffs admit the same upon 
information and belief, but reserve the right to withdraw said 
admission in the event that discovery proves the facts to be 
otherwise then as asserted by Leisure Sports, Inc., in said 
paragraph 14. Plaintiffs assert upon information and belief that 
the money was borrowed in connection with a much larger loan, for 
other purposes. 
4. The allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the 
Counterclaim are denied. 
5. Answering paragraph 16, Plaintiffs admit that they have 
initiated a claim against the sum of $17 5,000 held in escrow by 
Dixie Title Company by reason of Leisure Sports1 failure to pay 
said funds when due, but deny all other allegations contained in 
paragraph 16. 
6. The allegations contained in paragraph 17 of the 
Counterclaim are denied. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
7. As an affirmative defense, Plaintiffs assert the matters 
set forth in their Complaint on file herein. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
8. The damages alleged by Leisure Sports, if any, have been 
caused by Leisure Sports or third parties, and not by these 
Plaintiffs. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
9. In the event that Leisure Sports has suffered any 
damages, which Plaintiffs deny, Leisure Sports has failed to 
mitigate its damages. 
_2_
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SIXTH DEFENSE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that . •'•si lee ;•. • •* • ' ' i:f-
of the above and foregoing REPLY TO COUNTS RCLAT '••:, 
J. Gallian, of GALLIAN, DRAKE & WE:""""r 






f i r s t c lass mail, postage ful ly prepaid t h i s .. fy" day of 
August, 1985. 





WILLARD R. BISHOP #03 44 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P . C . 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
P . 0 . Box 279 
C e d a r C i t y , U'. . . . 
T e l e p h o n e : (80] x :;->•- 9483 
OCT .y, ^ &S* 
COURT 
STATE 01 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE a n d BONNII 
C R A N! F i h lj r ba r: o a r\ c' r.-7 A * ( 
v s 
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Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC, , a Utah Corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner cf TTMBERBRC ":-
VILLAGE, LTD. ; LEISURE SPORTb, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; and 




Civil No. 85-281 
T h i s m a t t e r came b e f o r e th*- C^ur* cr r r i d a y May ~ - - - -
 a ^ 
( ,
 ;
 * e r e n o e i ^  ] ^ ^ ^  P f ^ r c * ,ri *% u ^  -^  v- - i - 1 / T u , » * I -« T > 1 1 -1-- <_, 
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P r o c e d u r e . The f o l ] o w i n q a c t i o n s \/e : ~ t a k e n : 
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ips For 3 • :-- :.'*.. . t u i . i - , I !: Bi si: IOJ: , : if 1 1: .• -. " f :i rm 
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B . Pc ) " ' • 
Thompson , Lujlir-L c, ^ C L . . . . 
D . n u o r • ' f OL t h e f i r m of 
Irw 
2. JURISDICTION AND VENUE were admitted by all parties 
present, and were found to be proper by the Court. 
3. GENERAL NATURE OF THE CASE AND CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES; 
Claims of the parties are generally as follows: 
A. CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFF; 
(1) In its First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs claim 
to have entered into a certain "Agreement for Sale of 
Limited Partnership Interest" with Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., by the terms of which Plaintiffs sold 
a five percent (5%) interest in Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd., to the partnership in return for a conveyance 
to Unit 201, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums. 
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to specific 
performance and to receive a conveyance of the 
condominium from Timberbrook Village, Ltd., and Heart 
Marketing and Development, Inc., its general partner. 
Failing specific performance, Plaintiffs claim 
damages in the amount of $150,000, and claim that 
defenses raised by Timberbrook Village, Ltd., and/or 
Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., entitle 
Plaintiffs to reasonable attorney fees under the 
provisions of U.C.A. 78-27-56 (1953, as amended). 
(2) In their Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs 
claim that they entered into a certain "Agreement for 
Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" with Leisure 
Sports, Inc., by the terms of which Plaintiffs were 
to sell Leisure Sports a twenty percent (20%) limited 
-2-
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fees if any defenses are asserted in bad faith, and 
other relief. Responding thereto, Defendants Dixie 
Title has interpled, indicating its intention to be 
bound by the Court's orders. 
CLAIMS OF . CQUNTERC^AIMANT, LEISURE,..SPORTS., INC., , are 
as follows: In its Counterclaim, Defendant Leisure 
Sports claims that it borrowed money to pay 
Plaintiffs, that said monies were placed in escrow 
with Dixie Title Company, that Leisure Sports 
withdrew its offer to Cranes, that Cranes have 
initiated a claim against the money in escrow, 
wrongfully, and that Leisure Sports has thereby been 
damaged in the amount to be proven. Plaintiffs Crane 
have replied to the Counterclaim, have asserted that 
the Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, have admitted upon information 
that Leisure Sports borrowed money to pay Plaintiffs 
and that said monies were placed into escrow with 
Dixie Title Company, but have denied the allegation 
that they did not accept the offer, have denied that 
they counteroffered, and have denied that Leisure 
Sports withdrew its original offer. Plaintiffs admit 
they have initiated a claim against the funds held by 
Dixie Title Company, but have otherwise denied the 
allegations contained in the Counterclaim. As 
affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs asserted the matters 
set forth in their Complaint, have claimed that any 
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documents to the Plaintiffs, executed by certain of 
the Defendants, calling for Plaintiffs1 signatures. 
These documents were included in a cover letter dated 
on or about November 13, 1984, by Russell J. Gallian. 
The discussions proceeding Mr. Gallian1s November 13, 
1984, letter included a representation by Mr. Gallian 
that Mr. Gallian would substitute himself on 
Plaintiffs' loans as a condition to any agreement. 
The documentation mailed to Plaintiffs did not 
include the provision concerning the release from 
Plaintiffs1 guaranty to Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association. 
On or about November 20, 1984, Russell J. Gallian 
executed a document entitled "Substitution of 
Guarantor", the original of which was retained by 
Nebraska Savings and Loan Association, and was 
countersigned by its Vice President, simultaneously 
with Gallian1s signature. 
On January 16th and 17th of 1985, Willard R. Bishop 
wrote two demands at Plaintiffs1 request to 
Defendants Timberbrook and Heart Marketing and 
Development, seeking the financial records, tax 
returns and a complete accounting of Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd, 
Concurrently, Plaintiffs had retained a California 
attorney, one Dean Mixon, to contact Mr. Russell 
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tendered, would now execute the earlier documents 
tendered to them. Gallian's second letter, also 
dated February 11th, 1985, was sent to Plaintiffs1 
Utah attorney, Mr. Willard Bishop. -ffhio—letter 
K -explaino—that—the—Plaintiffs were—g4r^en full—acccoo 
v\iwto/thc beeks and records of the partnership,—and tha£ 
\\\/ -/jailiran—was—awaiting—documents—in—kke—possession—ef 
* / -Pl-aint-if f s—to —be—placed—in—escrow—at—Dixie—¥-itlc 
Compa-ny. This letter was copied to Plaintiffs1 
California attorney, Mixon. Attorney Bishop had no 
prior knowledge of the November 13, 1984 documents or 
of Mr. Mixon1s involvement. Gallian assumed that Mr. 
Bishop was aware of the negotiations with Mixon prior 
to February 13, 1985. 
Q. On February 12th, 1986, the Plaintiffs, through their 
Utah attorney, Willard R. Bishop, filed suit in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
Civil No. 85-066 seeking, through judicial means, an 
accounting on Timberbrook Village, Ltd. On the 13th 
day of February, Mr. Barry Church, an officer of 
Heart Marketing, Timberbrook1s general partner, and a 
signatore to Defendants1 offers in this case, was 
served the summons and complaint in that lawsuit. 
R. One day after that lawsuit was served, Civil No. 
85-066, and the same day that Mr. Church received 
service of process, February 13, 1985, Mr. Bishop 
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instructed Mr. Westbrook that he could close the 
transaction "as soon as...[Westbrook had] received 
from Nebraska Savings and Loan Association their 
written affirmation of the validity of the 
'substitution of guarantor1 document along with their 
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have 
no obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings and 
Loan Association, either jointly or severally, either 
actual or contingent". Mixon's letter concluded as 
follows: 
There are three conditions to closing from our side: 
1) Your mailing to me by registered mail, the 
original of the above referenced affirmation and 
warranty by Nebraska Savings and Loan Association; 
2) Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully 
executed warranty deed to Unit 210, Building 1, of 
Timberbrook Condominiuns; 
3) Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of 
$175,000 into my clients1 account at Home Savings of 
America, 179 North Tustin, Orange, California 92667, 
account no. 125-900624-3. 
Lastly, Mixon added the following language: 
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by 
Friday, March 8th, 1985, you are instructed to return 
all documents to me and to terminate the escrow. If 
you have any question or comment, please do not 
hesitate to call. 
V. On the morning of February 22nd, 1985, Mr. Clifford 
Crane called Gallian's office, Nebraska Savings and 
Loan, Dixie Title Company and Russell Gallian's 
office again. Nebraska Savings and Loan o.rally 
confirmed that, true to Gallian's representation, 
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Z. Defendant Dixie Title Company still holds in escrow 
the $175,000 deposited therein, through a trust 
account at Gallian/ Drake & Westfallf in an interest 
bearing account, paying the interest to Leisure 
Sports, Inc. Said title company also holds Mixon's 
letter dated February 18, 1985, the enclosures 
therewith, and the three mailgrams. 
5. ISSUES ...QF..FACT.. AND. £AW and any implicit in the foregoing 
paragraphs, remain for trial as set forth below. Plaintiffs view 
the issues of fact and law as follows: 
A. Was an agreement reached between the parties prior to 
November 13, 1984, which the subsequent documents 
only serve to memorialize? 
B. If the signed documents mailed to Plaintiffs on or 
about November 13, 1984, did not merely memorialize 
an existing agreement, and if they constituted 
"offers" as such term is legally defined, were such 
offers accepted by Plaintiffs, and if so, when? 
C. Did the February 18, 1985 letter from Dean Mixon to 
Dixie Title Company, contain "conditions" not 
anticipated by the agreement between the parties, 
thus creating a counteroffer? 
D. Who was the cause, and what were the reasons for, the 
delays which resulted in Plaintiffs signing the 
documentation on February 13, 1985, although such 
documentation was mailed to them during the latter 
part of November, 1984? 
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When did Dixie Title Company receive Dean Mixon's 
letter of February 18, 1985? 
Did Russell J. Gallian ever communicate to either 
Plaintiff, or to Dean Mixon, any withdrawal of the 
documentation mailed on November 13f 1985, and if so, 
did such withdrawal occur on or after February 22, 
1985, and exactly when? 
Did Russell J. Gallian communicate rejection of the 
purported "conditions" contained in Mr. Mixon's 
February 18, 1985 letter, to Mr. Crane and/or Mr. 
Mixon, and if so, when? 
If enforceable contracts exists, have Plaintiffs 
suffered any damages, and if so, in what amount? 
Have Plaintiffs acted tortiously in bringing this 
suit? 
If Plaintiffs acted tortiously in bringing this suit, 
has Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., suffered any 
damages, and if so, in what amount? 
Were any claims or defenses raised in bad faith in 
this action, and if so, which? 
If any party is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
in this action, what is the amount of such reasonable 
fees? 
Did Dixie Title Company wrongfully fail and refuse to 
deliver money and documents to Plaintiffs upon 
demand? 
-13- i i 7 
N. Do Plaintiffs have any enforceable contract with 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd.f or with Leisure Sports, 
Inc. , for the conveyance of a condominium to 
Plaintiffs, and if so, is Timberbrook Village's 
general partner also liable on such contract? 
0. If Plaintiffs have an enforceable contract with 
Timberbrook Villager Ltd., and Heart Marketing and 
Development, Inc., as its general partner, and/or 
with Leisure Sports, Inc., concerning the 
condominium, are Plaintiffs entitled to specific 
performance and to conveyance of the condominium, or 
are Plaintiffs limited to an award of damages? 
P. Do Plaintiffs have an enforceable contract with 
Leisure Sports, Inc.? 
Q. If so, are Plaintiffs entitled to delivery of the sum 
of $175,000 from Defendant Dixie Title Company, plus 
any reasonably forseeable consequential damages? 
R. Are Plaintiffs entitled to judgment against Defendant 
Dixie Title Company, and if so, in what amount and 
what form should the judgment take? 
S. Is Leisure Sports, Inc., entitled to judgment against 
Plaintiffs based upon tortiously bringing this suit, 
and if so, in what amount? 
T. Is any party entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney fees under U.C.A. 78-27-56 (1953, as 
amended)? 
Defendants view the issues of law and fact as follows: 
-14-
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(1) Did the Plaintiffs, seeking specific performance, 
diligently discharge their duties; are their hands 
clean? 
(2) Was the Plaintiffs' tender, by cover letter of Dean 
Mixon dated February 18, 1985, an unconditional 
acceptance of Defendants' offers? 
(3) Was Defendants' tender, together with the cover 
letter of Mixon dated February 18, 1985, a 
conditional acceptance and by its essence a rejection 
of Defendants1 offers? 
(4) If the Defendants' offers were rejected, could 
Plaintiffs reinstate their acceptance by subsequently 
unilaterally waiving their conditional acceptance? 
(5) Do the offers initially mailed by Defendants' or the 
Plaintiffs' waiver(s) violate the statute of frauds? 
(6) Can an offer, once rejected, be unilaterally revived 
by the offeree without the express consent of the 
offeror? 
(7) What was the intent and/or understanding of 
Plaintiffs in executing Defendants' proposals on 
February 13th, 1985; was there a material difference 
between their understanding and the actual terms of 
the written proposal? 
(8) Did the Plaintiffs filing a lawsuit for an accounting 
and their proceeding with said lawsuit, constitute an 




* .EXHIBITS were marked, i den t i f i ed , offered and received as 
follows: 
EXHIBIT 
-> f l f f . T , . ^ JTEM OFFERED, gy RECEIVED 
Letter from Russell J. Gallian 
to Clifford G. Crane, dated 
November 13, 1984, 
Enclosures to Mr. Gallian1s 
letter to Mr. Crane of November 
13, 1984, including agreements 
for sale of limited partnership 
interest, unsigned by Plaintiffs, 
together with exhibits attached 
thereto, unsigned by Plaintiffs. 
Letter from Willard R. Bishop 
to Heart Marketing and Develop-
ment, Inc., dated January 16, 
1985. 
Letter from Willard R. Bishop 
to Barry Church, President of 
Heart Marketing and Develop-
ment, Inc., dated January 17, 
1985. 
"Substitution of Guarantor11, 
dated November 20, 1984, 
executed by D. E. Crouch and 
Russell J. Gallian. 
Letter dated February 6, 1985, 
from Willard R. Bishop to 
Russell J. Gallian. 
Letter dated February 11, 1985, 
from Russell J. Gallian to Dean 
Mixon. 
Letter dated February 11, 1985, 
from Russell J. Gallian to 
Willard R. Bishop. 
Letter from Willard R. Bishop 
to Russell J. Gallian, dated 
February 18, 1985. 
Letter from Dean Mixon to 1 ? 0 
Douglas Westbrook of Dixie 
Title Company, dated February 
18, 1985. 
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Enclosures to Dean Mixon's 
letter to Douglas Westbrook of 
February 18, 1985, including 
agreements for sale of limited 
partnership interst signed by 
Plaintiffs, together with 
exhibits which were attached 
thereto, and were signed by 
Plaintiffs. 
Envelope postmarked February 
21, 1986, which contained Mr* 
Mixon's letter dated February 
18, 1985, and enclosures. 
Mailgram dated February 22, 
1985, to Doug Westbrook over 
name of Clifford G. Crane. 
Mailgram dated February 27, 
1985, to Doug Westbrook, over 
name of Clifford G. Crane. 
Mailgram dated March 7, 1985, 
to Doug Westbrook of Dixie 
Title Company, over name of 
Kleinfeld and Mixon. 
Limited Partnership Agreement 
of Timberbrook Village, Ltd. 
Guaranty made by Plaintiffs 
to Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association. 
Guaranty of completion made 
by Plaintiffs in favor of 
Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association. 
Exhibits were returned to the party offering the same, to be 
made available by that party at the time of trial. If other 
exhibits are to be offered and the necessity of the same can be 
reasonably anticipated, copies of such additional exhibits shall 
be submitted to opposing counsel prior to trial. 
: ^ A 
The parties stipulated that the Court could take judicial 
notice of all filings in the case of Crane v. Timberbrook 
ymagfe, kt.d^ .. e.t...al, bearing Civil No. 85-066, in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, and of all 
filings in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, 
State of Utah in the case of Conrad,.JK9.n1.ng„,..ajicL.Amy^ JKonARg„„ys> 
LeJLsLVure ,.SP9Xts./ Ins....r....et;„al/ bearing Civil No. 86-024 
?• HJ.TMSSJiS s At trial, the following witnesses may be 
called: 
HME^Qg. WIT-BBSS ^ARTX^q^^^.^T^ElSff 
Clifford G. Crane Plaintiffs 
Dean Mixon Plaintiffs 
Doug Westbrook Plaintiffs/Defendants 
Russell J. Gallian Defendants 
Barry Church Defendants 
Mark Griffin Defendants 
Russ Turner Defendants 
Bonnie Crane Defendants 
The witnesses named above who are parties, or officers or 
employees of parties shall appear to testify at the time of trial 
without the necessity of issuing and serving Subpoenas. In the 
event that other witnesses are to be called at trial, a statement 
of the names and addresses of such witnesses and of the general 
subject matter of their testimony will be delivered to opposing 
counsel prior to trial. 
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, 'RON COUNTY 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
Michael D. Hughes #1572 
Attorney for Defendants 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801/67 3-4 892 
JAN 2 3 1987 
4
 fos. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85-281 
COME NOW the Defendants above-named, and by and 
through their attorney of record, Michael D. Hughes, and 
hereby move the Court for a summary judgment. A memorandum 
in support of this motion is attached an exhibit hereto. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 1987. 
MICHAEL 
Attorney 
/^r^C/< ^ f^T>< .' 
D. HUGH&S-l^ ^ ^Z7 
for Defendants ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage 
prepaid, to Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. 
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IRON COUNTY 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
Michael D. Hughes #1572 
Attorney for Defendants 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801/673-48 92 
JAN 2G1937 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD,, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85-281 
For purposes of this Memorandum, the Defendants 
factual recitation will be brief but sufficient for accurate 
judicial analysis of the real issue presented to the Court. 
FACTS 
The Defendants, Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie 
Crane, residents of California, are owners of a twenty-five 
percent (25%) interest as limited partners in Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, hereinafter 
"Timberbrook." In November of 1984, Timberbrook, through 
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its general partner, Heart Market and Developing, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, sought the purchase of the Cranes' 
interest by a cover letter dated November 13th, 1984 over 
the signature of Russell J. Gallian, and enclosing two 
purchase offers. The cover letter and offers are attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibits lf2f',, "3", 
and "4", having been xeroxed from the deposition of Clifford 
Crane. Mr. Gallian1s letter, Exhibit "2" herein, requested 
that the Cranes contact Barry Church, president of Heart 
Marketing, in the event that they had any questions about 
the documents. As additional consideration for these 
transactions, however, Mr. Gallian personally guaranteed the 
Cranes that Mr. Crane would be released from any liability 
as a guarantor on two construction loans from Nebraska 
Savings and Loan on the Timberbrook project. See deposition 
of Clifford Crane, hereinafter "C.C." at pp 13-14. 
Accordingly, on the 20th day of November, 1984, Russell J. 
Gallian personally substituted himself as a substitute 
guarantor for and on behalf of the Cranes with Nebraska 
Savings and Loan Association; the latter Association having 
countersigned said document by and through its vice 
president, Mr. Dewey Crouch. This document was not 
immediately sent to Mr. Crane. 
On February 11th, 1985, having not received an 
acceptance of the original offers made to the Cranes, Mr. 
Gallian, by cover letter, mailed a copy of the substitution 
of guarantor to the Cranes1 California attorney, Mr. Dean 
Mixon. Exhibit "9". This letter certified over Gallian's 
signature that the substitution of guarantor had been 
executed by himself and Mr. Dewey Crouch, See Exhibits "9" 
and "10". 
On February 13th, both Plaintiffs testified under 
oath that they executed Exhibits "2" and "3" as heretofore 
set forth, although Mrs, Crane when deposed indicated that 
she had no opinion whatsoever whether Exhibit "10" was 
acceptable consideration for substituting out her husband as 
a guarantor on the loans to Nebraska Savings and Loan, See 
deposition of Bonnie Crane, hereinafter "B.C." at p. 21. 
Indeed, Mrs. Crane indicated that if, after February 13th, 
her husband changed his mind then her mind would also be 
changed in reference to accepting Mr. Gallian's proposal. 
Id. at 26. Regardless, however, the acceptances were not 
sent back to escrow, but rather were delivered to the 
offices of Plaintiffs1 California attorney, Mr. Dean Mixon. 
On the 18th day of February, 1985, Mixon drafted a 
letter to Mr. Douglas Westbrook as the principal of Dixie 
Title Company. This letter included Exhibits "2" and "3" as 
executed by the Cranes, together with the copy of the 
substitution of guarantor dated November 20th, 1984, earlier 
enclosed to Mixon by Mr. Gallian's letter of February, 11th, 
1985. See Exhibit "12"; compare Exhibits "9" and "10". Mr. 
Crane conceded at his deposition that Mr. Mixon1s letter 
enclosed Exhibit "10": Gallian's substitution dated November 
20th, 1984. Mixon1s letter, however, did not 
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unconditionally accept Exhibits "2", "3" and "10" as 
proposed by Gallian, though in May of 1986, Mr* Crane 
testified that Exhibit "10" was acceptable to him. Both of 
the Plaintiffs1 agent, Mr. Mixon, indicated otherwise. See 
"C.C" at p. 34; compare Exhibit "12". Indeed, in the 
transmittal to Douglas Westbrook, the Plaintiffs1 acceptance 
of Defendants1 offers was conditioned upon three factors. 
This Memorandum, however, need only discuss one. 
In his second paragraph, Mr. Mixon as Plaintiffs1 
agent was apparently unhappy with the unnotarized and 
unverified Exhibit "10" previously mailed to him by Mr. 
Gallian, and that letter succinctly proposes that Mr. 
Westbrook may close only upon the receipt of a third, 
non-existent document. Mr. Mixon's words are as follows: 
You may proceed to close the transaction referred 
to in Mr. Gallian1s February 11th, 1985, letter to me, 
copy enclosed, as soon as you have received from 
Nebraska Savings and Loan Association their written 
affirmation of the validity of the "substitution of 
guarantor1 document along with their warranty that 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no obligations 
whatsoever to Nebraska Savings and Loan Association, 
either jointly or severally, either actual or 
contingent. 
Mr. Mixon again conditioned closing on behalf of the Cranes 
by requiring "the original of the above-referenced 
affirmation and warranty by Nebraska Savings & Loan 
Association . . . " Clifford Crane admits that the closing 
was conditional upon all three conditions (See C.C. at p.37; 
8-10). Ultimately, Crane further admitted his lawyer's 
letter required different documents than the Exhibit "10" 
wofi^ /RG-flqfis A 1 9tt 
previously provided by Gallian and thought by Gallian to be 
a sufficient substitution as per the parties1 agreement. On 
pages 43 and 44 of Clifford Crane's deposition, the 
questions and answers proceed as follows: 
Question: Would you read the text around that 
letter [Exhibit "12"] and not where it says the 
conditions and the original of the above-referenced 
affirmation, but where he speaks of what that 
affirmation is? Read that to yourself. 
Answer: 1 read it. 
Question: Doesn't that speak about Nebraska 
Savings and Loan providing you a document affirming the 
validity of Exhibit "10", and further stating from 
Nebraska Savings and Loan that you and your wife have 
no further obligation to them? 
Answer: Yeah. That's what it says, doesn't it. 
Question: And is that not a separate document 
from the Exhibit "10" that was already enclosed by 
Mixon? 
Answer: Apparently, from what I see. 
Not only is it apparent, but it is clear that Mr. Mixon's 
cover letter on behalf of the Plaintiffs desired a separate 
verification of the authenticity of Exhibit "10" with this 
separate document being countersigned by the bank. Mr. 
Mixon's cover letter conveyed no authority to close the 
transaction without this additional affirmation in his file. 
On the 22nd day of February at 8:57 in the 
morning, Clifford Crane individually called Mr. Gallian's 
office directly. This time, by reason of several factors, 
Gallian indicated that the buyers were no longer interested 
in pursuing the purchase of Mr. and Mrs. Crane's joint 
interest in the limited partnership. Subsequently, Crane 
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phoned Nebraska Savings and Loan and received oral 
confirmation that Gallian had indeed executed Exhibit "10" 
and that the same was authentic as represented by Gallian. 
Crane then sent, at 9:37 in the morning, a mailgram to Doug 
Westbrook, over his signature alone, apparently attempting 
unilaterally to withdraw condition Number 1 of Mr. Mixon's 
cover letter of February 18th, 1985. The mailgram is not 
signed by Mrs. Crane. See Exhibit "13". Five days later, 
Mr. Crane attempted to unilaterally withdraw condition No. 2 
in Mr. Mixon's cover letter. See Exhibit "14". And, 
finally, on March 7th, Mr. Mixon attempted to unilaterally 




AN ACCEPTANCE WHICH IMPOSES TERMS OR CONDITIONS 
NOT PRESENT IN THE OFFER HAS NO VALIDITY 
AND CAN ONLY BE RECOGNIZED AS A COUNTEROFFER. 
The above-stated rule has been variously set forth 
in several jurisdictions in the United States. For example, 
in the 1949 Utah case of Hawaiian Equipment Co, v. Imco 
Corp. , 115 Utah 590, 207 P. 2d 794, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
An acceptance which imposes terms or conditions not 
present in the offer has no validity and . . . its only 
recognition is as a counteroffer. 
Three years later in the case of R. J. Daum Construction Co. 
v. Child, 247 P. 2d 817, the Utah Supreme Court approvingly 
quoted the following language: 
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Appellant's proposed written contract was not an 
unconditional acceptance of respondent's offer, but was 
a rejection and counter-offer. To create a binding 
contract the acceptance must unconditionally agree to 
all the material provisions of the offer, and must not 
add any new material conditions, but all of the 
provisions of an offer need not be expressly stated 
therein - some may be implied from the surrounding 
circumstances* See Williston on Contracts, pp. 209, 22 
to 225 and 227 to 229, Sees. 73, 77 and 78, and 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, pp.65 to 67, Sees. 
58, 59 and 60. 
Sec. 58 provides: 
'Acceptance must be unequivocal in order to create 
a contract.f 
Sec. 59 provides: 
'Except as this rule is qualified by §§45, 63, 72 
an acceptance must comply exactly with the 
requirements of the offer, omitting nothing from 
the promise or performance requested.1 
Sec. 60 provides: 
'A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept 
it, which adds qualifications or requires 
performance of conditions, is not an acceptance 
but is a counter-offer. 
'Comment a. A qualified or conditional acceptance 
is a statement of an exchange that the person 
making it is willing to make, differing from that 
proposed by the original offeror. A counter-offer 
is a rejection of the original offer (see §38 and 
Comment thereon). An acceptance, however, is not 
inoperative as such merely because it is expressly 
conditional, if the requirement„of the condition 
would be implied from the offer, though not 
expressed therein.' 247 P.2d 817 at 821. 
The thrust of the Hawaiian Equipment, and the Daum 
cases have been reiterated in several other opinions, among 
them Trautwein v. Leavey, 472 P. 2d 776 (Wyoming 1970), and 
Williams v. Espey, 358 P.2d 903 (Utah 1961). 
POINT II 
The Plaintiffs may not unilaterally waive the 
conditions of their counteroffer as subsequently argued and 
W 0 6 ? /P£_QQ£c; 
subsequently accept the offer based upon Exhibits "2", "3" 
and "10" standing alone; the lessons learned by Alan H. 
Coombs preclude the Plaintiffs from prevailing and allow 
this Court to enter summary judgment on behalf of 
Defendants• 
In the mid-1970s, Mr. and Mrs, Herbert Burton of 
St. George sued Alan H. Coombs. Mr. Coombs was represented 
at trial by the Honorable Joseph Jackson. Mr. and Mrs. 
Burton were represented by David E. West. At the beginning 
of trial, Defendants Alan H. Coombs, et al., tendered an 
offer to settle. Plaintiffs rejected this offer but at the 
conclusion of the case their counsel, Mr. West, made a 
statement purporting to accept Defendants' offer made before 
trial. Defendants1 counsel, Joseph Jackson, Esq., 
repudiated that acceptance on the grounds that the earlier 
rejection terminated responsibilities of Mr. Coombs and the 
other Defendants and that the offer had not been renewed. 
The Supreme Court's language regarding this issue is 
telling: 
It is a well-settled, elementary principle of law 
that if the offeree rejects the tendered offer, 
obligations of the parties are terminated and neither 
can force performance by the other. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Sec. 
39 states as follows: 
An offer is terminated by rejection and 
cannot thereafter be accepted so as to create a 
contract. Having once rejected the offer, the 
offeree cannot revive it by tendering acceptance. 
Any words or acts of the offeree indicating 
that he declines the offer, or which justify the 
offeror in inferring that the offeree intends not 
to accept the offer or give it further 
consideration, amounts to a rejection. [Emphasis 
added.] 
T/r A a o / o a o o r c 
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This view is accepted by Restatement of Contracts 
2d which states: 
An offeree's power of acceptance is 
terminated by his rejection of the offer, unless 
the offeror has manifested a contrary intention* 
and by 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 51, p.713: 
Rejection terminates an offer so that it 
cannot afterward be accepted by the offeree 
without the renewed consent of the offeror. 
The above authorities are clear that when an 
offer is rejected by refusal, conditional 
acceptance or by counter-offer, the party making 
the original offer is relieved from liability and 
the party who rejected the offer cannot, of his 
own volition, create agreement by his subsequent 
acceptance. 557 P.2d at 148-149. [emphasis added] 
In so ruling that the offer, once rejected, could not be 
subsequently accepted of the offeree's own unilateral 
volition, the Utah Supreme Court cited the Trautwein v. 
Leavey case. Importantly here, mailgrams sent twice over 
the signature of Clifford Crane attempted unilaterally to 
waive conditions of his counteroffer, and thus subsequently 
accept Timberbrook*s offer as originally proposed without 
the renewed consent of the Defendants, to-wit, Timberbrook 
and Gallian. Mr. Crane's acts are futile and he cannot 
proceed at law or in equity with a cause of action against 
the Defendants. 
Though the evidence taken of Bonnie Crane at her 
deposition amply purports the contention that Bonnie v/ould 
do anything acceptable to Clifford, Bonnie is still a 
separate person under the law. Once again, the lessons of 
Alan H. Coombs are precise and poignant in the instant case. 
W062/86-8965 1M 
In the case of Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 
356, Mr. Coombs sought an extension of an option from the 
Defendant Arthur Ouzounian. The option was to be exercised 
by July 30th, 1967, but as the Supreme Court stated, the 
Plaintiff Alan Coombs, "invited Defendant Arthur Ouzounian 
to his home and requested an extension of the option period 
to September 30th, 1967." Plaintiff crossed out the July 
expiration date on the option and substituted the September 
date. The Plaintiff and Mr. Ouzounian signed the margin of 
the agreement by this substitution. In Coombs v. Ouzounian, 
the Supreme Court succinctly held that the wife was not 
bound by her husband's actions. In essence, the Supreme 
Court told Alan Coombs that when both parties own an 
interest that requires the same to be sold, i.e., in 
writing, or when the terms are changed or modified, both 
parties must execute the documents. Absent this condition, 
any extension or modification is invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
There is only one point necessary for the Court to 
rule in the Defendants1 favor in the instant case. That 
point succinctly stated is as follows: Mr. Mixon's cover 
letter conditionally accepting the offer presented by 
Gallian in Exhibits "2", "3" and "10", amounted to a 
counteroffer. Acceptance of the original offer cannot then 
be made without a revival of such offer by the Defendants. 
Waiver of the conditions unilaterally by Mr. Crane have no 
effect and are futile, and, as the offer was never revived, 
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the Plaintiffs cannot now maintain their action either for 
specific performance or for damages. Their conditional 
acceptance is nothing more nor less than a counteroffer or 
rejection of the original offer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January, 
1987. 
JT' 
MICHAEL D. H U G H E S ^ ' ' // 
Attorney for Defendants ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM, postage prepaid, to 
Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. O. Box 279, 
Cedar City, Utah 84720, this <?iji day of January, 1987. 




GALLIAJST, D R A K E & W E S T F A L L 
RUSSELL J GALL1AN 
LYLE R DRAKE 
G MICHAEL WESTFALL 
KENDRICKJ HAFEN 
ATTORNEYS ANO COUNSELORS AT LAW 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
1 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
PO BOX 1339 
S T . GEORGE, U T A H 6 4 7 7 0 
Bjih^ih "z." 
TELEPHONE 
<801l 6 2 6 - 1 0 8 2 
November 13, 1984 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
12671 Overbrooke Drive 
Santa Ana, California 92705 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Crane: 
Enclosed you will find documents which you should execute and 
send to the closing agent in connection with your sale of your 
Limited Partnership interest in Timberbrook Vxllage Ltd. The 
closing agent is Dixie Title Co. Inc., 205 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, Utah, 84770 (a self addressed envelope is enclosed for your 
convenience). 
We are handling your transaction in two steps. One to handle 
the redemption with the Condo, one to handle the cash part. I hope 
this is allright. 
We hope you will find these documents in order. Please call me 
or Barry Church (801-586-3090) if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Agreement made this day of , 1984, by and 
between Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership, 
(hereinafter "Buyer") and Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, 
(hereinafter "Seller"). 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of a^5% interest in Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership. 
2. The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an 
agreement wherein Seller shall purchase the limited partnership 
interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Buyer agrees to assign and convey all of Unit <^L I Q 
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums, at closing ail of 
Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached 
hereto at Exhibit "A" . Said Conveyance shall be subject to an 
existing construction loan which loan shall be released from the 
condominium upon completion of the sales of Units in Phase I. 
2. This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon 
closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and 
Loan Association. 
3. Closing shall occur through the offices of Dixie Title 
Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
Depos.bon Exhibit . 3 Deposition Exhibit ^ 
R 2 0 / 1 3 i 0 7 Dote 5~"->S{p PctcS-^-^C 
* ~ Laurie L Stuck., CSR, Notory Public , , '^ * „r , k i - — • 
Ln •-«- \ *1 -k» C^i tlalrrv Pub<.< 
Utah. The assignment (Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow 
Agent to be delivered! to Buyer upon closing. 
Agreement made the date first mentioned above. 
SELLER 
R20/13 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
BUYER 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC. 
By bCUV^y CJ^t 
B^j>r7Church, President 
sell J.^ c^txjLjLcii 
airman of the Board of 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane (Seller) hereby assigns and 
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 5% interest as a limited partner, 
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Seller warrants as follows: 
1. That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances or claims against Seller's title; 
2. That Seller has the full power to convey said interest; 
3. Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd", to show the change in interest as of the 
date of closing, and Seller hereby authorizes the Escrow Agent, 
Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the 
date of closing. 
DATED this day of November, 19 84. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the day of November, 1984, personally appeared before 
R20/13 
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me Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above 
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth. 
Notary Public 




AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Agreement made this day of , 1984, by and 
between Leisure Sports, Inc. (hereinafter "Buyer") and 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, (hereinafter "Seller"). 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of a 20% interest in Timberbrook 
Village Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership. 
2. The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an 
agreement wherein Seller shall purchase the limited partnership 
interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Buyer hereby agrees to pay, at closing as hereinafter 
defined, the sum of One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($175,000). 
2. Seller agrees to assign and convey at closing all of 
Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached 
hereto at Exhibit "A". 
3. This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon 
closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and 
Loan Association. 
4. Closing shall occur through the offices of Dixie Title 
Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
R20/12 
1 4 1 
Utah. The assignment (Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow 
Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing. 
Agreement made the date first mentioned above. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
BUYER 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC. 
By jSoJ^M CzJLx^tJ^^ 
B&zz^ CKurch, President 
fRussell J > Gallian 
lairman of the Board of 





ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane (Seller) hereby assigns and 
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 20% interest as a limited partner, 
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Seller warrants as follows: 
1. That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances or claims against Seller's title; 
2. That Seller has the full power to convey said interest; 
3. Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the 
date of closing, and Seller hereby authorizes the Escrow Agent, 
Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the 
date of closing. 
DATED this day of November, 19 84. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the day of November, 1984, personally appeared before 
14 3 
-3-
me Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above 
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing In: 
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-4-
>ALLIAN, D R A K E & W E S T F A L L 
RUSSELL J GALL1AN 
LYLE R DRAKE 
G MICHAEL WESTFALL 
KENORICK J HAFEN 
JEFFREY C WILCOX 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
DIXIE STATE BANK 8U1LD1NG 
1 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
PO BOX t339 




February 11, 198 5 
Mr. Dean Mixon 
WEINFELD & MIXON 
601 North Park Center Drive 
Suite 203 
Santa Ana, CA 92705 
Re: Clifford Crane 
Dear Mr* Mixon: 
Enclosed is a copy of the Substitution of Guarantor which I certify 
was executed by myself and Mr. Dewey Crouch, Vice President of 
Nebraska Savings and Loan. 
It is our understanding that Mr. and Mrs, Crane will execute the 
documents conveying their interest to Leisure Sports (20%) and 
redeeming 5% from Timberbrook. Upon receipt the Escrow Agent will 
disburse $175,000 to your clients and Barry Church will execute a 





LLIAN,/DRAKE & WESTFALL 
Gallian 
cc: Doug Westbrook 
Dixie Title Company 
230 
J4 5 
Deposition FxKikit f 
W.tnessC. C$ArW& 
R18/30 Uur>« I Stucki, CSR. Notory PwW.? 
Deposition Exhibit j ^ 
Date 
:>siti  i it 
— ^ - h l b l t ' M O laune L Stucki CS°„ Notary PubUc 
Deposhion Exhibit / _ Q 
Dote. S i l i S f i . 
SUBSTITUTION OF GUARANTOR \.aul«. t Sw*v C5R, **<vy * ^ 
Agreement made this ]/0 day of |\Jfj\}tW^ f 1984, by and between 
Nebraska Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter "Lender") and 
Russell J* Gallian (hereinafter "Substitute Guarantor"). 
RECITALS 
1. The parties hereto have entered into a Committment Letter 
dated October 19, 1984, wherein Lender is making at Two Million Six 
Hundred Thousand Dollar ($2,600,000) loan to Leisure Sports 
Incorporated. 
2. Part of said consideration is the participation of 
Timberbrook Village Ltd., Incorporated. Leisure Sports, Inc. 
has purchased 39% of the limited partnership interest in Timberbrook 
Village Ltd., including, A certain Clifford G. Crane, and Bonnie 
Crane limited partners in Timberbrook Village Ltd., who have 
personally signed on the note on the previous note issued on 
Timberbrook \Village Ltd. The parties desire to effect a change 
wherein Russell J. Gallian shall be substituted as the Guarantor in 
the place of Clifford Crane. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Nebraska Savings and Loan Association here^j releases 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane of any and all liabilities 
pursuant to the note secured by Deed of Trust on Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. , dated S&jpA- 3/7 (9^3 in the original principal balance of 
$7i.07y/flfflV93 and further dated XlkMe^l^fj^/ in the 
R20/29 
1 AO 
original principal balance of $ A.OlSOX)^ • 
2. The parties hereto agree that Russell J, Gallian is hereby 
substituted as Substitute Guarantor and Russell J. Gallian hereby 
agrees to be bound by all of the covenants and agreements contained 
in that certain Guaranty Agreement associated with the loan as 
stated above. 




WEINFELD 6 MIXON 
A LAW CORPORATE BdhlHtk "!£' 
eOl NORTH f»ARKCENTER DRIVC. SUITE 2 0 3 TELEPHONE 
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA 9 2 7 0 5 (71-*) S-*»-«e-^a 
February 18,1985 
Mr. Doug Westbrook 
Dixie Title Company 
205 E. Tabernacle 
St. George, Dtah 84770 
RE: CLIFFORD CRANE ESCROW 
Dear Mr. Westbrook: 
As I believe you know, our office represents Clifford 
G. and Bonnie Crane. Enclosed please find the following 
two original documents: 
1. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" 
to which my clients and Timberbrook Village Limited are parties; 
2. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" 
to which my clients and Leisure Sports Incorporated are parties. 
Enclosed please find, further, a copy of a document 
entitled "Substitution of Guarantee" dated November 20, 1984, 
between Nebraska Savings & Loan Association and Russell J. 
Gallian. You may proceed to close the transaction referred 
to in Mr. Gallian1s February 11, 1935, letter to me, copy 
enclosed, as soon as you have received from Nebraska Savings 
& Loan Association their written affirmation of the validity 
of the "Substitution of Guarantor" document along with their 
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no 
obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings & Loan Association, 
either jointly or severally, either actual or contingent. 
There are three conditions to closing from our side: 
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the original 
of the above-referenced affirmation and warranty by Nebraska 
Savings & Loan Association; 
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully executed 




tour.e l. StucU CSR Notary Pubtte utt^ 5 ~ ~ 1 - § ^ 1 - — — 
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 Mr . Dd W e s t b r o o k 
A LAW CORPORATION F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 8 5 
P a g e t w o 
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of $175,000 
into my client's account at Home Savings of American, 
179 N. Tustin, Orange, California 92667, Account No, 125-900624-3. 
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by Friday, 
March 8, 1985, you are instructed to return all documents 
to me and to terminate the escrow. If you have any question 
or comment, please do not hesitate to call. 
Very truly yours, 
WEINFELD & MIXON 
DEAN A. MIXON 
DAM/mw 
Enclosure 
cc; Mr. Clifford Crane 
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SANTA ANA CA 92705 s£~ M 
4 - 0 1 9 5 2 0 S 0 5 3 0 0 3 0 2 / 2 2 / 8 5 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP PRVB 
2 7 1 4 9 9 7 1 7 3 9 MGM TDRN SANTA ANA CA 0 2 - 2 2 1237P EST 
klkch.fc. "B" 
DIXIE TITLE 
ATTN DOUG VESTBROOK 
205 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
THIS IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU: 
I HAVE RECEIVED VERBAL CONFIRMATION WITH A COPY TO FOLLOW THAT I HAVE 
BEEN RELEASED FROM THE TWO TIMBERBROOK LOANS. PLEASE DO NOT HOLD UP 
CLOSE OF ESCROW FOR THIS ITEM. 
SINCERELY 
CLIFFORD G CRANE 
1 2 6 7 ! OVERBROOK DR 
SANTA ANA CA 9 2 7 0 5 
1240 EST 
MGMCOMP MGM 
Deposition Exhibit / 3 
Dote jT-7-YZJ 
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• buUG Wt-STbhuuK 
CAnr. DIXIh. TITLE 
20P tASl TAbt-rtuwCLE 
SI ucUnuc Ul b«770 
IHIS l b A CUftFIhhATlOrt CuPY OF A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU: 
ktuARuIrtG Tli'icRLROuK VILLAG& LTb SALE TO LEISURE SPORTS INC. 
I , CLIrFunb G CRANe., HcncoY WAVE ThE SECOND CONDITION IN THE LETTER 
UATLb FhUPi DCAH hlXulv l o YuU hcuARDIUu ThE FULLY EXt-CUTED WARRANTY 
DE.HI> oF UwIT 2 1 0 bUILuIi.G 1 . 
I I N S T M U C T YOU TU uISob'RSc THc FUiwS ( $ 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 ) NOW, AS AGREED BY 
BulH PAhTIcS Iw iHc L S C R O U . 
SI NCERELY 
CLIFKuRb G CRAr«E 
12671 uVcnnhOuK bR 
S M „ 1 A AuA CA 92 703 
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Deposition Exhibit '.. 
l o j - w l Si cLi CS0., Notary P'jWIe 
Deposition Exhibit ' J 
Date S-"?-?<b 
Laurie L Slucki CSP, Moiwy *<Mi* 
23& 
SANTA ANATa-?270:> O ^ J . . 
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• MR DOUG WESTBR00K, DIXIE TITLE CU 
205 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST GEORGE UT 8 4 7 7 0 
THIS IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU: 
THc PARCH 8 CLOSING REQUIREMENT REFERRED TO IN MY LETTER OF FEBRUARY 
18 , 1 9 8 5 , IS WAIVED. IHE tSCROW IS IRREVOCABLE. YOU ARE TO CLOSE AT 
ONCE. 
WEI NF ELD AivD MIXON 
601 NORTH PARK CENTER # 2 0 3 
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Witness 
louno L Slucki, CSR. Notary Publid * 
EXHIBIT £ Deposition Exhibit / S Date S^Ir$[p 
W.tness <L__£jf AN<b 
Laurie L Slucki, CSR, Notary Publ^ . 
FIFTH JUDICIAL bibi UHJ'.o 
IRON COUNTY 
WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
f£tf£-1987 
I)J,A^J IJ**JAS CLERK 
c& DEPIT 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT OF IRON CODNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE ) 
CRANE, 
vs. 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a ) 




MARKETING and DEVELOP- ) 
INC., a Utah Corpora- ) 
in its capacity as ) 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK ) 




a Utah Corporation; and ) 




CLIFFORD G. CRANE 
Civil No. 85-281 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Iron ) 
COMES NOW CLIFFORD G. CRANE, who being first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is a resident of State of California, fully 
competent to testify, and makes this affidavit on personal 
knowledge. 
2. In November of 1984, I reached an agreement to sell my 
25% ownership interest as a limited partner of Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd. My ownership of such interest is shown by the 
15 8 
Certificate of Limited Partnership of Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 
a copy of which is attached and which is incorporated by this 
reference. 
3. On February 13, 1985, I signed the documents which 
memorialized our contract. As of the date, even Mr. Gallian 
admits that their was an agreement. 
4. According to Mr. Westbrook's answers to interrogatories, 
Mr. Mixon's February 18, 1985 letter, with enclosures, was in the 
office of Dixie Title Company on February 22, 1985. 
5. Russell Gallian did not ever tell me on February 22, 
1985, that the deal was "off", or that the buyers would not 
purchase my limited partnership interests. 
6. I did talk with Dixie Title Company on February 27, 
1985. It was only then that I learned that Defendants were 
trying to back out of our deal. I spoke by phone on that day 
with Mr. Gallian. This was the very first time that Mr. Gallian 
ever said they were not going to follow through. See a copy of 
my phone bill on February 27, 1985 , showing that I made 3 calls 
to 628-1638 (Dixie Title Company) , one call to 628-1682 (Mr. 
Gallian) and then one call to 586-9483 (Mr. Bishop) on February 
27, 1985. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1987. 
CLIFFORDG. CRANE 
154 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2nd day of February, 
1987. 
My Commission Expires: Residing in 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that delivered a full, true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CLIFFORD G. CRANE, 
to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney for Defendants, at the Iron 
County Courthouse, at Parowan, Utah on February 3, 1987; and that 
I also mailed a full, true and correct copy of the same document 
to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, THOMPSON, HUGHES, & REBER, Attorneys at 
Law, at 148 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, Utah 84770, by 




CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP M/.^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) -^ 
: ss. <*-, ;<-^<-r-
COUNTY OF IRON ) "•> ^ 
v;E, the undersigned, desiring to form a limited partne 
ship pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, certify as 
fcllows: 
1. The name of the partnership is TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, 
LTD. 
2. The purpose of the partnership and character of the 
business is to purchase certain real property located at Brian 
Head, Utah, and develop that property by constructing a 
condominium development thereon, and to engage in any or all 
business legally permissible for a partnership. 
3. The principal place of business of the partnership is 
in Brian Head, Iron County, Utah. 
4. The name and place of residence of the General Partner 
in the partnership is as follows: 
NAME PLACE OF RESIDENCE 
HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. 84 0 South Main 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
5. The names and places of residence of the Limited 
Partners in the partnership are as follows: 
NAME
 t PLACE OF RESIDENCE 
CLIFFOFD CRANE 0*/9A>Oe C#> 
ANGELINE Q. McBRIDE //fAXQfV^ frO, A)lf, 
156 
FiGIiPY G. GRIFFIN and THAIS R. 
GRIFFIN, j o i n t l y , 6scL4L++>t'<t/ uf~, 
ROBERT CHURCH S ^ p TaSe &A • 
B-N-B PARTNERSHIP L*S ^-QAS, AJU. 
LT. JOHN J . KIKTA ; L*S Veg/iS, A)(/. 
MR. and MRS. JOHN DELANEY, 
jointly, jdA. 
WILLIAM THURMAN
 ; £/}, 
NEVADA HEART £ LUNG SURGICAL 
GROUP DON L. BUNCH M.D., 
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN LAS> ^/te/ /^U 
6. The term for which the partnership is to exist is from 
the 29th day of September, 1982, and continuing thereafter until 
December 31, 1982, and thereafter from year to year on a calendar 
Year basis unless otherwise terminated. 
7. The amount of cash and the description and anrcct6 
value of the capital contributed by each Limited Partner is: 
CAPITAL 
CONTRIBUTION 
1. CLIFFORD CRANE SJiO, 0^>0 
ANGELINE Q. McBRIDE 




* 3 QJ o o o 
s; o o o 
4. ROBERT CHURCH 
5. B-N-B PARTNERSHIP 
6. LT. JOHN J. KIKTA 
7. MR. and MRS. JOHN DELANEY, jointly, ^ lST,bOO 
8. WILLIAM THURMAN ' P;^oO 
9. NEVADA HEART & LUNG SURGICAL GROUP DON L. J/S-Oo€> 
BUNCH M.D., DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN 
8. Additional contributions to the capital of the 
partnership may only be made at such times and in such amounts as 
agreed upon by the partners, both General and Limited, and shall 
be treated as loans to the partnership. 
9. The contribution of the Limited Partner may not be 
withdrawn from time to time, and shall only be returned upon 
termination or dissolution of the partnership.. Profits may be 
paid to the Limited Partners from time to time in the sole 
discretion of the General Partner. 
10. The share of profits or other compensation by way of 
income which the Limited Partner shall receive by reason of his 
contribution is: 
NAME PERCENTAGE 
1 . CLIFFORD CRANE 
2. ANGELINE 0. McBRIDE 
3. BOBBY G. GRIFFIN and THAIS R. 
GRIFFIN, jointly, 
A. ROBERT CHURCH 
5. 3-N-B PARTNERSHIP 
6. LT. JOHN J. KIKTA 
1. MR. and MRS. JOHN DELANEY, jointly, 
8. WILLIAM THURMAN 
9. NEVADA HEART & LUNG SURGICAL GROUP DON L. 










11. The Limited Partner may substitute an assignee as 
contributor in his place. 
158 
12. Additional limited partners may be admitted by the 
General Partner upon payment of a sum set by the General Partner 
for the additional Limited Partnership interest and by signing 
the Limited Partnership Agreement, and/or a subscription agree-
ment . 
13. Upon the death, retirement or incapacity of a General 
Partner, any remaining General Partner or the Limited Partners 
shall have the right to continue the business by unanimous 
agreement and notice to the other Partners. 
14. The Limited Partners shall not have the right to 
demand or receive property other than cash in return for his 
contribution, and no one or more Limited Partners shall be 
entitled to priority over other Limited Partners as to 
contributions or as to compensation by way of income. 
15. The Partnership Agreement provides that additional 
partners, both General and Limited, may be admitted to the 
partnership. This Certificate may and shall be amended from time 
to time to reflect the admission of additional partners. 
GENERAL PARTNERS: 







ANGELINE Q. McBRIDE 
BOBBY G. GRIFFIN 





LT. COL. JOHN J. KIKTA 
MR. JOHN DELANEY 
MRS. JOHN DELANEY 
1G0 
WILLIAM THURMAN 
NEVADA HEART & LUNG SURGICAL 
GROUP DON L. BUNCH M.D., DEFINED 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
This Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is submitted pursuant to 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., (hereinafter TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE), 
is a Utah limited partnership which is in the business of real 
estate development and sales in southern Utah. HEART MARKETING 
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., (hereinafter HEART MARKETING), is a Utah 
corporation which serves as general or managing partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. Plaintiff, CLIFFORD CRANE, is a limited 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. 85-281 
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partner of TIMBERBROOK, owning twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
partnership interest. California, where the Plaintiffs reside, 
is a "community property" state. LEISURE SPORTS, INC., 
(hereinafter LEISURE SPORTS), is also a Utah corporation. Mr. 
Barry Church is the President of HEART MARKETING as well as 
LEISURE SPORTS. Mr. Russell Gallian is Chairman of the Board of 
LEISURE SPORTS. 
In or about November, 1984, Plaintiffs entered into an 
agreement with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, drafted by 
Russell Gallian, for the sale of Plaintiff CLIFFORD CRANE'S 
limited partnership interests. Plaintiffs don't know why BONNIE 
CRANE'S name was included, but it was. It may be that Gallian 
included BONNIE CRANE because of his knowledge that California is 
a "community property" state. Two separate agreements were 
prepared by Mr. Gallian and signed by the parties. 
One agreement outlines the sale of a five percent (5%) 
interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE TO LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for 
Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums. This property 
was encumbered by an existing construction loan with Nebraska 
Savings and Loan Association and conveyance was to be made 
subject thereto, but title later was to be cleared. Attached to 
the agreement was an Assignment of Limited Partnership Interest 
signed by Plaintiffs on February 13, 1985. 
The other agreement recited provisions which would transfer a 
twenty percent (20%) interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE from 
Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE to LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for the 
sum of One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000). 
-2-
Attached to this agreement was a second Assignment of Partnership 
Interest which was also signed on February 13, 1985, conveying 
Plaintiffs1 interest to LEISURE SPORTS. Both agreements were 
placed with DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah corporation operating out 
of St. George, Utah, which was to serve as escrow agent for the 
transaction and deliver the documents and cash upon closing. 
On or before February 22, 1985, Mr. Doug Westbrook of DIXIE 
TITLE COMPANY received a letter from Mr. Dean A. Mixon, 
Plaintiffs1 California attorney, dated February 18, 1985. This 
letter instructed DIXIE TITLE COMPANY to proceed in closing the 
transactions with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK as soon as 
confirmation was received from Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association that Plaintiffs had been released of their 
obligations by acceptance of a Substitution of Guarantor 
agreement entered between that Association and Russell J. 
Gallian, Chairman of the Board of Directors of LEISURE SPORTS 
(Substitution of Guarantor was dated November 20, 1984). 
The February 18th letter contained the following language: 
There are three conditions to closing from our 
side: 
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the 
original of the above-referenced affirmation 
and warranty by Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association; 
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a 
fully executed Warranty Deed to Unit 210, 
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums; 
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum 
of $175,000 into my client's account at Home 
Savings of America, 179 N. Tustin, Orange, 
California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3. 
-3- 1(55 
If the above-referenced closing does not occur 
by Friday, March 8, 1985, you are instructed 
to return all documents to me and to terminate 
the escrow. If you have any question or 
comment, please do not hesitate to call. 
Defendants claim, although Plaintiffs dispute said claim, 
that on the same day Mr. Westbrook received the above-noted 
letter, Mr. Gallian, after learning of the letter and speaking 
with his clients, attempted to withdraw the offer of purchase and 
terminate the escrow by telephone. 
The following series of transactions then ensued: 
(1) A telegram was sent by Plaintiffs, to DIXIE TITLE 
COMPANY on February 22, 1985, which stated the following: "I 
have received verbal confirmation with a copy to follow that I 
have been released from the two Timberbrook loans. Please do not 
hold up close of escrow for this item." 
(2) On February 27, 1985 a second telegram was sent to Doug 
Westbrook as follows: "Regarding Timberbrook Village Ltd. sale to 
Leisure Sports Inc. I, Clifford G. Crane, hereby waive the second 
condition in the letter dated from Dean Mixon to you regarding 
the fully executed warranty deed of Unit 210 Building 1. I 
instruct you to disburse the funds ($175,000) now, as agreed by 
both parties in the escrow." 
(3) And on March 7, 1985, a telegram was sent from Mr. Mixon 
to Mr. Westbrook with the following message: "The March 8 
closing requirement referred to in my letter of February 18, 
1985, is waived. The escrow is irrevocable. You are to close at 
once.n 
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To this date Defendant, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, has refused to 
deliver funds held in escrow to Plaintiffs, and has not delivered 
the applicable conveyance. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Paragraph 10 of the Pretrial Order signed by the Court, states: 
"DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, including Motions for 
Summary Judgment, etc. , may be made to the 
Court until fifteen (15) days prior to the 
time set for trial." (Emphasis added) 
Despite the Court's order that dispositive motions be brought 
before it not less than 15 days prior to trial, Defendants filed 
their "Motion for Summary Judgment" on January 23, 1987, (only 12 
days prior to trial) and now are attempting to argue it to the 
Court on February 3, 1987, (only 1 day prior trial). 
For this reason alone, the motion should be denied. 
POINT II 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN FOR 
TRIAL. 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied on 
the basis that they have failed to meet the requirement of 
establishing that there are no remaining genuine issues as to 
material facts and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that: 
(b) A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
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time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) . . .The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and its accompanying 
Memorandum attempt to ignore the primary question of fact and law 
that gives rise to the dispute at hand: Was a contract formed 
between Plaintiffs CRANE and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.? 
Plaintiffs have continually asserted that a binding verbal 
contract was entered between these parties prior to November 13, 
1984, when Mr. Russell Gallian, acting as agent for TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, and LEISURE SPORTS sent written agreements to the CRANES 
as a memorialization of the prior agreement. Defendants, on the 
other hand, persist in viewing the documents sent by Mr. Gallian 
as an offer requiring acceptance by the CRANES. At no point in 
the procedural history of this case has this central issue been 
resolved. 
Furthermore, by their own admission Defendants have 
indicated that the facts and circumstances surrounding a series 
of communications entered into between Plaintiff CLIFFORD CRANE 
and Defendants, acting through their authorized attorney and 
agent, Russell Gallian, remain in dispute. In the Pretrial 
Order, signed on October 2, 1986, by the Honorable Judge J. 
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Harlan Burns and approved as to form and content by attorneys by 
both parties, the parties agreed that the substance of 
conversations occurring on February 22, 1985, is disputed. See, 
Pretrial Order, p. 11. 
The substance of conversations conducted on February 22, 
1985 is crucial to determining the outcome of this case. 
Defendants contend, but present no evidence in support of their 
contention, that a revocation of the "offer" to purchase 
Plaintiff CLIFFORD CRANE'S partnership interest was communicated 
to Mr. CRANE by Mr. Gallian on this day. On the other hand, 
while admitting that conversations did pass between himself and 
Mr. Gallian, Mr. CRANE denies that any revocation was suggested 
until February 27, 1985. See, Deposition of Clifford Crane, 
p. 22, and Affidavit of Clifford G. Crane. 
Furthermore, in the same Pretrial Order Defendants have 
indicated their belief that eight issues of fact and law remain 
for trial. See, Pretrial Order, p. 15. This position is 
inconsistent with the Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment 
which asserts that there are no remaining issues of fact and that 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 'of law. 
POINT III 
BONNIE G. CRANE'S SIGNATURE ON DOCUMENTS WAS 
NOT NECESSARY TO THE CREATION OF ANY BINDING 
CONTRACT, NOR WAS IT NECESSARY TO ANY 
CORRESPONDENCE. 
Plaintiffs are husband and wife, and at all times pertinent, have 
resided and till reside in California. Defendants know this. 




Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE was the owner of a 25% interest 
as a limited partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. See Affidavit 
of CLIFFORD G. CRANE, and Certificate of Limited Partnership of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. 
California is a community property state. The interest in 
the limited partnership, listed as being owned 25% in the name of 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE, is personal and not real property. 
C.C.P. 5125(a) provides in pertinent part: 
" (a)...(E)ither spouse has the management and 
control of the community personal property, 
whether acquired prior to or on or after 
January 1, 1975, with like absolute power of 
disposition, other than testamentary, as the 
spouse has of the separate estate of the 
spouse." (Emphasis added) 
Even if BONNIE CRANE had not authorized her husband to deal for 
her, as she did, he has full power to deal with respect to 
personal property, either under Utah law (where the partnership 
interest is owned by him alone) or under California community 
property law. Therefore, BONNIE CRANE1s signature was not and is 
not necessary to any documents or correspondence involved in this 
case. 
Defendants cannot rely upon U.C.A. 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 (1953, 
as amended) , nor upon Coombs vs. Osgouman, 465 P.2d 356 (Utah, 
1970) . There, the extension of an option on real property was 
held invalid because the optionor's wife failed to sign it. Here, 
the agreements are signed by TIMBERBROOK and LEISURE SPORTS, 
against whom they are sought to be enforced. Also here, 
Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE has conveyed his own personal 
property over his own signature. If Defendants claim BONNIE 
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CRANE has an interest in the partnership as community property, 
then C.C.P. 5125(a) gives Mr, Crane absolute power of its 
disposition. Finally, BONNIE CRANE authorized whatever her 
husband did. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT REMAINING FOR TRIAL, AND EVEN IF 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT, DEFENDANTS STILL WOULD NOT 
BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO 
"COUNTEROFFER" WAS MADE BY MR. MIXON'S LETTER 
OF FEBRUARY 18r 1985. 
Defendants have also asserted that "an acceptance which 
imposes terms or conditions not present in the offer has no 
validity and can only be recognized as a counteroffer." 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Point 1. Their own citations, 
however, clearly indicate that requirements that are immaterial 
or those that would ordinarily be implied from the offer will not 
render the offer inoperable. Defendants quote the following 
language: 
. To create a binding contract the 
acceptance must unconditionally agree' to all 
the material provisions of the offer, and must 
not add any new material conditions, but all 
of the provisions of an offer need not be 
expressly stated therein - some may be implied 
from the surrounding circumstances. 
• * * 
.An acceptance, however, is not 
inoperative as such merely because it is 
expressly conditional, if the requirement of 
the condition would be implied from the offer, 
though not expressed therein. (Citations 
omitted.) 
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Point 1. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' California attorney, by 
letter dated February 18, 1985, created additional conditions to 
the escrow agreement which constituted a counteroffer that 
nullified the original "offer". In other words, Defendants 
contend such conditions acted as a rejection of LEISURE SPORTS' 
and TIMBERBROOK'S agreements while proposing a counteroffer which 
was unacceptable. Defendants' position is untenable under the 
law as well as on the facts. 
The facts do not demonstrate that Plaintiffs' attorney was 
trying to include additional conditions to the existing 
agreement. The letter under consideration was clearly addressed 
to DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, an entity that was not a party to the 
original agreement at all. Had Plaintiffs wished to amend the 
agreement the logical approach would be to negotiate directly 
with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK, and to propose changes to 
the agreements themselves. 
The only meaningful conclusion that can be drawn from the 
letter is that the provisions contained therein were intended to 
serve as instructions to the escrow agent and nothing more. In 
fact, if the provisions under consideration are closely examined 
it becomes apparent that Mr. Mixon has clearly addressed his 
requests to the title company only with regard to the manner in 
which relevant documents and funds were to be handled. For this 
reason the so-called "conditions" should not be considered as 
having any effect whatever on Plaintiffs' acceptance of the 
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purchase agreements. They only applied to the escrow agent and 
related to administrative provisions, and to required performance 
under the agreements* 
In any event, the Court should reach the same conclusion 
under the law of offer and acceptance as the following passage 
indicates: 
The rule is fundamental that an acceptance 
must comply with the terms of the offer—that 
is, in order to form a contract, the offer and 
acceptance must express assent to one and the 
same thing, and there must be no substantial 
or material variance between them.... 
17 AmJur2d, Contracts, Section 62, see also, 17 AmJur2d, 
Contracts, Section 40. Appended to this general statement of law 
is the following clarification: "Immaterial or minor difference 
or variances between the offer and acceptance will not prevent 
the formation of a contract." 17 AmJur2d, Contracts, Section 62, 
Footnote 20; see also, Steele v. Harrison, 552 P.2d 957 (Kan. 
1976) . 
The provisions upon which Defendants base their claim are 
precisely the type of "immaterial or minor differences" which 
should have no effect on the contract formation/ "It must not be 
inferred, from the rule that an acceptance must be unconditional, 
that the mere mention in a letter of acceptance of matters upon 
which the acceptance of the proposition does not depend prevents 
the contract from being completed...." 17 AmJur2d, Contracts, 
Section 65. 
In a case with facts that are parallel to the present, the 
Alaskan Supreme Court reached the conclusion that additional 
discussion of the terms of payment in a letter of acceptance is 
not sufficient to preclude formation of the contract: 
[Wlhen the acceptance of the offer is 
initially unconditional, the fact that it is 
accompanied by a request or a direction 
looking to the performance of the contract 
does not render the acceptance ineffective nor 
give it the character of a counter-offer so 
long as it does not limit the contract. 
Here, [offeree! unequivocally accepted the 
[offeror's] offer. The fact that assent was 
accompanied by a suggestion as to terms of 
payment, a detail not inconsistent with the... 
offer, did not convert it into a counter-
offer. [The offeree's] proposed payment terms 
were in accord with the standard contract 
terms used by the [offeror] in its land sales 
contracts.... 
Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, 622 P.2d 440, 448 (Alaska, 1981); 
see also, Hall v. Add-Ventures, Ltd., 695 P.2d 081 (Alaska, 
1985) . 
It can hardly be argued with credibility that Mr. Mixon's 
letter adds significant terms to the agreement. 
The first "condition" requests that the original affirmation 
and warranty of Plaintiffs' release from their obligation under 
the loan held by Nebraska Savings and Loan Association be sent by 
registered mail. Certainly providing such verification and 
information to Plaintiffs was anticipated by the original sale 
agreement. The Defendants had provided only a photocopy, and 
Plaintiffs were entitled to the original, as well as to 
verification that it had been signed by Nebraska Savings and Loan 
Association. 
The second "condition" also lies within the ambit of the 
parties' intentions as a mere request that the Warranty Deed to 
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Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums be forwarded by 
certified mail. The agreement did not specify what type of deed 
was to be used. In such a case the law implies a warranty deed. 
Further, Mr. Gallian himself, in his letter to Dean Mixon dated 
February 11, 1985, stated that a warranty deed would be provided. 
See Exhibit 9, Deposition of Clifford G. Crane. 
Finally, the third "condition" simply requests that the funds 
in escrow be transferred by wire to Plaintiffs1 bank account. In 
no way do these provisions alter the original intentions or the 
essential nature of the agreement and should not, therefore, be 
considered a counteroffer. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to 
that of Defendants in a case where the acceptance came much 
closer to changing the intent of the parties than the "acceptance 
in the present case. The court outlined the facts and stated the 
law in these terms: 
Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs* 
attempted acceptance was not identical to the 
original offer. They argue that the 
telegraphic reply imposed a new condition. It 
is not disputed that New Mexico enforces the 
general rule of contracts to the effect that 
an offer must be accepted unconditionally and 
unqualifiedly by the offeree. In the instant 
case, defendants offered to purchase the 
property subject to an eight months lease 
thereon. Plaintiffs attempted to accept the 
offer subject to the existing lease, "if 
leasee (sic) will release additional years 
option after eight months tenent/see (sic) or 
sooner...." 
Almost as general in its application as the 
rule that an offer must be accepted 
unconditionally, is the qualifying rule that 
"an acceptance, however, is not inoperative as 
such merely because it is expressly 
conditional, if the requirement of the 
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condition would be implied from the offer, 
though not expressed therein." In the present 
case, the lease on the property in question 
had eight months left to run at which time the 
tenants held an option to renew the lease for 
an additional year. This was known to 
defendants who agreed to accept the property 
subject to the eight months lease, but did not 
make mention of the renewal option. The 
necessary implication of the offer was that 
they did not purchase subject to the renewal 
option and that the relinquishment of the 
option was a condition upon which their offer 
to buy the property was made dependent. Thus, 
the plaintiffs acted with an abundance of 
caution and inserted a condition in their 
acceptance which merely expressed what would 
be implied in fact from the offer. Such an 
act does not negate the existence of a valid 
acceptance and contract. (Citations omitted.) 
Pickett v. Miller, 412 P.2d 400 (N.M. 1966). The clear 
implication when comparing the Pickett case with the present is 
that the supposed "conditions" do not rise to the level of a 
counteroffer which would justify a rejection by Defendants 
LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK. 
In summary, as the Court considers the Defendants' claim that 
the February 18th letter provides an adequate basis for allowing 
Defendants to escape their obligations under the contract, it 
should keep in mind (1) that the letter was addressed only to the 
escrow agent and, beyond accepting the purchase offer, was 
intended only to serve as imparting administrative instructions; 
(2) that the letter does not add any material or differing terms 
or conditions to the original purchase agreement; and, (3) that 
the "conditions" discussed therein were matters that are easily 
implied from the terms and conditions of the contract and do not 
add any material or significant differences which would justify 
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Defendants' contention. For this, and all reasons cited above, 
the Court should find that Defendants are not entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be overruled 
and denied. 
DATED this 2oJ[ day of February ,/198J, 
JILLARD R. BIS 
Attorney for 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered a full, true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney for Defendants at the 
Iron County Courthouse, Parowan, Utah, on February 3, 1987; and 
also mailed to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, of THOMPSON, HUGHES & 
REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 
84770, a full, true and correct copy of the same document, at 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East 




WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. , a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW PLAINTIFFS, and submit this Addendum to their 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, having inadvertently omitted the 
following POINT V from said memorandum. 
POINT V 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED AND DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS AND 
DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO A CONTRACTUALLY 
BINDING IRREVOCABLE AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE OF 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS IN TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD., AND, INASMUCH AS PLAINTIFFS 
HAVE FULFILLED THE CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED BY 
THE ESCROW AGREEMENT, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY IS 
OBLIGED TO RELEASE DEPOSITED FUNDS TO 
PLAINTIFFS. 
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ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT 
Civil No. 85-281 
In November 1984, Plaintiff and Defendant LEISURE SPORTS 
entered into a valid and binding verbal agreement for the 
purchase and sale of Plaintiff's limited partnership interest in 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. The fact that Defendants clearly believed 
and intended to treat the oral agreement as binding is 
demonstrated by their actions. On November 13f 1984, Mr. Russell 
J. Gallian acting as agent for LEISURE SPORTS sent Plaintiff a 
letter which speaks of the sale as a "fait accompli" subject only 
to the memorialization process of signing subsequent 
documentation. The following language is instructive: "Enclosed 
you will find documents which you should execute and send to the 
closing agent in connection with your sale of your Limited 
Partnership interest in Timberbrook Village, Ltd." Nothing in 
this language would suggest that the parties remained in the 
process of negotiation. 
In addition, on several occasions following receipt of the 
above-noted letter Mr. CRANE1s California attorney was informed 
by Mr. Gallian in the course of telephone conversations that the 
agreement was complete and that Mr. CRANE would be bound thereby, 
despite the fact that documentation was as yet unsigned. 
Whether the parties to an oral or informal 
agreement become bound prior to the drafting 
and execution of a contemplated formal writing 
is a question depending largely upon their 
intention, or, as is sometimes expressed, upon 
whether they intend the formal writing to be a 
condition precedent to the taking effect of 
the agreement. If the written draft is viewed 
by the parties merely as a convenient memorial 
or record of their previous contract, its 
absence does not affect the binding force of 
the contract. . . . 
. . . In other words, where all the substan-
tial terms of a contract have been agreed on 
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and there is nothing left for future 
settlement, the fact alone that it was the 
understanding that the contract should be 
formally drawn up and put in writing does not 
leave the transaction incomplete and without 
binding force, in the absence of a definite 
intention or positive agreement that it should 
not be binding until so reduced to writing and 
formally executed. 
17 AmJur2df Contracts, §28. 
Mr. CRANE'S deposition and consistent statements throughout 
the course of these proceedings are that he believed an agreement 
had been consummated during the month of November 1984. See 
Deposition of Clifford Crane, pp. 15, 27, and 48. All of the 
writings and letters requesting that Defendants send a Warranty 
Deed and original Substitution of Guarantor were merely incident 
to the LEISURE SPORTS1 performance of the original 
verbalagreement to purchase Plaintiffs1 personal property limited 
partnership interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. The escrow 
arrangements which were set up by LEISURE SPORTS for the 
convenience of closing the agreement were in no way an indication 
that negotiations were still underway. 
The concept of "escrow" has been described as: 
tAl written instrument which by its terms 
imports a legal obligation and which is 
deposited by the grantor, promisor, or 
obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third 
party, to be kept by the depositary until the 
performance of a condition or the happening of 
a certain event, and then to be delivered over 
to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. 
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 1. 
A valid escrow must be of such a nature that neither party is 
in control of the items given to the depositary, which means that 
the agreement is irrevocable. 
-3- 1 o n 
An instrument cannot be said to be delivered 
in escrow, and, moreover, does not constitute 
an escrow, where possession by the depositary 
is subject to the control of the depositor. In 
order to constitute an instrument in escrow, 
it is essential that the deposit of such 
instrument be in the meantime irrevocable— 
that is, when the instrument is placed in the 
hands of the depositary, it should be intended 
to pass beyond the control of the depositor, 
and the depositor should actually part with 
all present or temporary right of possession 
and control over it.... 
Until the delivery of the escrow instrument to 
the depositary upon the agreed condition or 
conditions, it may be revoked at any time by 
the one so delivering, but when the delivery 
of the instrument is accompanied by the 
conditions mutually beneficial to both 
parties, and in which each has an interest, it 
then becomes irrevocable during the period it 
is to remain in escrow. Thus, once a valid 
deposit has been made in accordance with the 
contract of the parties, neither party can 
revoke the escrow during the escrow period 
without the consent of the other. 
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 8. See also, Gammon v. Bunnell, 64 
P. 958, 959 (Utah 1900); Goldberg v. Sanglier, 616 P.2d 1239, 27 
Wash. Appl. 179, reversed 639 P.2d 1347, 96 Was. 2d 874, opinion 
changed 647 P.2d 489 (1980); and Home-Stake Royalty Corp. v. 
McClish, 103 P.2d 72 (Okla. 1940) . 
Under the facts of the present case Plaintiffs entered a 
valid agreement with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE for 
the sale and purchase of their interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. 
Escrow arrangements were instituted merely as an aid to closing 
the transaction. Nevertheless, the agreement was made in 
consideration of mutual covenants and once LEISURE SPORTS placed 
funds in the hands of the depositary, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, the 
agreement became irrevocable and not subject to withdrawal. 
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Furthermore, when escrow is established the grantor cannot forbid 
delivery to the grantee once the conditioned performance has been 
met. See, Kauffman v. Kauffman, 278 P.2d 179, 183 (Colo. 1954). 
On February 22, 1985, Defendants LEISURE SPORTS and 
TIMBERBROOK claim that through their attorney they attempted to 
revoke their agreement to purchase Plaintiffs' limited 
partnership interest, such offer being the subject matter of the 
binding escrow agreement. Plaintiffs deny this. At no time have 
Plaintiffs communicated their consent to such a revocation and, 
therefore, the depositary has no authorization to modify the 
terms of the escrow agreement. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have 
complied with all of the conditions outlined in the agreement, a 
fact which automatically vests title and ownership in Plaintiffs 
of those funds being held in escrow. 
It has been said that a constructive delivery 
of the instrument held in escrow occurs when 
all conditions of the escrow have been met. 
Thereafter the escrow holder ceases to be the 
agent for both parties and becomes the agent 
for each party in respect to the things placed 
in escrow to which each party has thus become 
completely entitled. When the condition has 
been performed or the event has happened upon 
which a deed in escrow is to be delivered, the 
grantee is entitled to possession, and the 
grantor cannot thereafter prevent delivery 
from taking place by obtaining possession of 
the deed or by its destruction. 
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 28. The Utah Supreme Court is in 
agreement with this position as evidenced by the case of Gammon 
v. Bunnell: 
The delivery of this deed in escrow rendered 
it absolute when the condition upon which it 
was made was f ulf illed. . . The purpose of the 
escrow having been accomplished, the Plaintiff 
held the deed in the same manner he would have 
- . « ; -
held it if it had been delivered to him in the 
first instance.... 
Gammon at 959. 
The obligation of the depositary to deliver the materials 
held in escrow upon the occurrence of all conditions has been 
well documented as the following passage would indicate: 
The depositary is under a duty imposed by law 
not to deliver the escrow to anyone except 
upon strict compliance with the conditions 
imposed. The depositary, being as much the 
agent of the grantor as of the grantee, is as 
much bound to deliver the deed on performance 
of the condition or happening of the event as 
he is to withhold it until such performance or 
happening.... 
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 17. 
Therefore, on the basis of the irrevocability of the offer 
and escrow and the fact that Plaintiffs now possess an absolute 
ownership interest in the deposited funds, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY 
should be ordered to release such funds and pay the damages for 
which the Plaintiffs have prayed. Necessarily, then, the Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be overruled and denied. 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that delivered a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, at the Iron County 
Courthouse, Parowan, Utah, this 3rd day/of>E^6ruary, 1987. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




TINBERBROOK VILLAGE, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM RULING ON 
DEFENDANTSf MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85-201 
The above-entitled natter having come before the 
Court on defendants1 Motion for Sunnary Judgment and plaintiffs 
having been represented by their attorney, Willard R. Bishop 
arv4 defendants having been represented by their attorney, 
Michael D. Hughes, and the Court, having heard the arguments of 
counsel and having reviewed the file, together with the 
memorandums, and being fu]]y advised in the premises, hereby 
makes the following ruling; 
Defendants' flotion for Summary Judgment should be and 
hereby is, DENIED, for the reason that there exist material 
issues of fact to be resolved at trial, including but not 
limited to, whether a contract was formed and whether the Nixon 
letter imposed conditions precedent, or restated the existing 
agreement, or was simply intended as instructions to 
184 
the escrow agent. 
Plaintiff to prepare an Order reflecting the ruling 
of the Court, 
-iC DATED this £> - day of March, 1987 
riSTRICT JUDGE BY ASSIGHHE 
HAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the //^^~~day of March, 1987, 
copies of the foregoing document were nailed, first class 
postage prepaid, to Willard P. Bishop, P. 0. Box 279, Cedar 
City, UT 847 20 and Michael D. Hughes, 148 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, UT 84770. 
^--^C<r A ,0 
Sheila G. Rose 
Trial Court Executive 
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Michael D. Hughes #1572 
Attorney for Defendants 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801/673-4 892 
SEP i 1987 
p£W*^f? \hA<Us$ CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 85-281 
THIS MATTER having come on for trial on the 4th 
and 5th of August, 1987, and the Plaintiffs, Clifford G. 
Crane and Bonnie Crane, having been represented by their 
attorney of record, Willard R. Bishop, and the Defendants 
collectively represented by their counsel of record, Michael 
D. Hughes, and the Court having heard the testimony of the 
witnesses, having received the evidentiary support, both of 
the Plaintiff's complaint and the defenses proposed by 
1ft7 
Defendants, and the matter having been submitted upon oral 
argument by both counsel, 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court hereby enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the pleadings were 
properly joined for trial. 
2. The Court finds that Clifford G. Crane had 
purchased a 25% interest in Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a 
Utah limited partnership, with its principal place of 
business in Iron County, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that Leisure Sports, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, together with Heart Marketing and 
Development, Inc., a general partner of Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd., desired to repurchase the interest of Clifford Crane 
in said partnership. 
4. The Court finds that as of November 13 th, 
1985, Plaintiffs and these Defendants had reached in 
principle an oral agreement which was to be reduced in 
writing, signed by the Plaintiffs, deposited by the 
Plaintiffs at Dixie Title Company, along with assignments of 
their partnership interests, and that these requirements 
were necessary to complete the transaction. 
5. The Court finds that some but not all of the 
items had been discussed and settled in the oral agreement, 
but that they included, among other things, transfer of 
money, release of the Plaintiffs from the guarantee of a 
construction loan, preparation of a deed by the Defendants, 
and the preparation and completion of two assignments by the 
Plaintiffs. 
6. The Court finds that on November 20th, 1985, 
the Defendants, Leisure Sports, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., caused to be 
placed in escrow $175,000 in reliance upon their belief that 
a deal had been struck and that, further, Leisure Sports, 
Inc., by and through Mr. Russell Gallian, one of its 
principals, obtained release of the Plaintiffs from the 
construction loan. The Court finds, however, that said 
release was not placed in escrow at this time and was not 
communicated to the Plaintiffs. 
7. The Court finds that on November 13th, 1984, 
Russell Gallian, on behalf of Leisure Sports, Inc., and 
Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., did enclose documents 
requesting their execution and delivery to Dixie Title 
Company to the Plaintiffs Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane. 
These documents were marked at trial as P-7, P-8, and P-9, 
respectively, and were received into evidence. 
8. The Court finds that nothing more of 
significance happened until January of 1985, when the 
Defendant Clifford Crane, acting through his attorney, Dean 
Mixon, contacted Mr. Bishop, an attorney in Cedar City, 
Utah, and retained Mr. Bishop for the purposes of obtaining 
an accounting on Timberbrook Village, Ltd. The Court finds 
that Crane's action in retaining both Mixon and Bishop 
evidences Crane's feeling there was no binding agreement at 
the time, but that he was in a position of being in receipt 
of an offer regarding which he was either free to accept or 
reject. 
9, The Court finds from the evidence that the 
thrust of Mixon*s conversations with Gallian were to 
increase the amount of money to be paid Plaintiffs, but that 
in February of 1985, Mixon expressed a concern over the 
releasing of the Plaintiffs from a loan guarantee which had 
heretofore been a part of the parties' negotiations. The 
Court finds that by Exhibit P-13, Mr. Russell Gallian 
forwarded to the offices of Mr. Mixon a copy of a 
substitution of guarantor, by the text of which the 
Plaintiffs were both released from any loan guarantees 
related to the Timberbrook Village, Ltd. partnership. The 
Court further finds that the original of such substitution 
was retained by the bank. The Court finds that by P-12, the 
Defendants Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and 
Leisure Sports, Inc., once again renewed their offer for 
Crane to execute Exhibits P-8 and P-9 and return the same to 
the Defendant Dixie Title Company so that escrow could be 
completed. In this letter, Gallian once again redefined the 
terms on behalf of these Defendants, of what he understood 
the agreement to be, including transfer of the 20% to 
Leisure Sports and the 5% to Timberbrook. Gallian further 
stated in such letter that the escrow agent would then 
disburse $175,000 to the Plaintiffs and that Barry Church, 
1 on 
on behalf of Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., a 
general partner to Timberbrook Village, Ltd., would then 
execute a warranty deed for the condominium which was 
additional consideration in the transaction. 
10. The Court finds that simultaneous with the 
transfer of the letter to Mixon, Gallian, by way of P-13, 
wrote a letter to Mr. Willard R. Bishop explaining the 
contact of the Defendants with Mixon, Cranes1 California 
attorney, and reaffirming to Bishop the existence of the 
terms of the offer. Gallian further stated his belief that 
the accounting problems appeared to have been solved by 
Crane's prior inspection of the books and, once again, the 
question indicated that these Defendants were awaiting 
documents to be placed in escrow at Dixie Title Co. , at 
which time the closing would be completed and the accounting 
problems resolved. 
11. The Court finds that on February 12th, 1985, 
the lawsuit was filed for an accounting against Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, and that on February 13th, Mr. Barry 
Church, as a principal of Heart Marketing and Development, 
Inc., was served with the complaint in said lawsuit. The 
Court finds that on February 13th, Mr. Crane advised Mr. 
Bishop, his Utah counsel, that he had not accepted the 
outstanding offer made to him by the Defendants, Heart 
Marketing and Development, Inc. and Leisure Sports, Inc., 
and that Crane desired to proceed with an accounting until 
the settlement was eHH^xed. Crane did not in fact ever 
accept it. The Court finds that the thrust of this 
information^relayed to Gallian orally by conversation on the 
15th day of February, 1985, and reconfirmed by a letter 
received as Exhibit P-15 over the signature of Willard R. 
Bishop, dated February 18th, 1985. 
12. The Court finds that February 13th, figS. % 
Plaintiffs executed P-8 and P-9, deposited said exhibits 
with Mr. Mixon, Plaintiffs1 attorney in California. The 
Court finds, however, that such information was not conveyed 
to Mr. Bishop, Plaintiffs1 attorney in Utah. The Court 
finds that by reason of the same, Bishop advised Gallian on 
February 15th, 1985, that Crane had not yet accepted the 
offer based upon Crane's February 13th conversation with 
Bishop, but that during that discussion, terms of the offer 
were still outstanding and had not yet been revoked. 
13. The Court finds that on the same day that Mr. 
Bishop sent his letter, Exhibit P-15, to Mr. Gallian, that 
Gallian and Church met on behalf of Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd, Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and Leisure 
Sports, Inc., and decided that the deal was off. This 
decision, however, was not then communicated to anyone. The 
Court finds that while Mixon dictated a letter on February 
18th, 1985, said letter was not mailed until the afternoon 
of February 21st, 1985, as per the postmarked envelope which 
had been received into evidence. In this letter, sending 
Exhibits P-7 and P-8, Mixon also stated certain conditions, 
1 no 
including additional documents which were to be received, 
which Mixon stated were necessary prerequisites to the 
closing of escrow. 
14. The Court finds that on the morning of 
February 22nd, 1985, Mr. Crane called Mr. Gallian and the 
Court finds that in the first portion of that conversation, 
Gallian advised Crane that the deal was off. 
15. The Court also finds that subsequent to this 
conversation with Gallian, Crane phoned the bank in Nebraska 
to determine the status of the release of the Plaintiffs 
from the construction loan and called Mr. Westbrook of Dixie 
Title to determine the status of the escrow. 
16. The Court finds, basing its finding on the 
testimony of Mr. Westbrook, Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as 
well as the postmark on the Mixon letter, that the title 
company had not received Plaintiffs1 acceptance as per the 
terms of the agreement on the morning of February 22nd, 
1985. The Court finds that the agreement states, as do the 
cover letters of Gallian, said agreements were to be 
executed and delivered by the Plaintiffs in escrow to 
complete their end of the transaction. The Court finds that 
this event had not occurred when Mr. Crane had been told, as 
had Mr. Westbrook, by Mr. Gallian that the deal was off. 
17. The Court finds that up through and including 
the date of February 22nd, 1985, the Plaintiffs considered 
sales agreement documents P-8 and P-9 merely as an offer 
which he free to accept or reject, not a memorialization of 
1 fl 'A 
an agreement binding upon him. This finding is evidenced by 
the actions of the Plaintiffs and the communications of Mr. 
Crane to his attorneys, Mr. Mixon and Mr. Bishop, and their 
communications to Mr. Gallian on behalf of Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and 
Leisure Sports, Inc. 
18. The Court further finds that Mr. Gallian, as 
a representative of these Defendants, considered the status 
of the parties1 dealings in the same posture, to-wit, that 
the oral agreement, if any, was tenuous and unenforceable, 
and that what was outstanding was an offer that Crane was 
considering, but could accept or reject. 
19. The Court further finds that the letter of 
Dean Mixon of February 18th, 1985, which accompanied 
Exhibits P-8 and P-9, and deposited in escrow, in fact, only 
conditionally accepted the outstanding offer and requiring 
that Defendants submit yet additional documents into escrow. 
As a result, the Court finds that Mixon's cover letter on 
behalf of Plaintiffs created a counteroffer requiring the 
Defendants to supply a new document not previously part of 
the offer, that document being a verification of the 
authenticity of the release of the Plaintiffs from the 
construction loan on Timberbrook Village, Ltd. 
20. The Court further finds that at the close of 
evidence, the Plaintiffs moved that Defendants1 counterclaim 
be dismissed and that the Defendants so stipulate. 
194 312 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court hereby concludes as follows: 
1. The Court concludes that both parties dealt 
with this transaction on the basis of an outstanding offer 
which required acceptance by the Plaintiffs. As a result, 
while the Court concludes that Gallian believed an oral 
agreement had been reached, the terms of the same remained 
subject to the Plaintiffs' acceptance and the Court 
specifically concludes that both parties understood there 
was an offer outstanding which Crane could either accept or 
reject. 
2. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff seeking 
specific performance, has the burden of proving in a clear 
and convincing manner the terms of the agreement and the 
formation of the contract, and in this case, the Court 
concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to carry that 
burden. 
3. The Court further concludes ,that P-8 and P-9 
were indeed offers open to the Plaintiffs' acceptance 
without consideration, and, thus, could be revoked at any 
time prior to proper acceptance by the Plaintiffs. The 
Court finds that proper acceptance under these circumstances 
called for the deposit of Exhibits P-8 and P-9 executed by 
the Plaintiffs, in escrow at Dixie Title Company in St. 
George, Utah. 
195 
4. The Court concludes that the Defendants orally 
revoked their offer to Crane and communicated the same to 
the Plaintiffs prior to their acceptance of the offer and 
prior to any communication called for by the agreement or 
otherwise, by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants that their 
offer had, in fact, been accepted. The Court finds that 
thet subsequent receipt of P-8 and P-9 in escrow after such 
oral revocation of the offer, did not thereafter create an 
enforceable contract; this is so especially in light of the 
Court's conclusion that Mixonfs cover letter, received as 
P-18, imposed an additional condition upon the closing and 
thus constituted a counteroffer conditioning Plaintiffs1 
acceptance of Defendants' offer upon Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd., supplying separate verification of the substitution of 
guarantor document previously mentioned. The Court finds 
that there was no enforceable contract created under these 
facts because the offer was properly revoked prior to its 
unequivocal acceptance and that the purported acceptance 
thereafter received by Defendant Dixie Title Company, was in 
fact a counteroffer which was never accepted, and that the 
Defendants never reinstated their offer. 
5, The Court concludes that the Defendants 
counterclaimed on the basis of Plaintiffs1 motion and 
Defendants1 acquiescence in the same should be dismissed. 
6. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs1 case as 
against Defendants should also be dismissed with prejudice 
JM) 
on the basis of the aforementioned Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; no cause of action. 
DATED this ^V^day of August, 198 7. 
BY THE COURT: 
IES 
district Cctart Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, to 
Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. 0. Box 279, 





: * 1 r ; 
WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. , a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOP-
MENT, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL IS HEREBY GIVEN that CLIFFORD G. CRANE and 
BONNIE CRANE, Plaintiffs and Appellants named above, hereby 
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the 
Judgment and Decree executed in this action on or about August 
24, 1987, which was duly filed and entered on September 4, 1987. 
Inasmuch as all matters and issues pertaining to the 
above-entitled action are now final, Plaintiffs/Appellants now 
file this Notice of Appeal. 
' R O N C O U ^ ' " 
*- • u is , 
£ , 0 C T -H987 
Qcp/ir. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
C i v i l No. 85-281 
198 
DATED this ^ ?W^day of ^^fj^u^ef / , 1987. 
WILLARD R. BI$HOP 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to Mr. Michael D. 
Hughes, Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, of THOMPSON, HUGHES 
SL REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
Utah 84770, first class postage fully prepaid on this day 




AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Agreement made this day of , 1984, by and 
between Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership, 
(hereinafter "Buyer") and Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, 
(hereinafter "Seller"). 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of a .5% interest in Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership, 
2. The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an 
agreement wherein Seller shall purchase the limited partnership 
interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Buyer agrees to assign and convey all of Unit <=D, / O 
Building } of Timberbrook Condominiums, at closing all of 
Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached 
hereto at Exhibit "A". Said Conveyance shall be subject to an 
existing construction loan which loan shall be released from the 
condominium upon completion of the sales of Units in Phase I. 
2. This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon 
closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and 
Loan Association. 
3. Closing shall occur through the offices of Dixie Title 
Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
p 7 PLAINTIFFS 1 
if ; EXHIBIT, \ t\ 
Utah. The assignment (Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow 
Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing. 
Agreement made the date first mentioned above. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
BUYER 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC, 
By 
Ba^i r7Church r P r e s i d e n t 
( s e H J . v 
i a i rman of t h e Board of 
o n / 1 i 
201 
EXHIBIT "A" 
ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane (Seller) hereby eissigns and 
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 5% interest as a limited partner, 
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Seller warrants as follows: 
1. That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances or claims against Seller's title; 
2. That Seller has the full power to convey said interest; 
3. Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the 
date of closing, and Seller hereby authorizes the Escrow Agent, 
Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the 
date of closing. 
DATED this day of November, 1984. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the day of November, 1984, personally appeared before 
r>n n / n ~> 
202 
me Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above 
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing In: 
P 9 H / 1 "5 
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Agreement made this day of , 1984, by and 
between Leisure Sports, Inc. (hereinafter "Buyer") and 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane/ (hereinafter "Seller"). 
j 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of a 20% interest in Timberbrook 
Village Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership. 
2« The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an 
agreement wherein Seller shall purchase the limited partnership 
interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Buyer hereby agrees to pay, at closing as hereinafter 
defined, the sum of One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($175,000). 
2. Seller agrees to assign and convey at closing all of 
Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment forn attached 
hereto at Exhibit "A". 
3. This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon 
closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and 
Loan Association. 
4. Closing shall occur through the offices of Dixie Title 
Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
PLAINTIFF'S 
204 lf:>tEXHIBlT,; 
R20/12 ™IBrr '*" W^g^. 
Utah. The assignment (Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow 
Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing. 
Agreement made the date first mentioned above. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
BUYER 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC, 
By Q&f^l (Ji|luA^X^__ 
B a r ^ Cnurch , Pr>&-sident 
y 
[sell J. Gallian 
lairman of the Board of 
Directors and Secretary 
205 
EXHIBIT "A 
ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
Clifford G. Crane (and Bonnie Crane/ (Seller) hereby assigns and 
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 20% interest as a limited partner, 
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Seller warrants as follows: 
1. That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances or claims against Seller's title; 
2. That Seller has the full power to convey said interest; 
3. Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of 
Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the 
date of closing, and Seller hereby authorizes the Escrow Agent, 
Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the 
date of closing. 
DATED this day of November, 1984. 
SELLER 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the day of November, 1984, personally appeared before 
me Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above 
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth. 
Notary Public 
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G A L L I A N , D R A K E & V E S T F A L L 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
LYLE R.DRAKE 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL 
KENDRICK J. HAFEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
1 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 1330 
S T . GEOIIGK, U T A H 6 4 7 7 0 
November 13, 1984 
TELEPHONE 
(801)026-1682 
Clifford G. Crane 
Bonnie Crane 
12671 Overbrooke Drive 
Santa Ana, California 92705 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Crane: 
send 
documents which you should execute 
in connection with your safe of 
Limited Partner~sTTip interest in Timberbrook Village Ltd. 
closing agent is Dixie Title Co. Inc., 205 East Tabernacle, 
Enclosed you will find 
_££L_the_ closing agent your 
The 
St. 
George, Utah, 84770 (a selr addressed envelope is enclosed for your 
convenience). 
We are handling your transaction in two steps. One to handle 
the redemption with the Condo, one to handle the cash part. I hope 
this is allright. 
We hope you will find these documents in order. Please call me 
or Barry Church (301-586-3090) if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
GALZulu, DRAKE jr\WESTFALL 
R J G / k p 
fJctk^ *+& zhodtr CtLc&iri: fc>v cio<^ ^^<^k. 
Cc /TW\W' 
£^\WV t. 
209 \1t PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
P 7 0 / 6 JZL i ^ ^3^*_ o * «.. . 
WEINFELD 8 MlXON 
A UA.W C O R P O R A T I O N 
G O ! N O R T H P A R K C C N T E R D R I V E , S U I T E Z 0 3 
S A N T A A N A . C A U F O R N t A 9 2 7 0 5 
T E L t P M O N C 
(71<4) B 4 1 - 6 6 A 8 
February 18#1985 
Mr. Doug Westbrook 
Dixie Title Company 
205 E. Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
RE: CLIFFORD CRANE ESCROW 
Dear Mr. Westbrook: 
As I believe you know, our office represents Clifford 
G. and Bonnie Crane. Enclosed please find the following 
two original documents: 
1. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" 
to which my clients and Timberbrook Village Limited are parties; 
2. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" 
to which my clients and Leisure Sports Incorporated are parties. 
Enclosed please find, further, a copy of a document 
entitled "Substitution of Guarantee" dated November 20, 1984, 
between Nebraska Savings & Loan Association and Russell J. 
Gallian. You may proceed to close the transaction referred 
to in Mr. Gallian's February 11, 1985, letter to me, copy 
enclosed, as soon as you have received from Nebraska Savings 
& Loan Association their written affirmation of the validity 
of the "Substitution of Guarantor*' document along with their 
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no 
obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings & Loan Association/ 
either jointly or severally, either actual ox contingent. 
There are three conditions to closing from our side: 
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the original 
of the above-referenced affirmation and warranty by Nebraska 
Savings & Loan Association; 
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully executed 




r ^ r t L D tt MiXON 
A CAW C O R P O R A T I O N 
Mr. Douf rtestbrook 
February 18, 1985 
Page two 
3- Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of $175,000 
into my client's account at Home Savings of American, 
179 N. Tustin, Orange, California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3 
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by Friday, 
March 8, 1985, you are instructed to return all documents 
to me and to terminate the escrow. If you have any question 
or comment, please do not hesitate to call. 
Very truly yours, 
WEINFELD & MIXON 
y i , 
BY: '" 
t-v 
DEAN A. MIXON 
DAM/mw 
Enclosure 
cc: Mr. Clifford Crane 
21.1 
GAI.T.TAK, D R A K E & W E S T F A L L 
RUSSELL J GALL1AN 
LYLE R DRAKE 
G MICHAEL WESTFALL 
KENOR1CK J HAFEN 
JEFFREY C WILCOX 
ATTOAMffYO AMO COUttSClOfta AT LAW 
OiKIE STATC SANK tlHLOtMO 
I SOUTH MAIN «TH«CT 
P O BOX 1330 
S T . G E O R O C , UTAJX 8 * 7 7 0 
TELEPHONE 
(001) 620-1CS2 
February 11, 1985 
Mr. Dean Mixon 
WEINFELD & MIXON 
601 North Park Center Drive 
Suite 203 
Santa Anaf CA 92705 
Re: Clifford Crane 
Dear Mr, Mixon: 
Enclosed is a copy of the Substitution of Guarantor which I certify 
was executed by myself and Mr. Dewey Crouch/ Vice President of 
Nebraska Savings and Loan. 
It is our understanding that Mr. and Mrs. Crane will execute the 
documents conveying their interest to Leisure Sports (20%) and 
redeeming 5% from Timberbrook. Upon receipt the Escrow Agent will 
disburse $175,000 tq_3rour_^ients_£nd Barry^ Church will execvTtIe""l[ 
warranty deeRT^ on befialf of tKe Partnership tor the condo. 
• V&tL ' 
Thank y o u . 
V e r y jp^rirj/ y o u r s , 
JLIAN J DRAKE & V7ESTFALL 
RJG/sb 
11 J. Gallian 
cc: Doug Westbrook 
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SUBSTITUTION OF GUARANTOR 
Agreement made this \\) day of; iv^l^^y 1984, by and between 
Nebraska Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter "Lender") and 
Russell J. Gallian (hereinafter "Substitute Guarantor")• 
RECITALS 
1. The parties hereto have entered into a Committment Letter 
dated October 19, 1984, wherein Lender is making a Two Million Six 
Hundred Thousand Dollar ($2,600,000) loan to Leisure Sports 
Incorporated• 
2. Part of said consideration is the participation of 
Timberbrook Village Ltd., Incorporated. Leisure Sports, Inc. 
has purchased 39% of the limited partnership interest in Timberbrook 
Village Ltd., including, A certain Clifford G. Crane, and Bonnie 
Crane limited partners in Timberbrook Village Ltd., who have 
personally signed on the note on the previous note issued on 
Timberbrook \ Village Ltd. The parties desire to effect a change 
wherein Russell J. Gallian shall be substituted as the Guarantor in 
the place of Clifford Crane. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made 
herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Nebraska Savings and Loan Association hereby releases 
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane of any and all liabilities 
pursuant to the note secured by Deed of Trust on Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. , dated S*f/yf X ? (9^3 i n t h e original principal balance of 
S^Cn^ft^QO and further dated XanpTlfi^/ in the 
original principal balance of $ Z07S(K)O& 
2. The parties hereto agree that Russell J. Gallian is hereby 
substituted as Substitute Guarantor and Russell J. Gallian hereby 
agrees to be bound by all of the covenants and agreements contained 
in that certain Guaranty Agreement associated with the loan as 
stated above. 
DATED this <J2^day of K/^h^*jL^ , 1984. 
JD UHzrU^k 
jje p\&WKZ.?i-xc^^ 
\ jri AJO &fi*)*t**{ 
tie ^ - r . f . C T t u ^ £>y lU?r<&& ^ < ' W *j£ U'. 
Ci^ltl^y. >6 ide/e$&L p&iy W OTH&2- ^lX>£~ 
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